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While the conflict enhancing effects of social services, including those provided by humanitarian actors, has been relatively well documented, the potential service provision offers for conflict transformation is less well understood. This paper compares the impact of services on conflict transformation through a comparative analysis of services in three civil wars: Northern Ireland, Tajikistan and Sudan. Based on field research conducted in all three countries, it develops a framework for analysis building on the seminal work of Charles Tilly and his collaborators. It argues that causal mechanisms identified by Tilly, including opportunity hoarding and exploitation, offer useful lenses for understanding processes associated with service provision common to all three conflicts and provide a basis for understanding the contribution of service provision to conflict transformation in each case. While each case is unique in how peace was achieved, in each case service provision made a significant contribution towards conflict management and transformation, despite different capacity levels of systems of service provision. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the impact of interstate and intrastate conflict on the infant mortality rate (IMR). Building upon recent research which has sought to examine the social effects of conflict we use a newly available data set on infant mortality to assess the effects of war on one particularly vulnerable group within society. More generally, the IMR is also used as proxy of broader breakdown of both government and society in times of conflict. This is because conflicts can affect the proper functioning of government and society ranging from the disruption of material and economic resources such as food and fuel to the destruction of critical infrastructure like power plants and sanitation facilities to the breakdown of health and welfare systems used to protect the populations as a whole. Other research has demonstrated that infants are particularly susceptible to changes in their environment. Conflict has the potential to severely affect many aspects of an infant’s environment. With this new data-set we can also examine how the societal effects of war have changed overtime. Our analysis uses all independent nation states between 1817-2002 and examines the effects of both interstate and intrastate conflict on the infant mortality rate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the maxims of Jean-Paul Sartre, three definitions are offered for terms widely used in armed conflict studies: the state of war, the failed state, and anarchy. The methodology used is phenomenology, specifically Sartre's existentialistic concept of nothingness and the phenomenological theory of being, with the aim of providing an a priori definition. The three a priori definitions provided are: the failed state phenomena occurs when the populace wants a state but is not able to have one; the state of war occurs when people do not question why violent attacks are being committed against them; and anarchy is a state of wanting order. I present these definitions by highlighting the issue of awareness based on what does not exist versus the conventional approach in international relations studies and political science which use the methodology of comparison based on what exists and should exist. What exists from the state's perspective is seen as subjective, but the existentialistic methodology based on the individual is seen as objective. Based on this process, the dialectic is based using nothingness - an objective concept according to Sartre - to process and analyze a state of mind - a subjective state of existence for Sartre. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the military in setting policy and shaping institutions. To do this, it presents a model of the military based around its role in fighting wars. The model's main insight is that although war creates an opportunity for the military to expand its control over policy or change institutions (by staging a coup d'etat), it also reduces its incentive to do so. In equilibrium war decreases the military's control over policy, but has a non-monotonic impact on the frequency of coups. We find empirical support for this non-monotonic relationship in both cross-country and panel data; to our knowledge, this is the first time that this correlation has been documented. These results reconcile two opposing views of the effect of war on institutions: the "garrison state" view that war leads to a regime where the military has substantial control over policy, and the "institutional" view where it results in a military devoted exclusively to defense. We also consider how the military's strength impacts on the probability of war, the e¤ect of political polarization, and why weak (tin-pot) militaries are often politically powerful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The title refers to the Odets play, in which the members of a labor union wait for their president, "Lefty," to arrive at a meeting and solve their political problems - -only to realize, at the end, that Lefty has been murdered and they have to do it themselves. My hypothesis is that the US movement for peace in Iraq is less developed than one might expect because anti-war activists continue to hope that the next election (first Congress in 2006, now the President in 2008) will bring an end to the war. The argument has three parts: 1) an assessment of the present size and strength of the peace movement; 2) an examination of the common argument that the movement is weak because there is no conscription; a look at the electoral activities of leading peace activists today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One frequent purpose of violence in civil war is to deepen the cleavage between sides so that reconciliation between them becomes unthinkable. However, little empirical evidence exists about the extent to which this strategy is successful in practice. While there is some evidence that the experience of trauma during war has important consequences for post-conflict political and social life, we know little about whether or how different kinds of violence have different kinds of post-conflict effects. This paper takes another step in understanding the consequences of war by examining the different effects of different kinds of wartime trauma. Using a unique household-level dataset from post-conflict Aceh, Indonesia, I identify three different categories of wartime trauma: the death or disappearance of a friend or loved one, economic loss, and displacement with or without return to the home of origin. I then examine similarities and differences in how these different kinds of trauma affect the way people participate in post-conflict social and political life. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has media coverage of the Sudanese conflict varied cross-nationally in the permanent member states of the U.N. Security Council? What influences when the media begins to identify the conflict as genocide? Factors that may be instrumental in provoking such dynamics in media coverage include the onset and escalations of violence; changing standpoints by influential officials like the U.N. Secretary General or U.S. Secretary of State; the divergent standpoints of permanent member states in the U.N. Security Council tied to differing national interests such as oil needs, foreign policy priorities, proximity to the region, or colonial ties; the efforts by some states to control and at times to threaten the media; and the pressures brought on by the international community. In this paper, content analysis is used to examine media coverage of the Sudanese conflict comparatively, focusing on the coverage since 2003, in the largest news wires in each of the five permanent member states of the U.N. Security Council. Elite interviews of several journalists covering Sudan are also discussed, as we consider the politics of covering the Sudanese conflict as genocide, in states that are powerful decision-makers concerning interventions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars tend to be analyzed as bilateral and static events. Recently scholars have begun to recognize that civil wars involve multiple actors using various and multiple tactics which tend to change over time..x000d.This paper builds upon this literature, making the argument that tactics employed by groups both influence and are influenced by negotiation patterns with the state. Governments might be expected to behave differently depending on the choice of tactic employed by a group. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between multiple group tactics and negotiation efforts by focusing on Southeast Asian intrastate conflicts in the post-World War II period. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars are violent by definition, but important variation exists in the humanitarian impact of war. Understanding why some rebel groups behave with restraint while others remain highly predatory holds significant implications for international intervention in civil war. This paper proposes a theory of rebel group behavior based on the type of resources available to the group. Groups dependent on top-down resources are more likely to behave with restraint towards the civilian population, while groups dependent on bottom-up resources are more prone to factionalization and civilian abuse. The civil war in Ituri, DR Congo, provides a strong comparative framework to test this resource-based model of rebel behavior against competing theories that focus on ethnic composition, territorial stability, or adverse selection. The conflict in Ituri supports the resource-based model of rebel organization, but also suggests ways to improve and deepen the theory's insights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars have often followed contentious elections. We investigate this little-noticed relationship by investigating 34 coded countries with event-history analysis and model estimation. We note that recent civil wars are more likely to follow electoral fraud, rather than an election per se. We test several recent cases as well to measure the extent of electoral fraud and the mobilization that follows. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can Cultural Determinists in the field of strategic culture provide anything useful to our understanding of the Iraq War, and what does the Iraq War say about this approach to strategic culture? The treatment of strategic culture as a deterministic variable is a common, important, and controversial approach. This study offers a new way of studying strategic culture by explaining how Cultural Determinists would apply their arguments on methodology, what constitutes strategic culture, and its effects on strategic behavior to the Iraq War. This results in two groups, with the first being Originalists who argue that socially learned ideas and behaviors among elites drives the production of strategic culture and strategic behavior. The second group are Grand Theorists who argue that culture is the basis and context for all political behavior, and thus all decisions relating to the use of force are culturally determined. This lays the foundation for further research comparing the relative explanatory power of this approach to strategic culture with others that treat strategic culture as a supplementary, independent, conditional, or instrumental variable. This approach is necessary because it serves as a palliative to the traditional approach that papers over differences within the paradigm and treats strategic culture as monolithically opposed to interest-based theories such as Waltzian neorealism. The Iraq War provides an ideal contemporary case for such a study. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that increasing information led Democrats to become more opposed to going to war in Fall 2002, despite the absence of an anti-war message from Democratic elites and that the effect of information is conditional on media consumption patterns. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show the effects of assumptions about the distribution of heterogeneity and event dependence on the estimated risk of civil war onset. Results show that civil war onset is heavily dependent on the number of prior civil wars a country experiences, regardless of assumptions about heterogeneity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I propose a model of state-society relations in order to explain the incentives of states to initiate interstate disputes in the face of high levels of population growth. Building on the contractual relationship between the government and the governed, lateral pressure theories of war suggest that states must extend their interests beyond their borders to meet the demands of a growing population. Estimating a series of logit models, I find that population growth and population density in a potential challenger significantly increase the likelihood of dispute initiation. When these population factors are combined in an interaction term, their effect is very large for high population growth in densely populated states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine civil war onset with a multilevel, stratified, frailty event history model to capture 1)sources of heterogeneity and 2)nesting of countries within regions--both of which can make countries more/less susceptible to civil war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From foundation work in data collection on the dynamics of major power war, the study of conflict in its various stages has advanced steadily across time. One particular example of recent scholarship (Walter 2002) turns both a quantitative and qualitative eye toward the successful settlement of civil wars. Since the canon of conflict studies encompasses so many different dimensions of the study of conflict dynamics, it is a logical progression for the canon to grow toward the boundary of conflict dynamics and peace dynamics. For every conflict there is an end, but do the dynamics of the conflict live on to poison the peace that follows? I propose to examine the question of conflict spillovers into the post-settlement environment. Through the application of maximum likelihood estimation techniques, the goal of this paper is to begin to address questions of the success and/or failure of durable peace concerning the interaction of conflict spillover with an initial model of post-settlement environments found after civil wars occurring since World War II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I expand upon earlier research on how power sharing institutions can best ensure a successful transition to peace following a negotiated end to civil war. Negotiated settlements can include power sharing arrangements that divide power along four dimensions — political, economic, territorial, and military. Prior research found that the increasing the number of dimensions included in a settlement increased the likelihood that peace survived. However, this research assumes that each dimensions impact on the duration of peace is equal and therefore have an additive relationship. This assumption suggests that negotiators ought to seek more complex power sharing agreements to maximize success. Without assuming an additive relationship, I use survival analysis to examine civil wars resolved by negotiation to show that different combinations of power sharing institutions have different impacts on the endurance of peace. This will show first that the dimensions of power are interactive, not additive. Second, it may show that a less complex settlement have the same impact on peace as one with a greater number of power sharing arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effect of violent conflict on the public health of societies is an important consequence of war to which not much attention has been paid. There are several direct and indirect ways in which involvement in conflict undermines population health, including diversion of resources from health expenditures to defense spending. I argue that conflict compels states to reallocate resources in favor of defense and this results in reductions in health spending. I assess the relationship between militarized conflict and government spending by estimating a system of equations, using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression. I find strong evidence that involvement in armed conflict leads to a trade-off between health and defense expenditures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The Causes of Peace, a work published in 1993, Robert Wagner claimed that civil wars that ended via a military victory by one of the parties to the conflict were more likely to be followed by a long-lived peace than civil wars that were concluded via a negotiated settlement. According to Wagner, this result followed because the winners of civil wars were able to destroy the organizational structure and identity of the losing side in the conflict, thus enabling the winners to establish a state with the capacity to stave off any armed challenges in the future. Negotiated settlements, on the other hand, left an opponent’s organizational structure and identity intact, enabling them to fight again in the future. Although there has been some empirical support (e.g., Licklider 1995) for the hypothesis that civil wars that end in military victories are most likely to produce an enduring peace, little is known empirically about how military victory works as a means of ending civil wars. Are the organizational structures and identity of losing groups really destroyed following a military victory? Do negotiated settlements leave intact the organizational structure and identity of insurgent forces? Does military victory necessarily produce a strong state? Or, are other factors responsible for producing an enduring peace following military victories in civil wars? This study attempts to answer these questions using a data set of all civil wars fought between 1945 and 1999. In an effort to get at the issue of the organizational structure of parties to the conflict, the key independent variable in thus study, each civil war settlement will be coded to determine what happens to the military organization and leadership of the armed opponents during the five years following the end of the conflict. This variable and others will be used in a survival analysis of the duration of the peace following the end of civil wars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research design of this paper represents the first attempt to quantitatively analyze both the decision of a third-party state to intervene in a civil war and the decision of an intervener to alter the level of its support to a civil war combatant. While the literature on the decision to intervene is theoretically rich, there have been few quantitative empirical studies on the topic. What is more, those quantitative studies that do exist suffer from flawed research designs. The research design I offer in this paper would make several contributions to the study of intervention initiation. First, and unlike previous studies, I simultaneously address the three questions of when, at what level, and on which side a third-party state is more likely to intervene in a civil war. In so doing, I construct a dependent variable that better captures the decision calculus of a potential intervener and that allows for richer theoretical analysis. Second, I do not model a civil war as an instantaneous event. By opening up the black box of civil war, I recognize that a third-party state decides whether to intervene at various points throughout the civil war. From this recognition, I develop new hypotheses that reflect intra-war dynamics. As it concerns the escalatory decisions of those third-party states that intervene in civil wars, there is very little theoretical work and no quantitative studies. This paper, therefore, could significantly improve our understanding of why an intervener?s level of support would vary over the course of a civil war. Although no empirical analysis is provided in this paper, I do offer hypotheses on civil war intervention and describe the data and methods that will be used in future quantitative tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. A growing number of case studies discuss the conditions that gave rise to some of the region’s civil wars as well as the terms on which these conflicts have been ended; however, no study has compared all of Latin America’s civil wars in a systematic manner. This study undertakes such a comparison in an effort to explore the impact civil conflict has had on governance and development in the region. I address this issue by focusing on the role civil wars, and more specifically the manner in which they have been resolved, has played in shaping institutional choice in the Latin American countries that have experienced these conflicts. Answers will be sought to three questions: What are the factors responsible for shaping institutional choice following civil wars? What is the nature of the institutional choice that takes place with the end of intrastate wars? What types of impacts have these institutional choices had on governance and development in the region? This study seeks to answer these questions by collecting and analyzing data on: (a) the charcteristics of civil wars and structural features of the societies and economies of the eleven Latin American countries that have had civil wars since 1945; and (b) institutions regulating political participation, the use of coercive force by the state and other non-state actors, and distributive policy. The study will employ these data to analyze the origins and consequences of post-war institutional choice, focusing specifically on: (a) the institutions’ creation as settlements of violent conflicts shaped by power relations, socioeconomic cleavages, and pre-existing institutions; and (b) their consequences for regime type, regime stability, levels of violence, economic equity and economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions some armed groups recruit children in intrastate conflicts whereas others don’t? This paper aims to test a new model of the probability of child recruitment by armed groups, as well as assess the validity of current recruitment theories for child soldiers. While controlling for structural factors such as national factors or conflict nature, the major aim of the analysis is to reveal specific characteristics of armed groups that lead to their decisions to recruit minors. The empirical analysis is conducted on a cross-country dataset on recruitment of children by different armed groups across various conflicts. The argument is then further examined on the case study of several Liberian armed groups that participated in the first Liberian conflict of 1989-1996. Both theory and empirical parts are also juxtaposed with the findings from the author’s field surveys of 240 former Liberian child soldiers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions do state leaders embroiled in civil war orchestrate mass killing against civilians? In this paper, I argue that the outbreak of state-sponsored mass killing is contingent upon how insurgent groups enhance their capabilities. I generate two hypotheses relevant to my argument: 1) state leaders confronting insurgents who control and exploit lucrative lootable resources are more likely to engineer mass killing and 2) incumbents fighting against rebels who obtain significant support from outside the country are less likely to perpetrate mass killing. To test these hypotheses, I construct a dataset that contains all civil wars between 1945 and 2005 and run statistical analyses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines how different economic earning profiles, particularly among blacks, Hispanics, young adults and women with low education and income, influence individual’s support for the Iraq War over time. I postulate that the economic and financial costs of war harm those individuals that are the most financially vulnerable; thus the latter are less likely to support the war. A theory of differential effects is proposed based on the principle that the economic and financial costs of war fall differentially upon citizens. Along with economic earning profiles, individual’s perceptions of the national economy, demographics, socioeconomic status and party identification are also examined. I expect that individuals with low income and education are less likely to support the war because they are more likely to link their economic and financial status to the war effort, and fear that the war will cause additional monetary strain. Using pooled, cross-sectional data, individual-level war attitudes are analyzed on a monthly basis throughout the Iraq War. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inadequate attention has been given to the role of international processes and actors, influencing various aspects and phases of civil war. Instead, emphasis has been placed on understanding the domestic causes of conflict initiation, perpetuation and difficult termination. Gleditsch (2007) argues this “closed polity” approach fails to consider the international context in which states operate and how interactions exogenous to the country might impact intrastate conflict. Shifting away from the closed polity approach this paper recasts the study of civil war through the rivalry framework to reveal that, because of the hostile environment in which states with contentious histories exist and interact, some countries may have a disproportionately higher risk of experiencing the onset of violent internal conflict, anticipate or encounter involvement by specific outside parties, and evidence intransigent negotiations between conflicting parties. As part of a larger research agenda, the present piece focuses solely on whether the initiation of civil war over the past 60 years has been more or less likely in the presence of rivalry. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immanuel Kant wrote in “Perpetual Peace” that in democratic societies the consent of the populace is necessary for a state to engage in conflict and that no populace would willfully wish to engage in warfare due to the horrors of war. Based off of Kant's realization, years of conflict research has been written. Despite its popularity, Kant’s theory has one questionable assumption, the universality of the horrors of war. If the universality assumption of the horrors of war is unsupported, then its effect on initiation would vary by the degree that a society realizes it. Using collective memory hypotheses, realization is defined as the length of time between the last domestic conflict, both intrastate and interstate, and the decision to initiate war or not, meaning that as time increases realization decreases. Using a hazard analysis, the proposed paper will test the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between realization and conflict escalation. In addition, the following paper hypothesizes that the predicted relationship exists in both anarchies and democracies, but due to democratic institutions and norms, the effect is stronger for democracies than anarchies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will survey the political developments in Liberia leading to the Civil War and the demise of the nation-state. It critically examines the challenges facing the government of in unifying Liberia and building viable democratic institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The onset of civil war is a prime example of a complex adaptive system. This paper describes REsCape: an agent-based computational framework for studying such complexities focusing on the relationship between resources, ethnicity, and civil war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing an event history analysis of 75 post-civil war countries in 1946-2002, I investigate what causes the success or failure of transitioning to and sustaining democracy after civil war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To date, even though significant amounts of research has been conducted to determine what factors make a negotiated conclusion to civil war more or less likely, we know very little about what factors influence the outcome of negotiations. This research develops and tests a theoretical explanation of state concessions that examines several general factors associated with conflict - the costs of war, incentives to cheat, the divisibility of stakes, the degree of democracy of the state, the presence or absence of a stalemate, and the timing and location of the settlement - and the degree to which states make concessions to the rebels. All cases of civil war occurring between 1945 and 1997 are analyzed using Tobit models. The basic conclusion of this research is that existing literature does not adequately identify the factors that influence state concessions, but that the explanatory power it does provide can be enhanced by the inclusion of existing literature and the results of the inductive analysis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the academic amazements in recent years among students of International Relations is a series of neorealist discourses, articulated by, such as John Mearsheimer, Jack Snyder and Stephen Walt, being against the Iraq War. Realists against wars are not surprising news; historical records shows numerous realists had resisted wars, Kenan in the Korean war and Morgenthau in the Vietnam war. But a real surprising is their contents of discourses against the Iraq War. Recent realists discourses can be seen as a dramatic move from traditional framework of neorealism toward its ethical turn. Neorealist ethical moments consist of six different moves while each of them are correlated one another. (1) From analysis to manifest: their arguments are critically shifting from that states behave rationally toward that states ought to behave rationally, (2) Embedded ethics for using forces: realists' strong criticism against Afghan and Iraq war implicitly indicates their standard of use of forces, whether the war is a matter of life and death of national security (all realists believe that the Iraq war is not in case), (3) Politics of truth, Myth and narrative: realists sharply attack false realities distorted by neoconservatives and they call strategists of the Bush administration and neoconservatives as a self-styled realists that articulate dangerous myths, (4) Discourses on open debate: instead of neoconservative myths, realists alternatively argue the necessity of an open debate in the public at large in order to overcome the distorted realities, (5) A concept of power: realists obviously move from Waltzian systemic neorealism toward new direction that focus on diffusion of power, (6) the political: the baseline of realists discourses is tension between friend and foe, Schmittian notion of the political, and, by acknowledging the political tension, they approve of others while neoconservatives strongly articulates good/evil forms of the myth-makings, (7)Quasi-Deconstruction: realists use some tools of what generally calls deconstruction that dissolves the binary opposition initiated by neoconservatives (good/evil, liberty/terror, Israel/Arab). Most of these arguments were not registered in the realist dictionary. The aim of this paper is thus, by examining realists' discourses against Iraq war, to explore the realist turn to ethics, which has not been explicitly appeared in their theories of international relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October of 2002 Cote d'Ivoire fell into a state of near civil war and the situation remains tenuous. The study analyzes the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire through the theoretical framework of the security dilemma. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper revises two accepted truths about the pre-Civil War period: (1) that slavery was a negative factor in the development of the American central state; (2) that the American central state remained a relatively weak state throughout the period. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has long been argued that audience costs are beneficial because they allow for credible information transmission. We show how audience costs can be used to generate bargaining leverage and may lead to war, even under complete information. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will compare the thought of Alexander Hamilton and Victor Davis Hanson on the nature of war, particularly war conducted by free societies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an abstract of the study, Political Wars of Attrition: A Preface to a Unifying Theory of Political Transitions, Civil Wars and Third Party Interventions, by G. Jiyun Kim. Viewing the process of political transitions as a costly bargaining process over the control of a polity in the shadow of violent conflict, the study analyzes a model of political transitions. Given the existence of gains from political stabilization between groups in conflict, a puzzling question is why transitional polities do not stabilize immediately and instead often engage in protracted and at times violent bargaining processes that may or may not bring about each group's preferred outcome.

The war and postwar years saw the formation of numerous civil society organizations in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Their efforts depended greatly on international finance and on political party strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars escalate for several reasons, but ideology has the greatest potential to draw in outside states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post 9/ll journalists presented administration inspired news despite the efforts of Internet activist organizations leading large demonstrations. Patterns of coverage reprised Cold War news. Exceptions were CNN Web News, and the Washington Post. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As civil wars have increasingly become the most visible and, in many ways, the most destructive form of warfare in the post cold war era more and more scholarly attention has been directed toward analyzing and understanding the process by which they begin and end. One of the more fruitful lines of research has involved how third party intervention strategy affects the probability of successfully bring the conflict to an end. Some have made suggested that picking the right strategy is essential for stopping the violence (Regan 2000). Intervention strategy appears to be vital in the process of ending civil wars. Despite the importance of strategy few have examined whether there are any factors that systematically influence what strategy states choose. It may be that certain conflicts and certain states are more likely to implement unsuccessful strategy. For example given the unique domestic issues faces by democratic leaders, democratic states may be more likely to intervene with economic aid even if military intervention would be more successful at stopping the violence. Using a multinomial logit model I examine whether there are characteristics of the conflict as well as characteristics of the intervening state that systematically influences a states choice of strategy. The results suggest that indeed conflict and regime characteristics influence what strategy is employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom asserts that civil liberties are routinely violated during wars. Previous essays suggest this may not be so, that civil rights and liberties are as likely to be expanded as well as restricted during wartime. This essay examines thre [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]