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• The attentional blink depends on selective attention to T1. • Selective attention to T1 in a two-target task is sensitive to proactive control. • Endogenous cueing can influence selective attention in a two-target task. This study examined proactive control in a two-target task using an endogenous cueing method. Participants identified two target words (T1 then T2) presented in rapid succession. T1 was presented alone or interleaved with a distractor word. In Experiment 1, informative pre-cues that signalled T1 selection difficulty were randomly intermixed with uninformative pre-cues. The results revealed a cueing effect for both T1 and T2, with better performance for informative cues than for uninformative cues. In Experiment 2, informative and uninformative cues were mixed for one group, and blocked for another group. In the mixed cue group, we again found a T2 cueing effect. In the blocked cue group, a cueing effect was observed for both T1 and T2, with the T2 cueing effect restricted to the shortest T1-T2 SOA. The results demonstrate that pre-cues of attentional conflict can modulate performance in a two-target task used to measure the attentional blink. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• EEG study investigating social-emotional influences in attentional blink task. • Enhanced awareness of faces associated with negative vs. neutral social information. • Emotion-specific awareness differences found in early posterior negativity (EPN). • No clear evidence for facial trustworthiness influence during attentional blink. The present EEG study with 32 healthy participants investigated whether affective knowledge about a person influences the visual awareness of their face, additionally considering the impact of facial appearance. Faces differing in perceived trustworthiness based on appearance were associated with negative or neutral social information and shown as target stimuli in an attentional blink task. As expected, participants showed enhanced awareness of faces associated with negative compared to neutral social information. On the neurophysiological level, this effect was connected to differences in the time range of the early posterior negativity (EPN)—a component associated with enhanced attention and facilitated processing of emotional stimuli. The findings indicate that the social-affective relevance of a face based on emotional knowledge is accessed during a phase of attentional enhancement for conscious perception and can affect prioritization for awareness. In contrast, no clear evidence for influences of facial trustworthiness during the attentional blink was found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We studied adaptive control of attentional scaling during the attentional blink. • The attentional scale can be adaptively controlled through (implicit) statistical learning. • A broad attentional scale induces an attentional "blur", implying gradual awareness. • A narrow attentional scale leads to an attentional "blink", or discrete awareness. Attentional scaling is a crucial mechanism that enables us to flexibly allocate our attention to larger or smaller regions in the visual field. Although previous studies have demonstrated the critical role of attentional scaling in visual processing, its impact on modulating visual awareness is not yet fully understood. This study investigates the adaptive control of attentional scaling and its influence on visual awareness in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants were required to attend to the first target's location, which was manipulated either session-wise, trial-wise, or such that it could be learned across a block of trials. Discrete, all-or-none, awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a narrow area, while gradual awareness was expected when attention was allocated to a larger area. We used mixture modeling to assess second target awareness across these different attentional scales. The results revealed that participants could adaptively control their attentional scale both across stable sessions, and through (implicit) statistical learning in blocks of successive trials. This produced gradual perceptual awareness when the participants adopted a broad attentional scale, causing an attentional "blur". However, trial-wise cues did not allow for attentional scaling, resulting in more discrete target perception overall, and an attentional "blink". We conclude that the attentional scale is to some extent under adaptive control during the attentional blink/blur, where it can produce qualitatively different modes of perceptual awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Self-prioritization effect (SPE) was assessed in the attentional blink (AB) paradigm. • Confounding factors affecting the SPE were controlled for by using the three shapes as T1. • Associations with self produced larger AB than associations with others, with and without shape-label association training. • After training, only the difference between condition friend and condition stranger disappeared. • The results suggest that the SPE is not affected by differences in familiarity between the labels. The self-prioritization effect (SPE) refers to the advantage in processing stimuli associated with oneself. Here, we addressed the SPE in an attentional blink (AB) task. In Experiment 1, shapes associated to you, friend, or stranger served as T1, and letter X as T2. The AB effect was larger for you than the other label conditions, and larger for friend condition than for stranger condition. We suggest that self-associated shape increased its perceptual salience, producing greater attentional capture. In Experiment 2 participants trained with a shape-label matching task to increase familiarity with the shape-label associations before performing the AB task. The difference between friend and stranger conditions disappeared, suggesting that the difference between the two conditions observed in Experiment 1 was mainly due to differences in familiarity or frequency of use. Importantly, the advantage of you over friend and stranger conditions remained, suggesting that the SPE is a genuine effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Irrelevant emotional stimuli automatically hijack attention from goal-directed tasks. • Aberrant attentional bias toward emotional stimuli is a marker of mood disorder. • Mindfulness is linked to more flexible and adaptive emotional responses. • Dispositional mindfulness was linked to faster attentional recovery after negative distractors. Abstract Emotional stimuli have been shown to automatically hijack attention, hindering the detection of forthcoming targets. Mindfulness is defined as a present moment non-judgemental attentional stance that can be cultivated by meditation practices, but that may present interindividual variability in the general population. The mechanisms underlying modification in emotional reactivity linked to mindfulness are still a matter of debate. In particular, it is not clear whether mindfulness is associated with a diminished emotional response, or with faster recovery. We presented participants with target pictures embedded in a rapid visual presentation stream. The targets could be preceded by negative, neutral or scrambled critical distractors. We showed that dispositional mindfulness, in particular the Non-reacting facet, was related to faster disengagement of attention from emotional stimuli. These results could have implications for mood disorders characterised by an exaggerated attentional bias toward emotional stimuli, such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attentional blink (AB) is a difficulty in correctly processing a target when it follows one or more other targets after a short delay. When no backward mask is presented after the last critical target, there is no or little behavioral AB deficit. The mask plays an important role in limiting conscious access to target information. In this electrophysiological study, we tested the impact of masking on the deployment and engagement of attention by measuring the N2pc and P3 components in an RSVP paradigm. We found that the presence of a mask in an AB paradigm reduced the amplitude of the N2pc, P3a, and P3b components. In addition to reducing encoding in memory, masking also reduced the effectiveness of the deployment and engagement of attention on the last target. We discuss the role of these findings in the context of current masking, consciousness, and AB models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• AB reflects a dilemma of deploying attentional resources in the time dimension. • Temporal expectation helps to optimize the control of temporal allocation in AB. • Interval-based and rhythm-based expectations are dissociable but similarly efficient. • More research on AB from a temporal perspective is warranted. The attentional blink (AB) reveals a limitation in conscious processing of sequential targets. Although it is widely held that the AB derives from a structural bottleneck of central capacity, how the central processing is constrained is still unclear. As the AB reflects the dilemma of deploying attentional resources in the time dimension, research on temporal allocation provides an important avenue for understanding the mechanism. Here we reviewed studies regarding the role of temporal expectation in modulating the AB performance primarily based on two temporal processing strategies: interval-based and rhythm-based timings. We showed that both temporal expectations can help to organize limited resources among multiple attentional episodes, thereby mitigating the AB effect. As it turns out, scrutinizing on the AB from a temporal perspective is a promising way to comprehend the mechanisms behind the AB and conscious cognition. We also highlighted some unresolved issues and discussed potential directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Practice can enhance of perceptual sensitivity, a well-known phenomenon called perceptual learning. However, the effect of practice on subjective perception has received little attention. We approach this problem from a visual psychophysics and computational modeling perspective. In a sequence of visual search experiments, subjects significantly increased the ability to detect a “trained target”. Before and after training, subjects performed two psychophysical protocols that parametrically vary the visibility of the “trained target”: an attentional blink and a visual masking task. We found that confidence increased after learning only in the attentional blink task. Despite large differences in some observables and task settings, we identify common mechanisms for decision-making and confidence. Specifically, our behavioral results and computational model suggest that perceptual ability is independent of processing time, indicating that changes in early cortical representations are effective, and learning changes decision criteria to convey choice and confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alternative views of the nature of consciousness posit that awareness of an object is either an all-or-none phenomenon or that awareness can be partial, occurring independently for different levels of representation. The all-or-none hypothesis predicts that when one feature of an object is identified, all other features should be consciously accessible. The partial awareness hypothesis predicts that one feature may reach consciousness while others do not. These competing predictions were tested in two experiments that presented two targets within a central stream of letters. We used the attentional blink evoked by the first target to assess consciousness for two different features of the second target. The results provide evidence that there can be a severe impairment in conscious access to one feature even when another feature is accurately reported. This behavioral evidence supports the partial awareness hypothesis, showing that consciousness of different features of the same object can be dissociated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meditation is becoming an increasingly popular topic for scientific research and various effects of extensive meditation practice (ranging from weeks to several years) on cognitive processes have been demonstrated. Here we show that extensive practice may not be necessary to achieve those effects. Healthy adult non-meditators underwent a brief single session of either focused attention meditation ( FAM ), which is assumed to increase top-down control, or open monitoring meditation ( OMM ), which is assumed to weaken top-down control, before performing an Attentional Blink (AB) task – which assesses the efficiency of allocating attention over time. The size of the AB was considerably smaller after OMM than after FAM, which suggests that engaging in meditation immediately creates a cognitive-control state that has a specific impact on how people allocate their attention over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous non-invasive experimental “blinding” methods exist for suppressing the phenomenal awareness of visual stimuli. Not all of these suppressive methods occur at, and thus index, the same level of unconscious visual processing. This suggests that a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing can in principle be established. The empirical results of extant studies that have used a number of different methods and additional reasonable theoretical considerations suggest the following tentative hierarchy. At the highest levels in this hierarchy is unconscious processing indexed by object-substitution masking. The functional levels indexed by crowding, the attentional blink (and other attentional blinding methods), backward pattern masking, metacontrast masking, continuous flash suppression, sandwich masking, and single-flash interocular suppression, fall at progressively lower levels, while unconscious processing at the lowest levels is indexed by eye-based binocular-rivalry suppression. Although unconscious processing levels indexed by additional blinding methods is yet to be determined, a tentative placement at lower levels in the hierarchy is also given for unconscious processing indexed by Troxler fading and adaptation-induced blindness, and at higher levels in the hierarchy indexed by attentional blinding effects in addition to the level indexed by the attentional blink. The full mapping of levels in the functional hierarchy onto cortical activation sites and levels is yet to be determined. The existence of such a hierarchy bears importantly on the search for, and the distinctions between, neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Blink extraction methods are inconsistently reported in attention research. • Selecting suboptimal blink parameters can affect results. • Consulting eye-tracking data can help justify optimal blink parameters. • Blink durations are positively associated with mind wandering. • Blink durations can help detect mind wandering in multiple modalities. Mind wandering is a universal phenomenon in which a person's attention decouples from stimuli within their current environment. Researchers have sought objective, less disruptive indicators of cognitive disengagement, resulting in a focus eye tracking and blink characteristics. Such research has found positive associations between mind wandering and blink characteristics, typically in reading tasks. However, extracting blinks accurately from continuous eye-tracking data is complex, and the literature contains inconsistently reported data processing methods, some of which may have an elevated risk of identifying noise as signal. Further, the relationship between attentional disengagement and blink durations has not been fully explored in multiple task modalities. We conducted three modality-specific experiments while recording eye movements. Blink durations varied as a function of stimulus/task engagingness; less engaging tasks yielded longer blink durations, suggesting a link between blinking and mind wandering. Recommendations are provided for researchers seeking to accurately derive blink events from continuous, binocular, eye-tracking data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Meditation has been associated with a reduction in the attentional blink (AB). [•] State of open monitoring meditation results in smaller AB than focused attention meditation. [•] AB reduction only for more experienced practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This cross-modal study provides evidence that an inhibitory effect of multiple distractors on target detection (distractor-induced deafness) can also be observed when cue and target derive from different modalities. • In line with recent findings, access to an auditory target was indicated by an early frontal negativity, suggesting that this ERP component reliably indexes auditory awareness. • A sustained negativity in succession to the frontal negativity was also linked to successful target detection and might reflect a cross-modal spread of attention. • In contrast to previous unimodal studies, P3 amplitude was not significantly influenced by target access, but instead by overall detection performance. Previous research showed that dual-task processes such as the attentional blink are not always transferable from unimodal to cross-modal settings. This study investigated whether such a transfer can be stated for a distractor-induced impairment of target detection established in vision (distractor-induced blindness, DIB) and recently observed in the auditory modality (distractor-induced deafness, DID). A cross-modal DID effect was confirmed: The detection of an auditory target indicated by a visual cue was impaired if multiple auditory distractors preceded the target. Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to identify psychophysiological correlates of target detection. A frontal negativity about 200 ms succeeded by a sustained, widespread negativity was associated with auditory target awareness. In contrast to unimodal findings, P3 amplitude was not enhanced for hits. The results support the notion that early frontal attentional processes are linked to auditory awareness, whereas the P3 does not seem to be a reliable indicator of target access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Alcohol use has long been assumed to alter cognition via attentional processes. To better understand the cognitive consequences of intoxication, the present study tested the effects of moderate intoxication (average BAC between .071 and .082) on attentional processing using complex working memory capacity (WMC) span tasks and a change blindness task. Intoxicated and sober participants were matched on baseline WMC performance, and intoxication significantly decreased performance on the complex span tasks. Surprisingly, intoxication improved performance on the change blindness task. The results are interpreted as evidence that intoxication decreases attentional control, causing either a shift towards more passive processing and/or a more diffuse attentional state. This may result in decreased performance on tasks where attentional control or focus are required, but may actually facilitate performance in some contexts. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: T2 in an attentional blink paradigm served as a high- or low-frequency prime word for a subsequent repeated target. Consistent with research in visual word identification, only reported primes facilitated the identification of a target repeated approximately 8s after RSVP. Priming was greater for low- than high-frequency words. Analogous with masked priming, a blinked T2 facilitated report of a repeated target occurring 318ms after T2 in RSVP. The blinked repetition priming effect was additive with target frequency. These results indicate that: (1) the outcomes of processing prime words are a key factor in repetition priming effects, with blinked and reported T2s behaving like masked and unmasked primes, respectively, (2) there may be different sources of repetition effects, (3) there is a consistent cross-paradigm pattern of repetition effects that occurs as a function of prime–target interval and the ability to identify the word on its first and second presentation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have began to explore the process of how sensory information gains access to awareness. To further probe this process, event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used while testing subjects with a paradigm known as the “attentional blink.” In this paradigm, visually presented information sporadically fails to reach awareness. It was found that the magnitude and time course of activation within the anterior cingulate (BA 32), medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9), and frontopolar cortex (BA 10) predicted whether or not information was consciously perceived during the critical period for the attentional blink. These results are discussed in light of a neural framework for conscious processing. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The attentional blink (AB) is an impairment of attention, which occurs when subjects have to report a target stimulus (T2) following a previous target (T1) with a short delay (up to 600 ms). Theories explaining the AB assume that processing of T2 is more vulnerable to decay or substitution, as long as attention is allocated to T1. Existing models of the AB, however, do not account for the fact that T2 detection accuracy reaches the minimum when T2 is presented after about 300 ms and not immediately following T1. Therefore, a new model is suggested, which is based on chronometrical considerations together with recent neurophysiological findings concerning the relation between the P3 event-related potential and the AB, the interaction between P3 and gamma oscillations, and the significance of the early evoked gamma band response. We hypothesize that suppression of the early gamma response to T2, accompanying the P3 related to T1, causes the AB. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

• Hypnotic emotional numbing modulated the size of the Emotional Attentional Blink. • The impact of hypnotic suggestion was limited to late targets involved in response preparation. • We isolated the roles of task-set updating and response preparation in hypnotic emotional modulation. To understand the role that attention plays in the deployment timeline of hypnotic anger modulation, we composed an Attentional Blink paradigm where the first and second targets were faces, expressing neutral or angry emotions. We then suppressed the salience of angry faces through a "hypnotic numbing" suggestion. We found that hypnotic suggestion only attenuated the emotional salience of the second target (T2). By implementing drift-diffusion decision modelling, we also found that hypnotic suggestion mainly affected decision thresholds. These findings suggest that hypnotic numbing resulted from belated changes in response strategy. Interestingly, a contrast against non-hypnotized participants revealed that the numbing suggestion had the instruction-like feature of incorporating emotional valence into the attentional task-set. Together, our results portray hypnotic anger modulation as a two-tiered process: first, hypnotic suggestion alters the attentional task-set; second, provided processing and response preparation are not interrupted, a hypnotizability-dependent response based on said altered task-set is produced through late cognitive control strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• It is debated how predictions affect conscious access and whether predictions need to be conscious to be effective. • Effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions on subjective visibility reports were studied. • Only consciously initiated predictions were shown to affect subjective visibility reports and conscious access. • Predictions may therefore rely on high-level feedback characteristic for conscious access. Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3). Critically, we tested the effects of conscious and non-conscious predictions, after seen and unseen T1s, on T2 visibility. We found that valid predictions increased subjective visibility reports and discrimination of T2s, but only when predictions were generated by a consciously accessed T1, irrespective of the timing at which the effects were measured (short vs. longs lags). These results further our understanding of the intricate relationship between predictive processing and consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Spatial attention is not necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Spatial attention is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception of a relevant stimulus is sufficient for triggering a blink. Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Access of faces to visual consciousness investigated in attentional blink paradigm. • Direct comparison of two sources of trustworthiness: knowledge and facial appearance. • Learned information about person's social behavior impacts visual consciousness. • No influence of facial trustworthiness on access to conscious perception. • Affective knowledge shapes social perception by influencing contents of consciousness. How we perceive and evaluate other persons depends on appearance-based impressions as well as top-down information such as knowledge about someone's character. To date, little is known about how these two sources of information affect the conscious perception of faces, about their relative contributions and possible interactions. Here, we directly compare how social-affective knowledge and visual cues of trustworthiness impact the access of faces to visual consciousness. Low- and average-trustworthy looking faces were associated with neutral or negative information about a person's social behavior. Trustworthiness and facial expression ratings showed robust and independent effects of both sources of information during evaluations. Under conditions of reduced attention in an attentional blink task, prioritized detection of faces associated with negative as compared to neutral person knowledge was observed, whereas facial trustworthiness did not affect detection. Thus, while both factors influenced conscious perception and evaluation, only person knowledge impacted the access to consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of attentional resources and affective stimuli on temporal selective attention in the rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm under acute stress was explored among women. Seventy-three female undergraduates were randomly assigned to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) group or control group. We found that when the first target was negative, stress increased its accuracy. Stress promoted the recognition of neutral target two (T2) only at lag2, and there was no interaction with the emotionality of target one (T1). In addition, the accumulated effect of stress enhanced temporal selective attention, predominately 20–40 min after the TSST task; cortisol concentration during this time period could significantly predict AB task performance. In summary, when attentional resources were severely insufficient, individuals under stress were more able to focus on the current target; that is, stress facilitated selective attention. A novel result was that participants were exempt from the affective influence of previous targets, which may have been caused by activation of the autonomic nervous system and gender differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]