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Blackwater Worldwide’s contemporary rise to infamy and its misdeeds in the Iraq War have historical precedents. That is, it is not unheard of for a state to employ non-state actors as means to achieve a goal. In this paper, we build a game theoretic model that determines the prospects for using extra-state actors in combat on behalf of the state. From this model, we hypothesize that despite the risk of agency loss by these private combatants, certain conditions increases the likelihood of their use. Specifically, democracy and non-territoriality of the conflict are predicted to have a positive influence on the decision to employ of extra-state combatants. We test these hypotheses using a censored probit model for all wars from 1816-2002. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the effect of legislative bicameralism on party centralization. Argues that centralized parties are better equipped to maintain coherent positions in the face of internal veto points such as those created by bicameralism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the conventional wisdom, the state is a centralized property protection institution where a central agent or agents use their monopoly over the legitimate use of force (within given territorial boundaries) to solve property disputes between their citizens in exchange for taxes. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a wider variety of property protection mechanisms exist within a state than has been originally thought. I will specifically demonstrate that while centralized property protection mechanisms exist in all states, semi-centralized property protection mechanisms can exist within a state as well (where the state allows private citizens to use force to protect their own property). The empirical analysis of this paper focuses on the Tribunal of Acordada, a semi-centralized property protection institution in New Spain. I will also apply the lessons of New Spain to modern day examples of semi-centralized property protection institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I am interested in the development of property protection mechanisms. Political scientists have developed both formal and informal models to explain the development of property protection mechanisms. Most models analyze the development of these mechanisms under a state of anarchy or as part of the development of the state. However, property protection mechanisms do not necessarily have to be apart of the existing political system. Developing such a model is the focus of this paper, with a specific focus on the development of property protection mechanisms, primarily for the protection of landed estates at the outset (e.g. haciendas), in colonial New Spain. The model suggests that during poor economic times, we should see roving bandits in region with lower income haciendas, stationary bandits in areas with average income haciendas, and no bandits in areas with the wealthiest haciendas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to untangle the "competing" privatization theories, this paper re-structures the privatization argument using the logic of willingness and capability, allowing for a more clearly specified empirical model. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]