Search

This paper uses the strategic dimensions concept and content analysis of nine key defence white papers published between 1957 and 2010 to assess which factors most influence declaratory policy. The paper also notes that the development of defence policy has been accompanied by the “muddling through” vs. decisive choice debate which reflects the tensions within policy between the thesis of strategy and the antithesis of fiscal parsimony. The paper maintains that defence policy is ultimately contingent upon external threats and it is these, rather than the desire to economise, which are the key policy drivers. It concludes that this extrinsic factor will determine the outcome of the next SDSR and though this is not necessarily incongruent with the desire to economise, events may prove otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent debate in the UK has questioned the United Kingdom’s understanding of strategy. This paper examines the nature of strategy in the context of UK security, particularly its recent attempts to craft a National Security Strategy and conduct a Strategic Defence and Security Review. Using a combination of official sources, published literature and interviews with officials closely involved in the process it suggests that there is much that is logical in the NSS and SDSR and that it represents a more realistic security strategy than hitherto attempted. However, it also highlights that flaws in the process and UK thinking have led to a number of inconsistencies and concludes that, lacking a true National Strategy, if strategists do not provide realistic feedback to policy-makers then political ambition will continue to outstrip ways and means and so UK security strategy will be exposed to potential failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategy has become a term so widespread that it has lost virtually all value. Its meaning has expanded so that it no longer applies solely to the application of military power. Even for those who seek to apply the discipline of strategy to matters that affect national, regional or even global security, the impact of transnational factors and the increasing imperative to act as part of a coalition or alliance suggest that strategic theory is increasingly different from practice. Multilateral responses challenge the clear articulation of ends, ways and means, and the act of intervention changes the context in ways that are often impossible to anticipate. This paper explores oblique decision-making, and its role in addressing complex problems for which scientific processes seem ill-suited. It challenges the assumption that shortage of resources and inadequate analysis of the theatre of operations are at the heart of our difficulties with strategy. Greater problems result from failures to clearly articulate the purpose for which we are employing military, and other instruments of power, and from identifying ends for which the prescribed ways and means are mismatched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author for three years designed, co-delivered and quality assured the Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context programme, an important and complex element of the UK National Security Strategy required by the MoD and Cross Government partners. To date little empirical research has been conducted in this field. This paper reflects upon the value and challenges of this flagship International Security Cooperation Education programme and provides a firm basis for enhancing future work. The intent is to be informative, though-provoking and intellectually challenging and thereby to contribute to the capacity building of defence and security leadership, management and command in transitional democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During recent years, a number of western donor countries have recognized the utility of, and need for, more robust and well-articulated national security frameworks. Two interesting phenomena have contributed to the awareness of such a need. Firstly, the recognition by these countries when assisting in the design and expenditure of developmental assistance programmes that, in many states emerging from conflict, a national security 'system' of sorts becomes a priority. Such a 'security system' will not work if left to develop at municipal or provincial levels within a state, without some parallel efforts towards establishing top-level national ownership behind the security agenda. Whether such ideas become embodied within a peace agreement or within the mandate of a new or provisional government, it is essential that the core foundations for national security provide strategic guidance for the range of other national instruments responsible for implementing security policy. More recently, in a number of international assistance programmes, donor states have encouraged the development of national security frameworks as a way of guiding the evolution of other programme areas (for example in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Jamaica). Whilst such developments are encouraging, they have also served as subtle reminders to some donor governments that there is room to adopt a similar practice in reviewing the way in which their own governments develop national security policy. Secondly, in the wake of a broader human security agenda - and following the progress made towards adapting and expanding roles and responsibilities across governments in support of international security priorities - some analysts and senior policymakers are making more efforts to think 'strategically' about national security in order to link up these expanded areas under a more concise central policy remit. Whereas some states already in possession of a national security architecture have used existing ... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of warfare is changing, with a far greater threat to international security posed by terrorists, in particular al Qaeda. This paper sets out to expose the deficiencies in perusing traditional concepts of deterrence that served the West well during the Cold War, but which are no longer relevant. It exposes the differences in approach either side of 9/11, setting out the challenges and proposing modern, well-orchestrated strategies, which will be successful in a contemporary context. This paper advocates a new concept of 'detercion', as one method by which the West may bring about the defeat of global terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the impact of climate change on the armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on Southeast Asia. The author argues that climate change will add burdens to the region's natural resources, the infrastructures of the region's political, economic, and social alignments, and increase domestic and foreign security threats. The author asserts that the increased threats and demands upon the political and economic systems of the region will add to the necessity of devoting military resources to humanitarian relief, domestic security, and policing maritime military actions. It is argued that the traditional application of national security does not apply because climate change can lead to the necessity to adapt military policy unconventionally.

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and information operations (IO) has enabled the formulation of new operational concepts. It explores how the concepts being developed by the United States rest upon skillful manipulation of an adversary through precision targeting. Such strategies, while elegant, constitute a major increase in the complexity of military planning and operational execution. Moreover, different theories of causation within the international system affect the development of national strategy, military strategy, and the specific selection and engagement of targets. Strategies of manipulation also demand distinctly different capabilities from strategies of annihilation, and therefore entail opportunity costs that must be considered in the Department of Defense's transformation agenda. The paper concludes that while strategies of manipulation may appeal to US strategists and war-planners, the long-term consequences of their adoption may have the unintended effect of concentrating military force against civilian populations and infrastructure, increasing the sensitivity of US warplans to adversaries' adaptations, and decreasing the flexibility and dynamism of US military forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of studies relating to the U.S. Armed Forces. "The Bush Doctrine: Rest in Peace?," by Donald C. F. Daniel, Peter J. Dombrowski and Roger A. Payne; "Does 9/11 Mark the End of Deterrence and the Birth of "Detercion"?," by British Army Major A. R. Nott; "Get Real: Transformation and Targeting," by Aaron Frank.

Defense ministries conduct strategic planning in various ways. In this article I outline tradeoffs in the design of strategic planning processes, and consider the implications of these tradeoffs for choices about the conduct of defense planning in different circumstances. Whereas an inclusive and transparent planning process is well-suited to building internal and external buy-in for a defense strategy, a more exclusive and opaque process is more likely to generate a defense strategy that departs from the status quo and speaks candidly about key challenges. The design of a defense planning process should therefore be informed by certain features of its context, such as whether the international security environment is stable or in flux and whether the defense ministry enjoys or lacks strong political support. I base the article’s findings on an in-depth analysis of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, which served for nearly two decades as the major strategy process of the U.S. Department of Defense. This analysis draws on interviews I conducted of 23 defense officials and experts, as well as primary and secondary sources. More generally, my findings highlight for scholars and practitioners the importance of understanding how planning processes can shape defense and national security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses why the US in its military operations tends to focus on only one dimension in war - the military narrowly understood. More precisely, in the US case, its armed forces tend to be preoccupied with platforms and understand military capabilities as those that deliver death and destruction. I explain this one-sided understanding of the military dimension in war with how the US armed forces think about future war. How the US understands future war is, in turn, a reflection of how it organizes its long-term defense planning procedures. In particular, by approaching the concept of future as by and large structurally determined, a focus on platforms becomes natural. Investments in weapons systems, too, are more easily motivated to Congress since it is easier to attach a price to developing, for example, a new submarine than it is to attach a price to the cost of developing a military organization that is adaptive, learning and anticipating. The understanding of the future as something that happens whether you like it or not is particularly odd in the US context where of course a central tenet of the American dream is that the individual creates her own future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Norwegian Armed Forces has seen extensive reforms since the early 1990s. It has been changed from a large, conscription-based, reservist-dominated territorial Defense force to a smaller, more proficient, and flexible force. However, this process has been far from linear, and to this day the Norwegian Armed Forces retains significant elements of its organizational and cultural cold war heritage. We argue that national security concerns, domestic politics and financial constraints have played the main role in shaping the reform of the Armed Forces. This argument gives an alternative to explanations offered by previous research, which has tended to emphasize the role played by international influences, such as the NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as NATO and US reform initiatives. While external factors undoubtedly have shaped the direction and tempo of the reforms, our findings point to long-standing structural and financial imbalances as the key explanation of the current structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to analyze the Brazilian Defense Policy in terms of its ability to reduce the gap between ends and means. Since 2003, the Brazilian defense policy has evolved along with Brazil’s increased role in the international system. Sustaining this process depends on institutional, economic, and operational conditions that are yet to be fully guaranteed. They require negotiations, reforms, and strategic perspective. By identifying specific challenges emerging from the national security institutional framework, the combat capability building process, the budgetary cycle, as well as from the defense industrial base, we sought to explain their rationale and to offer concrete policy pointers to overcome obstacles. As a general conclusion, the Brazilian defense policy was strengthened by the 2008 National Defense Strategy (END) due to its clearer strategic goals. Bridging the gap between those ends and the proper means is a continuous effort for any given country, but in the case of Brazil it has been addressed with firmer steps since the END, even in the face of harder economic and political conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article analyses the Spanish military transformation. This process started in 2004 as a means to adapt the force structure, organization and capabilities of the Spanish military to meet present and future threats in compliance with NATO’s initiatives, thus ensuring the continuity of the equipment modernization, professionalization and the adjustment of the country’s defence architecture to the post-cold war environment. A decade later, although transformation is still a priority for the Ministry of Defence, limited political will, a lack of strategic guidance, poor resource management and the effects of the economic crisis are compromising its development. This article describes the Spanish military transformation and assesses its value in adapting the country’s armed forces to the current and prospective security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is a growing consensus among defence planners that Australia is in need of a new defence policy that better suits the strategic realties of an emerging multipolar Asia. After assessing the implications of shifting regional power balances for Australia, this article advances the argument that Australia should redirect its attention back to its immediate north: the “Indo-Pacific Arc”. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have always been vitally important to Australia’s long-term security and, being the gateway between the Indian and Pacific oceans, their strategic value is set to dramatically increase in the multipolar Asia. Finally, this article develops the case for Australia to partner with its neighbours to stem the political and military influence of outside powers into the Indo-Pacific Arc. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Currently, “macro” systems thinking is arguably most evident in intelligence studies. Appearing especially apparent are characterisations of different intelligence architectures, strongly associated with grander-ranging national or central intelligence systems and their associated machinery, even being bounded as intelligence communities. Following on from noteworthy US defence sector developments, which have demonstrable relevance both to and for closely overlapping contemporary intelligence work, more “micro” systems thinking – namely involving intelligence-related “System of Systems” (“SoS”) concepts – is increasingly emergent. For helping to facilitate and better understand contemporary intelligence innovation, SoS constructs and their dynamics are now deserving of being further examined and refined. This includes as they pertain to the conduct of several multifunctional and special operations occurring across the world during an overall era of globalised strategic risk, and as the study and practice of intelligence aims towards further extension and adaptive transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at the changing nature of European militaries specifically within the context of the United States’s transformation agenda. The article looks at the key drivers of transformation in European militaries and asks the question to what degree has the American agenda impacted on the way Europe does defence. The article looks at three aspects of transformation across three case studies. The aspects are network enabledness, expeditionary forces and effects based operations. The analysis is applied to the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The findings suggest that local political and bureaucratic conditions have the potential to trump a larger process of force transformation led by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the traditional conceptions of security and defence in Brazil. It does so by investigating their introduction in the political and legal vocabulary in Brazilian legislation. It further explores these terms as part of a project of militarization of the state and society which peaked during the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937–1945). Legislative sources and political writings of the time are thus used to corroborate the historical analysis and two main arguments: (1) conceptual innovations introduced in legislation allowed the armed forces to establish its monopoly over specific policy areas and, later, (2) to legally exercise control over civilian life. As such, it highlights the early relationship established between Brazilianess and development and argues that speaking security enabled authoritarian sectors to put forward their own project of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ‘mentoring’ of the Afghan armed forces will increasingly feature in the Coalition agenda as its involvement in Afghanistan gradually shifts to an ‘indirect approach’ by 2015. Therefore, the challenge for Western policymakers will be to set effective long-term policies into motion while setting aside any false expectations of short-term success. However, Coalition policies in this area to date have emphasized building a quantitatively large Afghan military system in the short-term, with little interest, apart from rhetorical, in stressing quality. This article argues that such policies will have profoundly negative implications for the ability of the Afghan state to build a relatively competent and sustainable military system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide-ranging 'broad risk management' approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism, conceived of as counter-insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower 'risk prevention' approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in 'firefighting' activities, enabling them to adopt more of a 'risk pre-emption' approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the approach used at the National War College of the U.S. Navy for teaching national security strategy. Background on the National War College; Analysis of the role of theory in teaching of strategic thinking; Information on the Joint Professional Military Education Program that is being offered at the National War College.

The article presents a brief overview of France-Polish relations, it turns to French security and defence within the transatlantic relationship. It then addresses some divergences in policy between the two countries, in particular within the context of European Security and Defence Policy, but also with regard to other issues at the heart of contemporary discussions on European defence, such as NATO enlargement and missile defence. The research for the article was carried out in the summer and autumn of 2001 and so does not cover developments that have taken place since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and since the recent change of government in France.

Due to its geographical situation and its historical experiences, Poland's efforts to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were mainly motivated by the disposition to become, first of all, a consumer of security offered by the Alliance. This disposition continues to shape the thinking of Polish politicians, who attach greater weight to the presentation of those NATO functions that safeguard defence than to those that could make NATO an instrument of Polish foreign policy. The difficulty of switching to the role of "security provider" primarily stems from Poland's perception of a continuing Russian threat.