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International institutions have been shown to exert independent effects on state behavior, even within an anarchic international system. These important effects have been widely theorized about and demonstrated in the 'enforcement of agreements' aspect of international cooperation. In the study of the formation of these international agreements, though, scholars often turn to bargaining processes for explanations, including the importance of constraining representatives in order to confer bargaining power, and thus maximize a state's interest in bargaining outcomes. The role of international institutions in this aspect of international cooperation is much less understood and analyzed. I argue, though, that institutions, which have been demonstrated to play an important role in impacting domestic decision-making processes, also play an important role in impacting decision-making processes at the international level. Bringing in the mechanism design literature from economics to analyze the role of institutions, I argue that any institution - domestic or international - with features embodying an 'incentive compatible mechanism' creates an equilibrium in which, rather than constraining representatives, giving them autonomy will lead to the maximization of states' interests in bargaining outcomes. Thus, the institutional setting and the degree of representative constraint interact in important ways to impact decision-making outcomes. I analyze this argument by examining decision-making within the European Union - an institution which embodies an 'incentive compatible mechanism.' Using coded interview evidence of decision-making in several different issue areas to create a dataset of interests and outcomes in a bargaining setting, I show that within this institution, autonomy of state representatives, rather than constraint, leads to the maximization of member state interests. I conclude by specifying the implications this argument has for an understanding of international decision-making, and for the study and design of international institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]