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La investigación analizó las interrupciones presidenciales que se han producido en América Latina entre 1990 y 2022. Los estudios realizados en la década de 1990 sobre la aparente falta de idoneidad del presidencialismo ante crisis políticas fueron cuestionados posteriormente por investigaciones que pusieron el relieve en la importancia de variables partidarias y contextuales para entender las crisis de gobierno. Este artículo intenta ir más allá, al describir la nueva ola de juicios políticos hasta 2022, planteando posibles causas de las salidas anticipadas de los presidentes y argumentado que puede estarse produciendo una parlamentarización del juicio político. Para ello, se llevó a cabo un análisis comparado y longitudinal de los 155 presidentes que ha habido en América Latina en el periodo de estudio, lo que evidenció una debilidad de los jefes de Estado, un fortalecimiento de los congresos y un determinante rol del juego de mayorías partidarias.

This paper describes the relationship between the executive and legislative branches during the first government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. We will focus on reviewing the legislative output of each branch of power, along with the effectiveness and efficiency they showed as promoters of this production. We will review the impact they had on the legislative agenda setting and on the control of the legislative process itself, making a diachronic analysis in which each legislature is used as a unit. Thus, we will try to identify the presence (or not) of some kind of pattern interactions, and we will evaluate, at one hand, the existence of hierarchical and transactional trends, and, on the other, the different types of balances produced between them.

This article presents the continuities from the past -structural asymmetries and hyper-presidentialism- as well as the innovations of the new democratic Argentina. This mixture of continuity and innovation has contributed to the development of particular forms of intergovernmental relations which we call cross control mechanisms and interference between the federal and provincial levels. This mixture also contributes to the shining of subnational actors in national arenas and of the provincial party identities. These elements are what primarily determine the way the democratic political game in Argentina has been structured, since the transition.

This paper describes the relationship between the executive and legislative branches during the first government of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. We will focus on reviewing the legislative output of each branch of power, along with the effectiveness and efficiency they showed as promoters of this production. We will review the impact they had on the legislative agenda setting and on the control of the legislative process itself, making a diachronic analysis in which each legislature is used as a unit. Thus, we will try to identify the presence (or not) of some kind of pattern interactions, and we will evaluate, at one hand, the existence of hierarchical and transactional trends, and, on the other, the different types of balances produced between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the continuities from the past -structural asymmetries and hyper-presidentialism- as well as the innovations of the new democratic Argentina. This mixture of continuity and innovation has contributed to the development of particular forms of intergovernmental relations which we call cross control mechanisms and interference between the federal and provincial levels. This mixture also contributes to the shining of subnational actors in national arenas and of the provincial party identities. These elements are what primarily determine the way the democratic political game in Argentina has been structured, since the transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]