Search

The article presents abstracts of papers about war. They include "Multi-Ethnic Armies in the Aftermath of Civil War: Lessons Learned From Lebanon," "Understanding the Leadership and Culture Dynamic Within a Military Context: Applying Theory to an Operational and Business Context," and "Strategy: The Challenge of Complexity."

Strategy has become a term so widespread that it has lost virtually all value. Its meaning has expanded so that it no longer applies solely to the application of military power. Even for those who seek to apply the discipline of strategy to matters that affect national, regional or even global security, the impact of transnational factors and the increasing imperative to act as part of a coalition or alliance suggest that strategic theory is increasingly different from practice. Multilateral responses challenge the clear articulation of ends, ways and means, and the act of intervention changes the context in ways that are often impossible to anticipate. This paper explores oblique decision-making, and its role in addressing complex problems for which scientific processes seem ill-suited. It challenges the assumption that shortage of resources and inadequate analysis of the theatre of operations are at the heart of our difficulties with strategy. Greater problems result from failures to clearly articulate the purpose for which we are employing military, and other instruments of power, and from identifying ends for which the prescribed ways and means are mismatched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the initial findings of a research programme which was designed to establish the utility of the British Army's Mission Command approach beyond the contextual confines of the military environment. The military metaphor has been widely used throughout business literature but, there has been little research to justify or refute the validity of such comparisons. This programme evaluates the utility of key military leadership and management techniques through an examination of Territorial Army (TA) Officers who have been selected and trained by the British Army while establishing and developing their own business practices. The research programme examines the adaptation of these key concepts by business and suggests further avenues for future research. The research suggests that the British military method of leadership and management practice does have utility within a non-military environment. The ability to share context, empower staff and ensure that context volatility is managed, which lead to competitive advantage are critical observations that have emerged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking its point of departure in Donald Rumsfeld’s second term as US Secretary of Defense (2001–2006), this article analyses the crisis of strategic leadership in Western national security. Three “traps” are identified that explain why Donald Rumsfeld ultimately was a failure as defence secretary and demonstrate the perils of national security governance. These traps are termed the inquisitor trap, the strong leader trap and the delegation trap. It is argued that our understanding of strategic leadership in national security, particularly in defence, can benefit from insights gained from the study of strategic leadership in business. As such, this article engages the recent trend of merging insights from business and military strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was a military disaster for Italy. However, for all of the ethnic slurs and cultural stereotyping levelled at Italian military performance in North Africa by historians and popular authors alike, relatively little research effort invested into identifying the real military disadvantages under which Mussolini’s soldiers in this theatre fought. When understood as a product of measurable and objective military factors, like the issue of leadership for example, the rout of the 10th Army takes on an entirely new complexion. The subsequent reputation of Italian soldiers as embarrassing battlefield liabilities in the Western Desert in this period is exposed as unfair. This overlooks the handicaps they fought under, and often ignores the bravery displayed in spite of them all. Like the Australians, the Italians in the Western Desert were ordinary men, no more and no less. In truth, it is singularly unsurprising that so many were killed or surrendered without putting up much real resistance. They faced challenges and conditions that would have handicapped troops from any country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]