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The existing, liberal world order is under pressure and transatlantic cooperation on security is challenged. The paper raises the question, why have the European steps and policy initiatives towards addressing the new international threats and challenges to Europe been so limited and cautious. The first argument states it is because the European decision-makers were unable to agree when it came to implementing salient and concrete policies addressing new security threats and building strategic autonomy. The second argument states that the European decision-makers were only able to reach agreement on diffuse and symbolic policy ideas like building "strategic autonomy" for the European Union. The third argument states that the Europeans were able to address some of the new security challenges if it took place within NATO. The analysis shows that the European responses and reactions to the increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific were subdued. The Europeans were unable to launch any concrete reactions to the American unilateral abrogation of the Iranian nuclear deal, to the unilateral American policy initiatives in the Israel-Palestine conflict or to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, the Europeans increased the level of their defense spending and they also cooperated closely with their transatlantic partner to counter the assertive Russian foreign policy behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]