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Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attentional blink (AB) is a difficulty in correctly processing a target when it follows one or more other targets after a short delay. When no backward mask is presented after the last critical target, there is no or little behavioral AB deficit. The mask plays an important role in limiting conscious access to target information. In this electrophysiological study, we tested the impact of masking on the deployment and engagement of attention by measuring the N2pc and P3 components in an RSVP paradigm. We found that the presence of a mask in an AB paradigm reduced the amplitude of the N2pc, P3a, and P3b components. In addition to reducing encoding in memory, masking also reduced the effectiveness of the deployment and engagement of attention on the last target. We discuss the role of these findings in the context of current masking, consciousness, and AB models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Alcohol use has long been assumed to alter cognition via attentional processes. To better understand the cognitive consequences of intoxication, the present study tested the effects of moderate intoxication (average BAC between .071 and .082) on attentional processing using complex working memory capacity (WMC) span tasks and a change blindness task. Intoxicated and sober participants were matched on baseline WMC performance, and intoxication significantly decreased performance on the complex span tasks. Surprisingly, intoxication improved performance on the change blindness task. The results are interpreted as evidence that intoxication decreases attentional control, causing either a shift towards more passive processing and/or a more diffuse attentional state. This may result in decreased performance on tasks where attentional control or focus are required, but may actually facilitate performance in some contexts. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• Spatial attention is not necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Spatial attention is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception of a relevant stimulus is sufficient for triggering a blink. Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]