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The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of warfare is changing, with a far greater threat to international security posed by terrorists, in particular al Qaeda. This paper sets out to expose the deficiencies in perusing traditional concepts of deterrence that served the West well during the Cold War, but which are no longer relevant. It exposes the differences in approach either side of 9/11, setting out the challenges and proposing modern, well-orchestrated strategies, which will be successful in a contemporary context. This paper advocates a new concept of 'detercion', as one method by which the West may bring about the defeat of global terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and information operations (IO) has enabled the formulation of new operational concepts. It explores how the concepts being developed by the United States rest upon skillful manipulation of an adversary through precision targeting. Such strategies, while elegant, constitute a major increase in the complexity of military planning and operational execution. Moreover, different theories of causation within the international system affect the development of national strategy, military strategy, and the specific selection and engagement of targets. Strategies of manipulation also demand distinctly different capabilities from strategies of annihilation, and therefore entail opportunity costs that must be considered in the Department of Defense's transformation agenda. The paper concludes that while strategies of manipulation may appeal to US strategists and war-planners, the long-term consequences of their adoption may have the unintended effect of concentrating military force against civilian populations and infrastructure, increasing the sensitivity of US warplans to adversaries' adaptations, and decreasing the flexibility and dynamism of US military forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of studies relating to the U.S. Armed Forces. "The Bush Doctrine: Rest in Peace?," by Donald C. F. Daniel, Peter J. Dombrowski and Roger A. Payne; "Does 9/11 Mark the End of Deterrence and the Birth of "Detercion"?," by British Army Major A. R. Nott; "Get Real: Transformation and Targeting," by Aaron Frank.

Defense ministries conduct strategic planning in various ways. In this article I outline tradeoffs in the design of strategic planning processes, and consider the implications of these tradeoffs for choices about the conduct of defense planning in different circumstances. Whereas an inclusive and transparent planning process is well-suited to building internal and external buy-in for a defense strategy, a more exclusive and opaque process is more likely to generate a defense strategy that departs from the status quo and speaks candidly about key challenges. The design of a defense planning process should therefore be informed by certain features of its context, such as whether the international security environment is stable or in flux and whether the defense ministry enjoys or lacks strong political support. I base the article’s findings on an in-depth analysis of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, which served for nearly two decades as the major strategy process of the U.S. Department of Defense. This analysis draws on interviews I conducted of 23 defense officials and experts, as well as primary and secondary sources. More generally, my findings highlight for scholars and practitioners the importance of understanding how planning processes can shape defense and national security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses why the US in its military operations tends to focus on only one dimension in war - the military narrowly understood. More precisely, in the US case, its armed forces tend to be preoccupied with platforms and understand military capabilities as those that deliver death and destruction. I explain this one-sided understanding of the military dimension in war with how the US armed forces think about future war. How the US understands future war is, in turn, a reflection of how it organizes its long-term defense planning procedures. In particular, by approaching the concept of future as by and large structurally determined, a focus on platforms becomes natural. Investments in weapons systems, too, are more easily motivated to Congress since it is easier to attach a price to developing, for example, a new submarine than it is to attach a price to the cost of developing a military organization that is adaptive, learning and anticipating. The understanding of the future as something that happens whether you like it or not is particularly odd in the US context where of course a central tenet of the American dream is that the individual creates her own future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, “macro” systems thinking is arguably most evident in intelligence studies. Appearing especially apparent are characterisations of different intelligence architectures, strongly associated with grander-ranging national or central intelligence systems and their associated machinery, even being bounded as intelligence communities. Following on from noteworthy US defence sector developments, which have demonstrable relevance both to and for closely overlapping contemporary intelligence work, more “micro” systems thinking – namely involving intelligence-related “System of Systems” (“SoS”) concepts – is increasingly emergent. For helping to facilitate and better understand contemporary intelligence innovation, SoS constructs and their dynamics are now deserving of being further examined and refined. This includes as they pertain to the conduct of several multifunctional and special operations occurring across the world during an overall era of globalised strategic risk, and as the study and practice of intelligence aims towards further extension and adaptive transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at the changing nature of European militaries specifically within the context of the United States’s transformation agenda. The article looks at the key drivers of transformation in European militaries and asks the question to what degree has the American agenda impacted on the way Europe does defence. The article looks at three aspects of transformation across three case studies. The aspects are network enabledness, expeditionary forces and effects based operations. The analysis is applied to the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The findings suggest that local political and bureaucratic conditions have the potential to trump a larger process of force transformation led by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide-ranging 'broad risk management' approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism, conceived of as counter-insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower 'risk prevention' approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in 'firefighting' activities, enabling them to adopt more of a 'risk pre-emption' approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the approach used at the National War College of the U.S. Navy for teaching national security strategy. Background on the National War College; Analysis of the role of theory in teaching of strategic thinking; Information on the Joint Professional Military Education Program that is being offered at the National War College.