Search

This paper introduces a collection of articles on strategic stability in South Asia that resulted from the launch conference of the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, hosted by the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford on 7–8 October 2004. The paper provides a brief conceptual comment on the elements of strategic stability, and introduces the different approaches that are available to promote and enhance strategic stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the conceptual elements of command-and-control, and argues that control is the more important. It then offers a discussion of the relationship between control and strategic stability, which provides some novel insights into the nature of the India– Pakistan nuclear relationship. Following a discussion of the factors that act for and against stability in the region, the paper offers some concluding thoughts about measures to provide more sustainable strategic stability over the medium and longer term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deterrence and strategic stability are closely interlinked. This paper explores the relationship between the two, which finds its clearest expression in the concept of deterrence stability. The paper examines contending views of strategic stability in South Asia, and considers deterrence stability during the 1999 Kargil Crisis. This discussion is developed with an analysis of the drivers of deterrence instability in the region. Finally, the paper concludes with an overview of different pathways to nuclear war in South Asia, and the policy prescriptions that might mitigate the risks of this happening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a detailed assessment of the behavior of nuclear command-and-control systems during peace, crisis and war. It highlights, in particular, the tensions and trade-offs that emerge once systems move away from peacetime configurations. The paper argues that there are significant parallels with the Cold War experience, but that particular complexities in South Asia raise real concerns about the risks of nuclear escalation and war. The paper concludes by asking whether the United States could not do more to help India and Pakistan manage their nuclear command-and-control systems more effectively, to help the stabilization of nuclear South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses some relevant issues concerning whether it is possible to envision arms control and confidence-building and security-building measures (CSBMs) in South Asia, a region characterized by highly competitive and extremely adversarial political relationships. It makes the case that, despite mutual hostility, competing nuclear weapon development programmes and opposing strategic cultures, both India and Pakistan could usefully consider and implement a series of CSBMs in the realm of arms control. These include a unilateral joint protocol to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, regional nuclear fuel cycle options, and CSBMs in the nuclear field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After considering the South Asian context, this paper reflects on the arms control experience of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War in order to highlight some of the practical and political difficulties of concluding and implementing meaningful agreements. It then relates the Cold War experience to what has been achieved in South Asia, explores what realistic opportunities exist for the region, and concludes by arguing that, with political will, significant progress on both formal and informal arms control agreements is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confidence-building and threat reduction measures have a considerable track record in South Asia, and include a number of important successes. The absence of trust, however, remains an obstacle to further progress towards a more stable and less conflictual relationship between India and Pakistan. This paper suggests some new trends for peace are emerging, and argues that, while Kashmir remains the key to the eventual defusing of tensions, both India and Pakistan can make significant progress, particularly in the political realm, to create a climate more conducive to peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional integration is of long-standing concern in South Asia. Despite increasing general levels of prosperity observed in some of its countries, an ongoing problem is how to ensure a good quality transportation system for the entire region. The purpose of the present study is to investigate opportunities for cooperation in the transport sector in South Asia. The study suggests adopting a common transport policy in South Asia for the optimum utilisation of existing utilities, as well as the expansion of new facilities in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Asia appears to be confronted with several issues that dominate the debate on the emergent order in the region; the question of hegemony and the legitimacy of the use of force, the issue of bilateralism and the question of order from the perspective of civil society. Traditionally, two competing frameworks have dominated South Asian security thinking. The first uses the liberal institutional framework, and the second set is rooted in a realist/neorealist framework of analysis. In the future, the agenda for South Asia needs to be set at two levels; a bilateral level of India and Pakistan, and a regional level of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), The former would be a continuous dialog based on confidence-building techniques, while the latter would have to follow an institutional line. The proposed new institutional arrangement is that of a South Asian regional parliament. A SAARC parliament offers new types of political interaction that would be an important condition for increasing transactions, linkages and coalitions. It can go beyond the bureaucratic-technical parameters of SAARC and introduce political, moral, cultural and civilisational dimensions of regionalism in South Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]