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The sea has increased in importance as a source of useful resources. The nation that has control of its immediate and external seas is in a good position to choose how much or how little of sea resources it wants. It is the importance of the sea and the sea lines of communication to nations that has made thoughts such as maritime power, sea power, naval strategy ... etc significant to them. The paper also examined the naval and constabulary relevance of the Nigerian Navy to its maritime environment. The study relied on primary and documentary data. The documentary data were sourced from books, newspapers and annual reports. The secondary sources used were subjected to textual and contextual evaluations. The primary sources was basically interviews with some important actors in the era. The paper's study of the Nigerian Navy also identified the roles of a small navy and their importance to the maritime environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the relationship between national security policymaking and the defence sector. The goal is to understand how a lack of attention to national security policymaking affects the defence sector and vice-versa using Brazil as a case study. Our main argument is that a lack of attention in national security policymaking by civilian elites can weaken political controls over the armed forces, inhibit effective defence reforms that challenge military prerogatives, and, over time, reinforce militarization in national security policymaking, especially in its three main pillars: defence, intelligence, and public safety. We call this process national security neglect. Our case study shows that as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to dealing with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking. Civilians also delegated civilian posts to the armed forces in defence, public safety and intelligence, instead of engaging in broader reforms. This led to a vicious cycle of military dependency, deteriorated the already fragile political controls over the armed forces, inhibited defence reforms, and increased the military role in the state and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern Mission Command philosophy in military operations originated with the German concept of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics). It emphasizes in general terms the exercise of disciplined initiatives by subordinates during the execution of mission-type orders in the course of military operations that are conducted within the overall intent of a commander. The present paper contains an overview of the historical evolution of the mission command concept and its application. The paper compares the mission command concept with the detailed or linear method of command. This paper focuses on the relevance of the mission command concept for the Hellenic Land Forces (HLF) in Greece. The paper provides a historical account on when and where mission command was successfully exercised by the Hellenic Armed Forces in the modern military history of Greece. The authors support the premise that the mission command concept is essential for safeguarding Greek national security in the current environment of evolving symmetric and asymmetric threats, and in meeting operational challenges in a diverse and difficult terrain. The paper examines the cultural reasons that have impeded the adoption of the mission command concept within the HLF and recommends a three-phase model for its permanent implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper shows how alliance networks have affected defence industrialization policies and processes in countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In countries that enjoyed security assurances from the United States like Japan and South Korea, they are primarily focused industrialization and technology development in civilian sectors, and consequently, defence industrialization is a secondary priority. On the other hand, defence industrialization was/is of higher priority for states that face acute security threats such as China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In contemporary industrialization processes, the paper concludes that the preference between commercial and defence industrialization is now closing, leading towards an integrated model from which both sectors can benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper uses the strategic dimensions concept and content analysis of nine key defence white papers published between 1957 and 2010 to assess which factors most influence declaratory policy. The paper also notes that the development of defence policy has been accompanied by the “muddling through” vs. decisive choice debate which reflects the tensions within policy between the thesis of strategy and the antithesis of fiscal parsimony. The paper maintains that defence policy is ultimately contingent upon external threats and it is these, rather than the desire to economise, which are the key policy drivers. It concludes that this extrinsic factor will determine the outcome of the next SDSR and though this is not necessarily incongruent with the desire to economise, events may prove otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Clausewitz described the nature of war in terms of a trinity that could be associated to relationships between the armed forces, the government and society. This paper examines if this trinity is fundamentally affected by three current processes: the increasing use of civilians to supplement or replace military capabilities; the growing employment of unmanned systems; and the rapidly developing capabilities and potential of cyberbased operations. Each of these areas is considered in turn, highlighting how the processes bring about changes between the traditional roles in providing national security of the elements of Clausewitz’s trinity. This paper concludes that the changes wrought by the processes of civilianisation, automation and cyber operations do pose significant challenges to the armed forces, but these are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The wider issue is the increasing reliance of the government on private organisations and other nations to provide the full range of national security measures, and it is in these areas where much work is required to continue to assure security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of warfare is changing, with a far greater threat to international security posed by terrorists, in particular al Qaeda. This paper sets out to expose the deficiencies in perusing traditional concepts of deterrence that served the West well during the Cold War, but which are no longer relevant. It exposes the differences in approach either side of 9/11, setting out the challenges and proposing modern, well-orchestrated strategies, which will be successful in a contemporary context. This paper advocates a new concept of 'detercion', as one method by which the West may bring about the defeat of global terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern Olympic Games are large and complex enough to be termed ‘mega events’. They use enormous resources; human, physical and financial. The effects of such investments are significant and long-lived for the host country; both urban infrastructure and security measures must be meticulously planned to ensure the event’s success. In the case of London 2012, there was less than 24 hours between the announcement that London would be the host, and the tragic events of the July bombings, meaning that Britain’s Olympic Games would forever be inextricably linked with terrorism. This paper examines whether the forthcoming Olympic Games has been used as an opportunity to ensure that Britain’s maritime flank is as well protected as it can be. It will ask whether there is a credible threat to the UK from the maritime domain, both during the event, and once it has finished. It will look at how the Government views the issue of defence of our homeland waters from threats, what work has been done to mitigate risks to the Olympics, and whether, once the closing ceremony has finished, the unique opportunities offered by the hosting of such event has made us safer. It will conclude that there is a credible threat of attack on the UK’s way of life, either at, or from the sea, but despite this, the Government is taking a strategic risk in relying on the maritime environment to deliver over 90 per cent of our trade. Not only that, the Government has directed that security for the Olympics will be based on ‘business as usual’, and so the hosting of the largest event on the planet has potentially been a missed opportunity to focus on strengthening our security structures. Current Government Foreign and Defence Policies provide little opportunity for re-visiting our homeland security strategy, despite predictions of security requirements to preserve our way of life becoming future defence priorities. In this era of fiscal strain, ever fewer assets and capabilities, and our reliance on the sea for our very survival, the homeland maritime domain has never looked so vulnerable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent debate in the UK has questioned the United Kingdom’s understanding of strategy. This paper examines the nature of strategy in the context of UK security, particularly its recent attempts to craft a National Security Strategy and conduct a Strategic Defence and Security Review. Using a combination of official sources, published literature and interviews with officials closely involved in the process it suggests that there is much that is logical in the NSS and SDSR and that it represents a more realistic security strategy than hitherto attempted. However, it also highlights that flaws in the process and UK thinking have led to a number of inconsistencies and concludes that, lacking a true National Strategy, if strategists do not provide realistic feedback to policy-makers then political ambition will continue to outstrip ways and means and so UK security strategy will be exposed to potential failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategy has become a term so widespread that it has lost virtually all value. Its meaning has expanded so that it no longer applies solely to the application of military power. Even for those who seek to apply the discipline of strategy to matters that affect national, regional or even global security, the impact of transnational factors and the increasing imperative to act as part of a coalition or alliance suggest that strategic theory is increasingly different from practice. Multilateral responses challenge the clear articulation of ends, ways and means, and the act of intervention changes the context in ways that are often impossible to anticipate. This paper explores oblique decision-making, and its role in addressing complex problems for which scientific processes seem ill-suited. It challenges the assumption that shortage of resources and inadequate analysis of the theatre of operations are at the heart of our difficulties with strategy. Greater problems result from failures to clearly articulate the purpose for which we are employing military, and other instruments of power, and from identifying ends for which the prescribed ways and means are mismatched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author for three years designed, co-delivered and quality assured the Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context programme, an important and complex element of the UK National Security Strategy required by the MoD and Cross Government partners. To date little empirical research has been conducted in this field. This paper reflects upon the value and challenges of this flagship International Security Cooperation Education programme and provides a firm basis for enhancing future work. The intent is to be informative, though-provoking and intellectually challenging and thereby to contribute to the capacity building of defence and security leadership, management and command in transitional democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and information operations (IO) has enabled the formulation of new operational concepts. It explores how the concepts being developed by the United States rest upon skillful manipulation of an adversary through precision targeting. Such strategies, while elegant, constitute a major increase in the complexity of military planning and operational execution. Moreover, different theories of causation within the international system affect the development of national strategy, military strategy, and the specific selection and engagement of targets. Strategies of manipulation also demand distinctly different capabilities from strategies of annihilation, and therefore entail opportunity costs that must be considered in the Department of Defense's transformation agenda. The paper concludes that while strategies of manipulation may appeal to US strategists and war-planners, the long-term consequences of their adoption may have the unintended effect of concentrating military force against civilian populations and infrastructure, increasing the sensitivity of US warplans to adversaries' adaptations, and decreasing the flexibility and dynamism of US military forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]