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The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper uses the strategic dimensions concept and content analysis of nine key defence white papers published between 1957 and 2010 to assess which factors most influence declaratory policy. The paper also notes that the development of defence policy has been accompanied by the “muddling through” vs. decisive choice debate which reflects the tensions within policy between the thesis of strategy and the antithesis of fiscal parsimony. The paper maintains that defence policy is ultimately contingent upon external threats and it is these, rather than the desire to economise, which are the key policy drivers. It concludes that this extrinsic factor will determine the outcome of the next SDSR and though this is not necessarily incongruent with the desire to economise, events may prove otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The nature of warfare is changing, with a far greater threat to international security posed by terrorists, in particular al Qaeda. This paper sets out to expose the deficiencies in perusing traditional concepts of deterrence that served the West well during the Cold War, but which are no longer relevant. It exposes the differences in approach either side of 9/11, setting out the challenges and proposing modern, well-orchestrated strategies, which will be successful in a contemporary context. This paper advocates a new concept of 'detercion', as one method by which the West may bring about the defeat of global terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent debate in the UK has questioned the United Kingdom’s understanding of strategy. This paper examines the nature of strategy in the context of UK security, particularly its recent attempts to craft a National Security Strategy and conduct a Strategic Defence and Security Review. Using a combination of official sources, published literature and interviews with officials closely involved in the process it suggests that there is much that is logical in the NSS and SDSR and that it represents a more realistic security strategy than hitherto attempted. However, it also highlights that flaws in the process and UK thinking have led to a number of inconsistencies and concludes that, lacking a true National Strategy, if strategists do not provide realistic feedback to policy-makers then political ambition will continue to outstrip ways and means and so UK security strategy will be exposed to potential failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategy has become a term so widespread that it has lost virtually all value. Its meaning has expanded so that it no longer applies solely to the application of military power. Even for those who seek to apply the discipline of strategy to matters that affect national, regional or even global security, the impact of transnational factors and the increasing imperative to act as part of a coalition or alliance suggest that strategic theory is increasingly different from practice. Multilateral responses challenge the clear articulation of ends, ways and means, and the act of intervention changes the context in ways that are often impossible to anticipate. This paper explores oblique decision-making, and its role in addressing complex problems for which scientific processes seem ill-suited. It challenges the assumption that shortage of resources and inadequate analysis of the theatre of operations are at the heart of our difficulties with strategy. Greater problems result from failures to clearly articulate the purpose for which we are employing military, and other instruments of power, and from identifying ends for which the prescribed ways and means are mismatched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author for three years designed, co-delivered and quality assured the Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context programme, an important and complex element of the UK National Security Strategy required by the MoD and Cross Government partners. To date little empirical research has been conducted in this field. This paper reflects upon the value and challenges of this flagship International Security Cooperation Education programme and provides a firm basis for enhancing future work. The intent is to be informative, though-provoking and intellectually challenging and thereby to contribute to the capacity building of defence and security leadership, management and command in transitional democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and information operations (IO) has enabled the formulation of new operational concepts. It explores how the concepts being developed by the United States rest upon skillful manipulation of an adversary through precision targeting. Such strategies, while elegant, constitute a major increase in the complexity of military planning and operational execution. Moreover, different theories of causation within the international system affect the development of national strategy, military strategy, and the specific selection and engagement of targets. Strategies of manipulation also demand distinctly different capabilities from strategies of annihilation, and therefore entail opportunity costs that must be considered in the Department of Defense's transformation agenda. The paper concludes that while strategies of manipulation may appeal to US strategists and war-planners, the long-term consequences of their adoption may have the unintended effect of concentrating military force against civilian populations and infrastructure, increasing the sensitivity of US warplans to adversaries' adaptations, and decreasing the flexibility and dynamism of US military forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]