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We propose a theory that views progressive ambition as an important factor shaping the internal structures of Congress. We focus on the House Judiciary Committee as an incubator for progressively ambitious members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina's (1990) notion of a "personal vote," the portion of legislators' support developed through their efforts to aid constituents as part of their official duties, plays a large role in theories of legislative behavior and congressional elections. In this essay, we revisit their multi-variate model to test whether electoral variables mitigate the effect of the personal vote; that is, we examine whether the personal vote is stronger in elections where the opposition is weaker, and vice versa. We test this hypothesis on an array of NES studies, including the authoritative 1978 study. If confirmed, this pattern would suggest that the personal vote itself is an artifact of and not a cause of electoral competition, thereby altering our understanding of the source of incumbency advantage. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Term limits research has largely focused on the before-and-after effects, but Oregon's experience allows assessment of the effect of the imposition and subsequent withdrawal of terms limits, providing for a critical test of important predictions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A complex adaptive systems approach to modeling the United States Congress. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a more general theoretical foundation for the study of legislativeorganization than that provided by the reelection imperative. The basisfor this more general framework is Schlesinger's (1966) Ambition Theory. Thepaper presents some predictions about legislative committees that come out ofthis Ambition Theory of Legislative Organization, and tests them using the naturalexperiment provided by state legislative term limits. The empirical resultsprovide evidence in support of the predictions, suggesting that with some modifications,the theory may have applications across a broad set of legislatures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I test a prediction from cartel agenda theory, that progressively ambitious House members adjust their roll call behavior to accommodate the statewide Senate constituency they hope to win on final passage votes but not on votes on special rules. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]