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The intentional binding effect refers to the phenomenon where the perceived temporal interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence is subjectively compressed. Prior research revealed the importance of tactile feedback from the keyboard on this effect. Here we examined the necessity of such tactile feedback by utilizing a touch-free key-press device without haptic feedback, and explored how initial/outcome sensory modalities (visual/auditory/tactile) and their consistency influence the intentional binding effect. Participants estimated three delay lengths (250, 550, or 850 ms) between the initial and outcome stimuli. Results showed that regardless of the combinations of sensory modalities between the initial and the outcome stimuli (i.e., modal consistency), the intentional binding effect was only observed in the 250 ms delay condition. This findings indicate a stable intentional binding effect both within and across sensory modalities, supporting the existence of a shared mechanism underlying the binding effect in touch-free voluntary actions., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The relationship between sense of agency and sense of ownership remains unclear. Here we investigated this relationship by manipulating ownership using the rubber hand illusion and assessing the resulting impact on self-experiences during the vicarious agency illusion. We tested whether modulating ownership towards another limb using the rubber hand illusion would subsequently influence the illusory experience of ownership and agency towards a similar-looking limb in the vicarious agency task. Crucially, the vicarious agency task measures both sense of agency and sense of ownership at the same time, while removing the confounding influence of motor signals. Our results replicated the well-established effects of both paradigms. We also found that manipulating the sense of ownership with the rubber hand illusion influenced the subsequent vicarious experience of ownership but not the vicarious experience of agency. This supports the idea that sense of agency and sense of ownership are, at least partially, independent experiences., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Magicians have developed powerful tools to covertly force a spectator to choose a specific card. We investigate the physical location force, in which four cards (from left to right: 1-2-3-4) are placed face-down on the table in a line, after which participants are asked to push out one card. The force is thought to rely on a behavioural bias in that people are more likely to choose the third card from their left. Participants felt that their choice was extremely free, yet 60% selected the 3rd card. There was no significant difference in estimates and feelings of freedom between those who chose the target card (i.e. 3rd card) and those who selected a different card, and they underestimated the actual proportion of people who selected the target card. These results illustrate that participants' behaviour was heavily biased towards choosing the third card, but were oblivious to this bias., (Copyright © 2020. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

In the "Libet experiment" the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet's intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet's intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Conceptions of responsibility are associated with the degree to which people ascribe conscious will to others. However, it is not known how the biological and environmental circumstances of moral actors independently impact attributions of conscious will. Although reductions in conscious will are associated with diminished punishment of criminals, does a reduced sense of conscious will of a hero affect support for reward? In two pre-registered studies (total N = 2668), we investigated the effects of biological or environmental histories on judgements of punishment and reward. Biological and environmental circumstances (especially biological) reduced perceptions of conscious will, which in turn reduced conviction judgements and punishment severity (Studies 1-2). In the context of a moderated mediation, we found that reductions in perceptions of conscious will were unrelated for a desire to reward a hero (Study 2). Findings are discussed in the context of a model of judgement, conscious will, and responsibility., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was developed to investigate the entry into consciousness of involuntary imagery. Subjects are presented with objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on many trials. RIT effects reveal the capacities of involuntary processing. These cognitions do not require symbol manipulation. Can mental rotation and visuospatial imagery, too, arise in this involuntary manner? In the mental rotation task, subjects were first taught to mentally rotate two-dimensional objects. Subjects were then instructed to not mentally rotate objects. In the chess task, subjects were taught how to move in their minds objects in specified ways, much as one could imagine how chess pieces move on a chessboard. Subjects were then instructed to not have such visuospatial imagery. For both tasks, involuntary imagery occurred on a substantial proportion of trials, revealing that symbol manipulation can be influenced involuntarily through external control., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The present study investigated the sense of agency (SoA) when actions were determined by another human vs. a humanoid robot as compared to when freely selected. Additionally, perceived robot-autonomy was manipulated via autonomous vs. non-autonomous descriptions of the robot. SoA was assessed by judgment of control ratings and intentional binding (i.e., perceived temporal attraction between voluntary actions and their outcomes). Participants performed free and instructed key presses that produced an auditory tone (Experiment-1) and visual stimuli conveying neutral, positive, or negative valence (Experiment-2). Binding and control ratings were greater in free compared to instructed actions, and comparable between human- and robot-instructed actions. Control ratings were higher for positive compared to neutral and negative outcomes, and positively correlated with ratings of how human-like the robot appeared. These results highlight the role of endogenous processing of action selection and provide preliminary insight into the SoA when actions are guided by artificial agents., (Crown Copyright © 2019. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Social exclusion is known to induce an immediate threat to one's perceived sense of control. The sense of agency is an important human experience, strongly associated with volitional action. Healthy participants perceive the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its effect to be shorter than the same interval when it separates an involuntary action and effect. This temporal illusion is known as intentional binding and is used experimentally to index the implicit sense of agency. The current study investigated whether activating memories of social exclusion alters intentional binding. Results show that action-effect interval estimates are significantly longer after remembering an episode of social exclusion than after remembering an episode of social inclusion, or a no priming baseline condition. This study is the first to demonstrate the link between feelings of social exclusion and the pre-reflective sense of agency., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Volitional control has been related to the excitatory/inhibitory (E/I) ratio of glutamate-glutamine to γ-aminobutyric acid concentration in the different parts of the frontal cortex. Yet, how the neurochemical balance in each of the brain areas modulates volitional control remains unclear. Here, participants performed an auditory Go/No-Go task with and without task-irrelevant face distractors. Neurochemical balance was measured with magnetic resonance spectroscopy at rest. Participants with higher E/I ratios in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) showed less control over No-Go cues under no distraction, whereas participants with higher E/I ratios in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were more prompted to make speeded Go responses under distraction. Therefore, the neurochemical balance in the DLPFC and ACC may be involved in the control over task-relevant and -irrelevant cues respectively., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The sense of agency refers to feelings of causing one's own action and resulting effect. Previous research indicates that voluntary action selection is an important factor in shaping the sense of agency. Whereas the volitional nature of the sense of agency is well documented, the present study examined whether agency is modulated when action selection shifts from self-control to a more automatic stimulus-driven process. Seventy-two participants performed an auditory Simon task including congruent and incongruent trials to generate automatic stimulus-driven vs. more self-control driven action, respectively. Responses in the Simon task produced a tone and agency was assessed with the intentional binding task - an implicit measure of agency. Results showed a Simon effect and temporal binding effect. However, temporal binding was independent of congruency. These findings suggest that temporal binding, a window to the sense of agency, emerges for both automatic stimulus-driven actions and self-controlled actions., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The time of subjectively registered urge to move (W) constituted the central point of most Libet-style experiments. It is therefore crucial to verify the W validity. Our experiment was based on the assumption that the W time is inferred, rather than introspectively perceived. We used the rotating spot method to gather the W reports together with the reports of the subjective timing of actual movement (M). The subjects were assigned the tasks in two different orders. When measured as first in the respective session, no significant difference between W and M values was found, which suggests that uninformed subjects tend to confuse W for M reports. Moreover, we found that W values measured after the M task were significantly earlier than W values measured before M. This phenomenon suggests that the apparent difference between W and M values is in fact caused by the subjects' previous experience with M measurements., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

There is an ongoing debate in philosophy and psychology about when one should consider an action to be free. Several aspects are frequently suggested as relevant: (a) a prior intention, (b) a conscious action-related thought, (c) prior deliberation, (d) a meaningful choice, (e) different consequences of the action, and (f) the duration between intention and action. Here we investigated which criteria laypeople adopt and thus probed their intuitions about free actions in three surveys based on daily life scenarios. First, our results indicate that laypeople consider a conscious intention important for an action to be free. Second, laypeople consider spontaneous actions without consequences to be freer than actions with prior deliberation. Third, laypeople consider proximal rather than distal intentions relevant when it comes to judging actions as free. Taken together, these results suggest that simple laboratory experiments on action choices reflect laypeople's intuitions of free actions to a considerable degree., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

An increase in brain activity known as the "readiness potential" (RP) can be seen over central scalp locations in the seconds leading up to a volitionally timed movement. This activity precedes awareness of the ensuing movement by as much as two seconds and has been hypothesized to reflect preconscious planning and/or preparation of the movement. Using a novel experimental design, we teased apart the relative contribution of motor-related and non-motor-related processes to the RP. The results of our experiment reveal that robust RPs occured in the absence of movement and that motor-related processes did not significantly modulate the RP. This suggests that the RP measured here is unlikely to reflect preconscious motor planning or preparation of an ensuing movement, and instead may reflect decision-related or anticipatory processes that are non-motoric in nature., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Forcing occurs when a magician influences the audience's decisions without their awareness. To investigate the mechanisms behind this effect, we examined several stimulus and personality predictors. In Study 1, a magician flipped through a deck of playing cards while participants were asked to choose one. Although the magician could influence the choice almost every time (98%), relatively few (9%) noticed this influence. In Study 2, participants observed rapid series of cards on a computer, with one target card shown longer than the rest. We expected people would tend to choose this card without noticing that it was shown longest. Both stimulus and personality factors predicted the choice of card, depending on whether the influence was noticed. These results show that combining real-world and laboratory research can be a powerful way to study magic and can provide new methods to study the feeling of free will., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In 1983 Libet et al. found that the Readiness Potential (RP) precedes the intention to act by 350ms and the actual movement by 500ms on average. Using our own replication study, we illustrate how seemingly innocuous technical details are actually crucially relevant to the debate surrounding the interpretation of Libet-style experiments. For instance, using one specific method for determining the RP onset actually led to a reversal of Libet's results (i.e., the intention preceded the RP onset) for one of the participants. Claims regarding the causal relation between RP and intention cannot be based on averages, but require individual, case by case analyses, which show no exceptions in the temporal relation between RP and intention. We conclude that, properly speaking, Libet-style results in themselves cannot yet be taken as proof for the type of conclusions that are often formulated regarding the non-existence of free will., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Most involuntary memories are elicited by external cues (e.g., smells, sounds) that have unique associations with specific memories (Berntsen's cue-retrieval hypothesis), but involuntary memories can sometimes be elicited by weak, even imperceptible, cues that raise the activation level of an already primed memory (Berntsen's motivation-priming hypothesis) to also reach conscious awareness during times of low attentional focus. The current study examined the effects of a motivation bias (restrained eating) on the involuntary memories recorded in daily diaries for seven days by 56 female participants. A large proportion of the involuntary memories were elicited by food-related cues and occurred in food-related contexts. A significant correlation was found between the participants' scores on a restrained eating scale and the percentage of involuntary memories involving cooking and eating content. These results parallel previous research involving voluntary memory retrievals during restrained eating., (Published by Elsevier Inc.)

The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a conscious feeling of having willed those movements., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Cognitive psychologists have often equaled retrieval of personal events with voluntary recall from autobiographical memory, but more recent research shows that autobiographical memories often come to mind involuntarily-that is, with no retrieval effort. Voluntary memories have been studied in numerous laboratory experiments in response to word-prompts, whereas involuntary memories primarily have been examined in an everyday living context, using a structured diary procedure. However, it remains unclear how voluntary memories sampled in the laboratory map onto self-prompted voluntary memories in daily life. Here, we used a structured diary procedure to compare different types of voluntary autobiographical memories to their involuntary counterparts. The results replicated previous findings with regard to differences between word-prompted voluntary and involuntary memories, whereas there were fewer differences between self-prompted voluntary and involuntary memories. The findings raise the question as to what is the best way of sampling voluntary memories and the best comparison for involuntary memories., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts., (Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Following a hypnotic amnesia suggestion, highly hypnotically suggestible subjects may experience amnesia for events. Is there a failure to retrieve the material concerned from autobiographical (episodic) memory, or is it retrieved but blocked from consciousness? Highly hypnotically suggestible subjects produced free-associates to a list of concrete nouns. They were then given an amnesia suggestion for that episode followed by another free association list, which included 15 critical words that had been previously presented. If episodic retrieval for the first trial had been blocked, the responses on the second trial should still have been at least as fast as for the first trial. With semantic priming, they should be faster. In fact, they were on average half a second slower. This suggests that the material had been retrieved but blocked from consciousness. A goal-oriented information processing framework is outlined to interpret these and related data., (Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experimental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous findings of the fMRI correlates of free choice, defined objectively. We introduced a novel task in which participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. BOLD responses for conditions subjectively experienced as free identified a postcentral area distinct from the areas typically considered to be involved in free action. Thus, the brain correlates of subjective feeling of free action were not directly related to any established brain correlates of objectively-defined free action. Our results call into question traditional assumptions about the relation between subjective experience of choosing and activity in the brain's so-called voluntary motor areas., (Copyright © 2013. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

Wilke et al. (2012) make significant headway in gaining a better understanding of the influence affect cues may have on action perception and judgement. In our view their account also brings up a row of important questions demanding further research. This concerns (a) the role of conceptual and non-conceptual content and (b) the different effects emotions of the same valence may play in the perception and judgement of action., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Research suggests that perceptual experience of our movements adapts together with movement control when we are the agents of our actions. Is this agency critical for perceptual and motor adaptation? We had participants view cursor feedback during elbow extension-flexion movements when they (1) actively moved their arm, or (2) had their arm passively moved. We probed adaptation of movement perception by having participants report the reversal point of their unseen movement. We probed adaptation of movement control by having them aim to a target. Perception and control of active movement were influenced by both types of exposure, although adaptation was stronger following active exposure. Furthermore, both types of exposure led to a change in the perception of passive movements. Our findings support the notion that perception and control adapt together, and they suggest that some adaptation is due to recalibrated proprioception that arises independently of active engagement with the environment., (Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

When interacting with the world, we need to distinguish whether sensory information results from external events or from our own actions. The nervous system most likely draws this distinction by comparing the actual sensory input with an internal prediction about the sensory consequences of one's actions. However, interacting with the world also requires an evaluation of the outcomes of self-action, e.g. in terms of their affective valence. Here we show that subjects' perceived pointing direction does not only depend on predictive and sensory signals related to the performed action itself, but also on the affective valence of the action outcome: subjects perceived their movements as directed towards positive and away from negative outcomes. Our findings suggest that the non-conceptual perception of the sensory consequences of self-action builds on both sensorimotor information related directly to self-action and a post hoc evaluation of the affective action outcome., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Sense of agency (SoA) is a compelling but fragile experience that is augmented or attenuated by internal signals and by external cues. A disruption in SoA may characterise individual symptoms of mental illness such as delusions of control. Indeed, it has been argued that generic SoA disturbances may lie at the heart of delusions and hallucinations that characterise schizophrenia. A clearer understanding of how sensorimotor, perceptual and environmental cues complement, or compete with, each other in engendering SoA may prove valuable in deepening our understanding the agency disruptions that characterise certain focal neurological disorders and mental illnesses. Here we examine the integration of SoA cues in health and illness, describing a simple framework of this integration based on Bayesian principles. We extend this to consider how alterations in cue integration may lead to aberrant experiences of agency., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Benjamin Libet has argued that electrophysiological signs of cortical movement preparation are present before people report having made a conscious decision to move, and that these signs constitute evidence that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously. This controversial conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the electrophysiological signs recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) are associated only with preparation for movement. We tested that assumption by comparing the electrophysiological signs before a decision to move with signs present before a decision not to move. There was no evidence of stronger electrophysiological signs before a decision to move than before a decision not to move, so these signs clearly are not specific to movement preparation. We conclude that Libet's results do not provide evidence that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously.

Recent research has shown that human instrumental action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between a voluntary action and an outcome is perceived as shorter than the interval between a physically similar involuntary movement and an outcome. The study by, Ebert and Wegner (2010) suggests that this change in time perception is related to higher order agency experience. Notwithstanding certain issues arising from their study, which are discussed, we believe it offers validation of binding as a measure of sense of agency.

A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller (2010). The comparability of their experimental task and of the potential they recorded with those used and recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983a) is questioned. An interpretation is given for the similarity of event-related potentials recorded when subjects decided to move and when they decided not to move.

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.

Prior to the initiation of spontaneous movement, evoked potentials can be seen to precede awareness of the impending movement by several hundreds of milliseconds, meaning that this recorded neural activity is the result of unconscious processing. This study investigates the neural representations of impending movement with and without awareness. Specifically, the relationship between awareness and 'idling' cortical oscillations in the beta range (18-24Hz) was assessed. It was found that, in situations where there was awareness of the impending movement, pre-movement evoked potentials were associated with a decrease in beta range oscillations. In contrast, when awareness of the impending movement was not present, the onset of the pre-movement potential was associated with tonic levels of beta range oscillations. A model is considered where by distributed neural activity remains outside of conscious awareness through the persistence of tonic slow wave cortical oscillations.

A commentary in response to B. Libet: 'The timing of brain events: Reply to the "Special Section" in this journal of September 2004, edited by Susan Pockett' ().

In this "Reply" paper, the arguments and experimental findings by Pockett, Pollen, and Haggard et al. are analyzed. It had been shown () that a 0.5s duration of repetitive activations of sensory cortex is required to produce a threshold of sensation. The view that this is due to a facilitatory buildup in excitatory state to finally elicit neuronal firing is shown to be incompatible with several lines of evidence. Objections to the phenomenon of subjective referral backwards in time (for the delayed sensation) are also untenable. report that a self-initiated act can, under hypnotic suggestion, appear to the subject to be "involuntary." The act under hypnosis is better viewed as one initiated unconsciously, not as an act of conscious will.

In this paper, it is examined how neuroscience can help to understand the nature of volition by addressing the question whether volitions can be localized in the brain. Volitions, as acts of the will, are special mental events or activities by which an agent consciously and actively exercises her agency to voluntarily direct her thoughts and actions. If we can pinpoint when and where volitional events or activities occur in the brain and find out their neural underpinnings, this can substantively aid to demystify the concept of volition. After first discussing some methodological issues regarding whether it is possible to locate volition in the brain, various approaches by which neuroscientists and psychologists explore the neural correlates and substrates of volition are examined. Although different psychological conceptualizations of volition shape different perspectives toward understanding the functions of volition, the explorations of the neural basis of volition converge on certain common brain areas and structures. A unifying conception of volition that helps to make better sense of recent empirical findings is then suggested.