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This research article examines how domestic politics has affected Thailand’s engagement with the United States and China since the 2014 military coup. It argues that Thai conservative elites, primarily the military, perceive the United States as a threat to their political legitimacy because of Washington’s emphasis on human rights and democracy. In contrast, they appreciate Beijing’s commitment to noninterference while increased economic ties with China strengthen their domestic legitimacy. Although Thailand’s foreign policy underwent an adjustment following the 2019 general elections, with Bangkok and Washington reaffirming their security ties, Thai policymakers continue to perceive China as a more dependable partner and think they must reassure Beijing that they are not aligned with the alleged US goal of containing China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines’ foreign policy is anchored on three pillars: the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty; economic development; and the protection of overseas Filipinos. Since these tenets were first enunciated by the Ramos administration (1992–98), they have remained constant despite perceptions that subsequent presidents have gravitated towards a closer partnership with the United States or China. Alternatively, it has been said that Manila partners with a particular foreign power to advance a particular pillar, thus creating a de facto division of roles: the United States is an ally that protects the Philippines’ territorial integrity and sovereignty, while China is a partner that advances economic development. However, the notion of a division of responsibilities is somewhat superficial. In reality, the Philippines’ relations with both the United States and China contribute to all three pillars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, Malaysia has positioned itself as being “equidistant” between the United States and China. But being equidistant does not mean being equally distant or equally close. Instead, it means maintaining a neutral position at the macro level while seeking inclusive but selective multilayered partnerships with all competing powers across micro-level domains. While the Malaysia-US defence partnership is much closer than that between Malaysia and China, Malaysia- China diplomatic and developmental ties are more multifaceted than those between Malaysia and the United States. Therefore, Malaysia’s equidistant stance entails several puzzling contradictions emblematic of hedging. This article theorizes hedging by unpacking the two-level determinants of Malaysia’s inclusive but prudently selective and contradictory policy of equidistance. It argues that while the smaller state’s macro-level neutrality is driven primarily by the structural imperative of insuring against the danger of entrapment and other systemic risks, the inclusive and contradictory elements in Malaysia’s micro-level, multilayered alignments are primarily due to domestic reasons. Chief among these is the governing elites’ necessity to optimize the different pathways of legitimation in a multiethnic society. This intersects with other domestic processes, prompting the state to hedge by pursuing seemingly paradoxical approaches to offset risks while maximizing benefits with politically acceptable trade-offs under conditions of uncertainties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Indonesia as a case study, this article aims to contribute to the existing literature on why weaker states engage in hedging by examining how Indonesia’s domestic factors influence its foreign policy decisions regarding the United States and China. The article argues that domestic and foreign policies are interconnected as domestic agendas, including the interests and aspirations of Indonesian politicians as well as public opinion, have led to variations in the country’s hedging behaviours towards the two great powers. On one hand, domestic political and economic considerations drive Indonesia to engage with the United States and China. On the other hand, the same factors can also act as hindrances that limit Indonesia’s engagement with these powers. Consequently, despite having strong defence ties with the United States, Indonesia now sees China as a major and essential economic partner that helps the country and its leaders achieve their development goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strategic competition between the United States and China is often seen as a rivalry confined to the two great powers alone, in which secondary states such as those in Southeast Asia have little influence and will inevitably end up “choosing sides”. However, this assumption overlooks how the domestic politics of Southeast Asian states shape their foreign policies. Furthermore, if the United States or China is to attain a leadership role and legitimacy in the region, it requires the validation, support, and deference of smaller states, none of which can be achieved without consideration of domestic politics. Thus, this Special Issue—including case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Thailand and the Philippines—underscores the domestic determinants of the foreign policy of Southeast Asian states, identifying how their concerns about economic security, political legitimacy and regional stability mediate their engagement with the United States and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By analysing three case studies--Singapore, Cambodia and Myanmar-- this article investigates health security partnerships formed by Southeast Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on their responses to China and India's vaccine diplomacy. It argues that a combination of factors--the capability of national governments in responding to the pandemic and the cost of doing so, as well as the credibility of vaccines and geopolitical relationships with potential partners--led to a divergence in partnerships. Singapore did not rely on Chinese vaccine donations but its acceptance of assistance from China was a diplomatic move to maintain a balanced policy amidst the United States-China strategic rivalry. In contrast, Cambodia and Myanmar were obliged to partner with either China or India due to their limited capacity to manage the crisis as well as their lack of financial resources and access to top-tier vaccines. Geopolitics also played a role. China became a leading partner for Cambodia due to the strong strategic relationship they had formed before the pandemic, while the governments of Myanmar--before and after the military coup in February 2021--based their partnerships on varying political and geopolitical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, most Southeast Asian states continue to prefer hedging strategies in an effort to maintain autonomy and flexibility. This involves deepening ties with both superpowers rather than siding with one or the other. Many studies have focused on why and how states hedge, but no scholarly analysis to date has considered why a state would abandon hedging even when it is not facing a direct security threat. While structural realist factors such as external security threats and economic rewards remain significant determinants for alignment decisions, this article demonstrates that internal threats can also compel states to abandon hedging in favour of bandwagoning. The article examines two case studies, Cambodia and Myanmar, to demonstrate how autocratic rulers in those two countries have stopped hedging and opted for closer alignment with Beijing in order to bolster regime security. In both cases, political leaders have prioritized personal interests and regime survival over national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensity of minilateral coalition-building among the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners, especially the consolidation of the Quad and the formation of AUKUS in 2021, has rekindled concerns over the relevance of ASEAN multilateralism and ASEAN's claim to centrality in the regional architecture. Although the challenge to ASEAN-led mechanisms from competing and parallel institutions initiated by other powers is not a new phenomenon, this article argues that the intensity of today's geopolitical tensions, primarily but not exclusively between the United States and China, has driven America and its Indo-Pacific partners to invest more in minilateral coalitions than in ASEAN institutions to advance their strategic goals. The institutional challenge that these minilaterals present to ASEAN is three-fold. First, they signify the entrenchment of hard balancing by the United States and its Indo-Pacific partners and their reduced reliance on ASEAN's normative influence. Second, their small, nimble membership holds out better prospects than ASEAN institutions in delivering tangible results and effective responses to regional security challenges. Third, they accentuate the pre-existing strategic incoherence within ASEAN in the face of Great Power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States adopt public "naming and shaming" as a rhetorical coercion strategy in-lieu of kinetic force in order to get other countries to comply with accepted norms. However, the effectiveness of this strategy has been uneven and at times has failed to elicit the response desired by the rhetorical coercer. The South China Sea dispute is a good example of rhetorical contestation as an important undercurrent in US- China competition. By tracing rhetorical exchanges--from the Obama administration's subtle rhetorical coercion to the Trump administration's overt naming and shaming strategy--this article shows that the US-China rhetorical contestation over the South China Sea has evolved from an initial implication contest into a framing contest, both of which are considered as "unstable outcomes" in rhetorical contestation. Such outcomes show that far from backing down, China has been able to resist and strategically counter American naming and shaming. This was accomplished in three ways. First, by exploiting the ambiguity of the international law frame. Second, by portraying the United States as an "outsider". Third, by appealing to its audience--the littoral states of Southeast Asia--with a publicly sustainable new narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores perceptions and reactions across Southeast Asia towards the Obama administration's "pivot" or "rebalance" to Asia. The US approach has been dismissed as more rhetorical than substantive grand strategy, its credibility under renewed scrutiny following President Obama's cancelled visit to Southeast Asia in October 2013. Nonetheless, the rebalance has expanded from its origins in 2010-11, acquiring diplomatic and economic "prongs" with a particular focus on Southeast Asia, broadening the bandwidth of US engagement beyond military diplomacy and force realignment. However, the US "pivot" has had to contend with entrenched narratives of the US role in the region oscillating between extremes of neglect or over-militarization. The US-China strategic dynamic weighing over the region, itself central to Washington's strategic calculus across Asia, has also coloured the lens through which Southeast Asians have viewed the re-balance. Varied reactions to the US rebalance at the national level in Southeast Asia are further suggestive of a sub-regional divide between "continental" and "maritime" states that to some extent predisposes their perspectives and orientation towards the Great Powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article serves as an introduction to the South China Sea dispute, as well as the themes and challenges highlighted by articles in this special issue. It draws attention to the complexity of a dispute that is no longer just about territory but also broader maritime rights, an evolving maritime regime, resources, and increasingly, the role of China as a rising power in East Asia vis-à-vis the United States as the status quo power. It especially highlights how the intersection of US-China issues with what has historically been a regional dispute has significantly raised the stakes for all concerned. It is the conclusion of contributing authors that mismanagement of the South China Sea will carry high, even unacceptable, costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]