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The First Sea Lord's offer to resign as an Anglo-French taskforce sailed to seize the Suez Canal in November 1956 became known following his retirement in 1965. Mountbatten oversaw naval preparations with consummate professionalism, although his praise for British forces' seizure of Port Said was tempered by admiration of the French, and not shared by all Combined Operations veterans. David Astor of the Observer actually opposed the invasion, and was passed information by a dissenting Mountbatten. An ageing Mountbatten's criticism of British–French–Israeli collusion led to his advancing an alternative version of events highly favourable to himself, which protagonists such as Lord Hailsham publicly contested. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines Harold Macmillan's role as Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Suez crisis in light of information now available. It argues that, contrary to present historiography, the Treasury was consistent in warning Macmillan of the dangers of the use of force, but that this advice was not accepted by Macmillan. He did not adequately pass on these warnings to his Cabinet and Egypt Committee colleagues. Though he did not lie to his colleagues about the state of the reserves when the decision to call a ceasefire was taken, the reasons that he gave for his abrupt change of mind were specious. The article concludes that American hostility was primarily responsible for the failure of the operation and that Macmillan showed a lack of judgement in not recognizing this until it was too late. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]