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This study explores demand-side stories of democratic backsliding among citizens. We argue that individual job insecurity is associated with higher levels of support for strong leaders who are not committed to being subject to legislative checks and balances. Furthermore, we contend that this relationship is mitigated by higher asset levels and household income. In our analysis of Korea, we utilize data from the 2018 World Values Survey and the 2021 Korean General Social Survey. These results provide robust evidence for this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that assets as private alternatives to the welfare state moderate the effect of job insecurity on public support for undemocratic leaders. The findings from the Korean case have implications that can be generalized: enhancing job security and expanding public welfare provisions could bolster citizens' democratic attitudes and behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worldwide, democratic erosion is on the rise, with incumbents slowly undermining the pillars of democratic competition such as political freedoms, clean elections, and a free press. While such gradual erosion frequently culminates in democratic breakdown, this is not always the case. How can accountability mechanisms contribute to halting democratic erosion before breakdown, even if they could not prevent the onset of erosion? To study this question, we use the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index to systematically identify three recent cases – Benin (2007–2012), Ecuador (2008–2010), and South Korea (2008–2016) – where substantial democratic erosion happened but democracy did not break down. Studying these cases in depth we find that accountability mechanism – parliamentary and judicial oversight (horizontal accountability), pressures from civil society and the media (diagonal accountability), or electoral competition between parties and within parties (vertical accountability) – played a part in halting democratic erosion in all of them. They effectively halted erosion when institutional constraints – such as presidential term limits or judicial independence – and contextual factors – in particular economic downturns and public outrage about corruption scandals – worked together to create simultaneous pressures on the incumbents from civil society and from vertical or horizontal accountability actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article mainly seeks to explain the legislature's preferences in social welfare before and after democratization using South Korea as a case study. Based on an original dataset that consists of all executive and of legislative branch-submitted bills between 1948 and 2016 – roughly 60,000– legislative priority on social welfare is compared over time, and tested using logistic regressions. The key focus of analysis is whether and how the level of democracy affected the degree and universality of social welfare priority. The findings show that the promotion of social welfare is positively related to higher levels of democracy in a continuous fashion, which clearly points to the need to avoid applying a simple regime dichotomy – authoritarian or democratic – when seeking to understand social welfare development. Going further, the article examines the legislature's priority in welfare issues within a presidential structure and under majoritarian electoral rule, at different levels of democracy. The result shows that the higher levels of democracy are, the more the legislative branch contributes to the overall salience of social welfare legislative initiatives as compared to the executive branch. Moreover, the legislative branch itself prioritizes a social welfare agenda – alongside democratic deepening – over other issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, there has been an increase in the number of scholars focusing on why voters around the world differ in their evaluations of electoral integrity. One group of scholars contends that perceived electoral integrity is determined by partisan status according to election results. Another group claims that individual perception of election quality is influenced by such political cues as institutional support for election management bodies. Although the two groups have developed this subject differently, they both underestimate the degree to which the election process affects electoral integrity. Based on the theory of procedural justice, this study argues that the more problems citizens see in the electoral process, the more negatively they tend to rate elections. An analysis of a public opinion survey conducted immediately after the December 2012 presidential election in South Korea provides credible evidence for our theoretical expectations and presents an important implication for elections of new democracies in a comparative perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How do mass citizens understand democracy? Are they capable of distinguishing it from its non-democratic alternatives? Does their understanding about democracy matter? To reveal the contours of cultural democratization in South Korea, this article addresses these questions largely overlooked in earlier survey-based studies. Analyses of the 2010 Korea Barometer survey indicate that all segments of the Korean electorate, including the young and the college-educated, are neither accurately nor fully informed about what distinguishes a democratic regime from its non-democratic alternatives. Moreover, the study provides strong evidence of democratic learning in that an increase in democratic knowledge leads to committed support for democracy. The findings together imply an urgent need to improve the quality of civic education for the development of democratic political culture in Korea and new democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this study, I assess whether administrative procedural openness, via administrative procedure acts (APAs) enhances public confidence in the civil service. I argue that APAs increase governmental transparency, predictability and accountability. Consequently, APAs ought to enhance public confidence in a country's democratic institutions, ceteris paribus. To substantiate this prediction, I investigate trends, pre- and post-APA passage, in the attitudes of Korean citizens regarding their country's democracy in general and civil service in particular (as well as with a second, brief case study of Taiwan). The evidence supports my argument both cross-sectionally and over time, suggesting that passage of Korea's APA laws in the mid-1990s did enhance the Koreans' confidence in their country's civil service. Attitudes toward the bureaucracy, in turn, are powerful predictors of satisfaction with Korea's democracy, measured both absolutely and relative to attitudes toward the state of the nation 10 years prior. Several key findings replicate for Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consolidation of nascent democratic rule requires ordinary citizens to have certain basic qualities of democratic citizenship. To understand these qualities, this study proposes and explicates the notion of citizen sophistication with regard to democratic politics in South Korea, a country widely regarded as one of the most successful new democracies. Analysis of the Korea Democracy Barometer surveys, 1996–2001, reveals that the proposed notion of sophistication about democratic politics can serve as a useful new tool for evaluating and monitoring the shifting qualities of democratic citizenship in newly democratizing countries. The same analysis also shows that Korea faces a gross deficiency and notable decline in the cognitive, affective and behavioural qualities of democratic citizenship. These findings seem to indicate that the challenge of promoting mass sophistication about democratic politics may constitute the most intractable task of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a case study of South Korean democratic consolidation in the 'three Kims' era that ended in 2002. The article evaluates the achievements and failures with regard to democratic consolidation. In a negative sense the 'three Kims' made great progress toward consolidation, such as reinstituting a firm civilian control over the military, institutionalizing electoral competitions and a peaceful transfer of government. However, with regard to the more positive terms of democratic consolidation, the record is a dismal failure. The 'three Kims' handed over some unfavourable legacies, including divisive regionalism, an underdeveloped party system, an imperial but weak and ineffective presidency and political corruption. Korean democracy at the end of the 'three Kims' era was at best faltering on the verge of consolidation. Thus although Korea has been classified as a liberal democracy, by Freedom House, it retained many of the elements of 'defective democracy' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the second part of an extended article; Part I, ‘Democracy and the Military: An Epitaph for Frankenstein's Monster?’ appeared in the previous issue of this journal. Part II takes as its starting point the theoretical analysis developed in Part I and applies it to three empirical cases, South Korea, Chile and Ghana. Behind the superficial similarity between the way the transition to democracy has been ‘crafted’ in the three countries, there lie significant variations which have also complicated the tasks of controlling the military and consolidating democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the growth of popular support for a competitive multi-party system as an indicator of democratic consolidation in South Korea. Using a national sample survey conducted in November 1993, it demonstrates that the South Korean mass public has been very slow to develop affective, behavioural, cognitive and evaluative links to political parties which, however, constitute an integral channel for representing its preferences in the policy-making process. Contrary to the tenets of the neo-corporatist and other theoretical models, this study finds that the failure of political parties to democratize their performance has been, and remains, a major factor inhibiting the development of popular support for a democratic party system. Based on this and other findings, we would predict much continuing difficulty and uncertainty in the process of consolidating South Korean political parties into a fully democratic party system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]