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The war in Ukraine, coupled with a more turbulent international system characterized by geopolitical competition between the United States and China, is leading to a simultaneous change in the demand and supply side of the European defence market. On the demand side, European countries are adapting their procurement plans to move from a crisis management phase dominated by asymmetric warfare against small states or non-state actors to an era of strategic competition and potential conflict against peer adversaries. On the supply side, European defence industries are preparing to meet the increased demand for major equipment from national governments in the short term, while at the same time trying to be ready to invest in long-term innovation, in order to anticipate future government requirements for the new era. This paper investigates the interactions between demand and supply in the European defence market and provides a first illustration of the trade-off between prioritizing short-term readiness over long-term innovation and vice versa [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union defence sector is not only crucial for the EU's security, but it is also a major industrial asset for EU member states, as it may foster innovation and greater integration among member states, as well as facilitate technology transfer. The understanding of and inferences about the sector, however, are laborious since data on the defence industry in Europe is often contradictory and confused and it is mostly compared at the national not at the European level. As a contribution to address such shortcomings and as opening piece for this Special Issue, this article focuses on the finding, collecting, cleaning, and organizing data on the geographical concentration/location of EU defence industries. This is a fully original descriptive analysis of the current situation, and it provides a reliable basis on the concentration/location of defence companies. This paper represents a firm basis from which to explore (in future research) how defence companies contribute to the technological integration of the EU and it should help the reader to better understand the following articles in this Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Critical Appraisal draws a picture of the current state of the EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by building on the 7 Papers included in the Defence Studies Special Issue dedicated to "European Defence". The authors assess the EU defence industry consolidation process, describing the trends that shape it and the variety of actors involved. In the complex European defence market, opposite – but not mutually exclusive – trends of consolidation and fragmentation coexist. The authors conclude that the EDTIB is likely to continue developing along these apparently contradictory lines, where the variety of public and private actors involved cooperate and compete simultaneously, according to a plethora of interests. The Appraisal suggests several areas for future research and touches upon new EU defence initiatives, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and it's precursor programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 1961 farewell address, US President Eisenhower coined the term "military-industrial complex," referring to the coalescing of military, industrial, and political interest groups. In contemporary Europe, the military-industrial complex is arguably transforming into a complex with a noteworthy commercial civilian dimension, blurring traditional military and arms-focused understandings of European defence and security. Our emphasis on an added corporate civilian component captures the expansion of defence and security beyond the traditional military domain. Coalescing of industry and politics is observed in Europe, blurring the military-civilian divide, technologically as well as in organization and governance, particularly through public-private partnerships. Eisenhower, himself a decorated WWII general, warned of how the US military-industrial complex could lead to "disastrous use of misplaced power." Rather than reiterating such a conclusion in the European context, our paper examines how the European military-civilian-industrial complex is emerging, looking at how elite participants shape the public-private structure of the complex, and specifically how policies on dual-use and emerging technologies influence developments in Europe. The focus herein is on novel actors, characteristics, and the European Union and charts out defining conceptual features of the defence and security industry in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Defence Industry is undergoing profound changes. Industrial activity is now operating on a quintuple helix innovation model with the deep involvement of universities and governments in innovation. In addition, military innovations are being transferred to civil society, with increasing attention paid to the environment. In the first stage, we report on the state-of-the-art of existing research using PRISMA protocol. The PRISMA technique is widely accepted by the academic community for its ability to discover concepts, ideas, and debates about the defence industry. In the second stage, we present a case study involving the Portuguese Defence Industry, for which multiple data collection sources were used to ensure triangulation and corroboration. The results show that, in the light of the quintuple helix innovation model, it was possible to bring applications from theoretical discussion to real life. Moreover, within the scope of the triple helix, it was possible to develop, produce and test military products, allowing to improve the military capacity of ground forces. In the future, ecological concerns will likely increase, so we suggest a greater focus on this area of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When it comes to states arming themselves, it has become axiomatic among scholars of comparative defence industries that go-it-alone production is no longer an option for most. The processes associated with defence-industrial globalization combined with the ever-rising costs of producing leading-edge weapons systems present huge disincentives for autarky in armaments. Against these strong headwinds, however, India has recently launched, as part of a broader, multi-sector initiative called Make in India, a renewed effort to achieve greater self-reliance in armaments production. This article first places India's recent defence indigenization efforts within wider discussions about states' armament strategies and trends in global arms production. Secondly, it contextualizes the drivers behind New Delhi's latest attempts to transform itself from leading arms importer to major producer (and significant exporter) against the backdrop of past efforts which have yielded little but disappointment. Third, it explicates the main facets of the current strategy for defence-industrial indigenization and gauges its chances for success. To preview the main findings, we argue that self-reliance in armaments via indigenous production will almost certainly continue to allude India because of systemic, structural and technological constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defence-industrial collaborative activities have gained a central stage in the current European debate, based on the simultaneous presence of two systemic pressures (unipolarity and “defence-industrial globalization”) that are pushing EU member states towards more cooperation in these issues. Nevertheless, the European defence-industrial panorama still continues to be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Protectionism, oligopolistic market straining and primary resource to domestic suppliers have prevented a more structured defence-industrial cooperation. The aim of this article is to add empirical evidence to recent academic works that highlighted how relative gains play a key role in understanding the simultaneous presence of cooperation and conflict in the European security architecture. In doing so, this analysis focuses on the European defence-industrial landscape and specifically on British, French and Italian preferences towards armaments cooperation. To preview the conclusions, France, Italy and the UK have constantly pursued greater intra-European cooperation, in order to increase their power within the international defence-industrial market. However, they have refused to participate in European defence-industrial initiatives when other countries would have a greater advantage from this cooperation. This happened despite strong geopolitical and strategic incentives to cooperate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish defence industries have significantly improved their production capabilities since the 1980s. According to the official documents, Turkey reached 54% local production level in 2011. Encouraged by this impressive defence industrial development, the government of Turkey declared that defence industrial autarky, the country’s main goal since the 1980s, would be reached by 2023. This paper evaluates the possibility of Turkey’s defence autarky. Contrary to the existing approaches in the literature that assess technological capabilities and cost-effectiveness, this paper argues that Turkey’s search for defence autarky is hindered by the interplay of institutional deficiencies, dependency on foreign inputs, and the United States’ continuing influence over Turkish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The debate over the benefits and drawbacks of defence industrialisation, particularly for emerging states, is far from settled but, as the case studies in this symposium suggest, a growing number of these states are taking steps to advance their defence industrial capabilities. In this volume, we attempt to decipher the reasons why states make that choice and why they choose to adopt a particular defence industrial policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Israel is currently one of the world’s leading exporters of defence goods and services. Its defence industries originated in the covert workshops of the Hagana and other resistance groups in the pre-independence era of the 1930s, supplying the pre-state armed forces with light weapons. Mainly relying on imported weapons, the French arms embargo in 1967 came as a shock to Israel’s leadership and public, causing a shift in policy towards self-sufficiency in major battlefield platforms (combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and warships) through indigenous research, development and fabrication. This policy of self-sufficiency was later modified to apply only to such weapons or systems that could not be obtained from abroad either for political or technical reasons. It can be expected that Israel defence industries now will focus more on sophisticated PGM’s and battlefield robotics, whilst the Government will strive to fully privatize the remaining state owned defence industries. How successful this will be remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores whether it makes sense for national governments to employ defence industrial policies – such as offsets and discriminatory procurement practices – to support their domestic defence industries. This question has so far primarily been discussed by economists, who have argued strongly against the use of defence industrial policies. This article maintains that these economists fail to address the often complex motivation behind the introduction of these policies. It illustrates these shortcomings by contrasting their arguments against a case study of Norway, which accounts for the country’s use of defence industrial polices from the early post-Second World War era up until today. The article concludes that, depending on their objectives, defence industrial policies can be seen as either a sound security strategy or an economic fallacy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]