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Perception of mechanical (i.e. physical) causality, in terms of a cause-effect relationship between two motion events, appears to be a powerful mechanism in our daily experience. In spite of a growing interest in the earliest causal representations, the role of experience in the origin of this sensitivity is still a matter of dispute. Here, we asked the question about the innate origin of causal perception, never tested before at birth. Three experiments were carried out to investigate sensitivity at birth to some visual spatiotemporal cues present in a launching event. Newborn babies, only a few hours old, showed that they significantly preferred a physical causality event (i.e. Michotte's Launching effect) when matched to a delay event (i.e. a delayed launching; Experiment 1) or to a non-causal event completely identical to the causal one except for the order of the displacements of the two objects involved which was swapped temporally (Experiment 3). This preference for the launching event, moreover, also depended on the continuity of the trajectory between the objects involved in the event (Experiment 2). These results support the hypothesis that the human system possesses an early available, possibly innate basic mechanism to compute causality, such a mechanism being sensitive to the additive effect of certain well-defined spatiotemporal cues present in the causal event independently of any prior visual experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Face identity aftereffects are significantly diminished in children with autism relative to typical children, which may reflect reduced perceptual updating with experience. Here, we investigated whether this atypicality also extends to non-face stimulus categories, which might signal a pervasive visual processing difference in individuals with autism. We used a figural aftereffect task to measure directly perceptual updating following exposure to distorted upright faces, inverted faces and cars, in typical children and children with autism. A size-change between study and test stimuli limited the likelihood that any processing atypicalities reflected group differences in adaptation to low-level features of the stimuli. Results indicated that, relative to typical children, figural aftereffects for upright faces, but not inverted faces or cars, were significantly attenuated in children with autism. Moreover, the group difference was amplified when we isolated the 'face-selective' component of the aftereffect, by partialling out the mid-level shape adaptation common to upright and inverted face stimuli. Notably, the aftereffects of typical children were disproportionately larger for upright faces than for inverted faces and cars, but the magnitude of aftereffects of autistic children was not similarly modulated according to stimulus category. These findings are inconsistent with a pervasive adaptive coding atypicality relative to typical children, and suggest that reduced perceptual updating may constitute a high-level, and possibly face-selective, visual processing difference in children with autism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aimed to investigate whether perceptual completion is available at birth, in the absence of any visual experience. An extremely underspecified kinetic visual display composed of four spatially separated fragments arranged to give rise to an illusory rectangle that occluded a vertical rod (illusory condition) or rotated so as not to elicit perceptual grouping (control condition) was constructed. After newborns' ability to detect the particular kind of rod-and-box display used in the present study had been probed (Experiment 1), they were habituated to the illusory rod-and-box display (Experiment 2), to the control display that did not contain illusory contours (Experiment 3), and to a standard real rod-and-box display akin to those used in previous infants' studies (Experiment 4). Newborns perceived the rod as a connected unit either in the illusory condition (Experiment 2) or in the real condition (Experiment 4), as documented by a preference for a broken rod over a complete rod during the test phase, but not when the occluder was absent (Experiment 3). In all experiments newborns showed no preference between the two test stimuli (control condition), avoiding the possibility that newborns have a spontaneous preference for one test display over the other. Overall, the results of the present study provide evidence that the ability to achieve object unity (1) stems from intrinsic properties of the human perceptual system and (2) is operative from birth, given the right conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explored the electrophysiology underlying intonational phrase processing at different stages of syntax acquisition. Developmental studies suggest that children's syntactic skills advance significantly between 2 and 3 years of age. Here, children of three age groups were tested on phrase-level prosodic processing before and after this developmental phase, while their brain activity was recorded. The Closure Positive Shift (CPS), which indexes the perception of intonational phrasing in adults, served as dependent variable. The event-related brain potentials of 3- and 6-year-olds, but not of 21-month-olds, showed a CPS. These results suggest that prosodic phrase processing, as indicated by the CPS, is established only later during children's development, pointing to a close interaction of prosody and syntax acquisition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effects of culture-specific experience on musical rhythm perception are evident by 12 months of age, but the role of culture-general rhythm processing constraints during early infancy has not been explored. Using a habituation procedure with 5- and 7-month-old infants, we investigated effects of temporal interval ratio complexity on discrimination of standard from novel musical patterns containing 200-ms disruptions. Infants were tested in three ratio conditions: simple (2:1), which is typical in Western music, complex (3:2), which is typical in other musical cultures, and highly complex (7:4), which is relatively rare in music throughout the world. Unlike adults and older infants, whose accuracy was predicted by familiarity, younger infants were influenced by ratio complexity, as shown by their successful discrimination in the simple and complex conditions but not in the highly complex condition. The findings suggest that ratio complexity constrains rhythm perception even prior to the acquisition of culture-specific biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do our mental representations of number change over development? The dominant view holds that children (and adults) possess multiple representations of number, and that age and experience lead to a shift from greater reliance upon logarithmically organized number representations to greater reliance upon more accurate, linear representations. Here we present a new theoretically motivated and empirically supported account of the development of numerical estimation, based on the idea that number-line estimation tasks entail judgments of proportion. We extend existing models of perceptual proportion judgment to the case of abstract numerical magnitude. Two experiments provide support for these models; three likely sources of developmental change in children's estimation performance are identified and discussed. This work demonstrates that proportion-judgment models provide a unified account of estimation patterns that have previously been explained in terms of a developmental shift from logarithmic to linear representations of number. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that young children commit perseverative errors from their observation of another person’s actions. The present study examined how social observation would lead children to perseverative tendencies, using a robot. In Experiment 1, preschoolers watched either a human model or a robot sorting cards according to one dimension (e.g. shape), after which they were asked to sort according to a different dimension (e.g. colour). The results showed that children’s behaviours in the task were significantly influenced by the human model’s actions but not by the robot’s actions. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that children’s behaviours were not affected by the robot’s actions because they did not observe its actions. We concluded that children’s perseverative errors from social observation resulted, in part, from their socio-cognitive ability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three experiments investigated the effect of an adult’s social cues on 2- and 3-year-old children’s ability to use a sign or symbol to locate a hidden object. Results showed that an adult’s positive, engaging facial expression facilitated children’s ability to identify the correct referent, particularly for 3-year-olds. A neutral facial expression and the presence of the adult’s hand also facilitated performance, but to a lesser degree than did an engaging facial expression. The effect of the adult’s social cues was greater for relatively unfamiliar signs and symbols (replica or arrow) than it was for a more familiar sign (pointing finger). These findings indicate that non-directional social cues such as facial expression help to convey communicative intent and facilitate children’s comprehension of signs and symbols. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twelve-month-olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal-directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16-month-olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants’ side) but green on the back (the agent’s side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent’s perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green-front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A critical aspect of perception–action coupling is the ability to modify ongoing actions in accordance with variations in the environment. Infants’ ability to modify their gait patterns to walk down shallow and steep slopes was examined at three nested time scales. Across sessions, a microgenetic training design showed rapid improvements after the first session in infants receiving concentrated practice walking down slopes and in infants in a control group who were tested only at the beginning and end of the study. Within sessions, analyses across easy and challenging slope angles showed that infants used a ‘braking strategy’ to curb increases in walking speed across increasingly steeper slopes. Within trials, comparisons of infants’ gait modifications before and after stepping over the brink of the slopes showed that the braking strategy was planned prospectively. Findings illustrate how observing change in action provides important insights into the process of skill acquisition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study distinguishes between attributions of goal-directed perception (i.e. attention) and non-goal-directed perception to examine 9-month-olds’ interpretation of others’ head and eye turns. In a looking time task, 9-month-olds encoded the relationship between an actor's head and eye turns and a target object if the head and eye turns were embedded in a sequence of multiple, variable actions with equifinal outcomes, but not otherwise. This evidence supports the claim that infants of this age may attribute perception, at least goal-directed perception, to others and undermines arguments that gaze-following at this age consists only of uninterpreted reflexes. The evidence also suggests alternative interpretations of the typical errors infants make in standard gaze-following procedures. Implications for infants’ understanding of perception and attention in both human and non-human agents are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several researchers have proposed that developmental improvements in children's face recognition abilities might reflect an increasing reliance on configural information (i.e. spatial relations between features) in faces ( Carey & Diamond, 1994 ; Mondloch, Le Grand & Maurer, 2002 ). We investigated 4- and 5-year-olds’ use of configural information for upright and inverted faces using Tanaka and Sengco's (1997 ) configural change paradigm. Participants saw a photograph of a child's face (e.g. Luke). Memory for features (e.g. Luke's mouth) was then tested in a face with the same configuration as the study face (e.g. Luke's face), in a face with a novel spatial configuration (e.g. Luke's face with the eyes shifted further apart), and presented on their own (e.g. Luke's mouth alone). We found that preschoolers and adults recognized target features from upright faces better when tested in the context of a face with the same configuration as the study face, than when they were embedded in a face with a new spatial configuration or when they were presented in isolation. This effect was lost when faces were inverted. The results suggest that adult-like styles of face processing are present from 4 years of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Appearance/Reality (AR) task some 3- and 4-year-old children make perseverative errors: they choose the same word for the appearance and the function of a deceptive object. Are these errors specific to the AR task, or signs of a general question-answering problem? Preschoolers completed five tasks: AR; simple successive forced-choice question pairs (QP); flexible naming of objects (FN); working memory (WM) span; and indeterminacy detection (ID). AR errors correlated with QP errors. Insensitivity to indeterminacy predicted perseveration in both tasks. Neither WM span nor flexible naming predicted other measures. Age predicted sensitivity to indeterminacy. These findings suggest that AR tests measure a pragmatic understanding; specifically, different questions about a topic usually call for different answers. This understanding is related to the ability to detect indeterminacy of each question in a series. AR errors are unrelated to the ability to represent an object as belonging to multiple categories, to working memory span, or to inhibiting previously activated words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sobel and Lillard (2001 ) demonstrated that 4-year-olds’ understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three experiments, children's reliance on other people's testimony as compared to their own, first-hand experience was assessed in the domain of ontology. Children ranging from 4 to 8 years were asked to judge whether five different types of entity exist: real entities (e.g. cats, trees) whose existence is evident to everyone; scientific entities (e.g. germs, oxygen) that are normally invisible but whose existence is generally presupposed in everyday discourse; endorsed beings (e.g. the Tooth Fairy, Santa Claus) whose existence is typically endorsed in discourse with young children; equivocal beings (e.g. monsters, witches) whose existence is not typically endorsed in discourse with young children; and impossible entities (e.g. flying pigs, barking cats) that nobody believes in. Children make a broad dichotomy between entities and beings that they claim to exist (real entities; scientific entities; and endorsed beings) and those whose existence they deny (equivocal beings and impossible entities). They also make a more fine-grained distinction among the invisible entities that they claim to exist. Thus, they assert the existence of scientific entities such as germs with more confidence than that of endorsed beings such as Santa Claus. The findings confirm that children's ontological claims extend beyond their first-hand encounters with instances of a given category. Children readily believe in entities that they cannot see for themselves but have been told about. Their confidence in the existence of those entities appears to vary with the pattern of testimony that they receive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children ages 2, 3 and 4 years participated in a novel hide-and-seek search task presented on a touchscreen monitor. On beacon trials, the target hiding place could be located using a beacon cue, but on landmark trials, searching required the use of a nearby landmark cue. In Experiment 1, 2-year-olds performed less accurately than older children on landmark trials but performed equivalently on beacon trials. In Experiment 2, the number of items on the screen was reduced and 2-year-olds’ performance improved. Use of the landmark transformation technique in Experiment 3 revealed that older children formed a more precise landmark–target spatial relationship than 2-year-olds. Experiment 4 showed that the transformation itself was not responsible for the youngest participants’ decreased accuracy in Experiment 3. Overall, beacons were utilized effectively by all participants, but the use of landmark cues is refined between the ages of 2 and 4. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research using the visual paired comparison task has shown that visual recognition memory across changing contexts is dependent on the integrity of the hippocampal formation in human adults and in monkeys. The acquisition of contextual flexibility may contribute to the change in memory performance that occurs late in the first year of life. To assess this skill, the images are presented on a background of one colour during familiarization and on a different coloured background during the recognition test. Our research showed that recognition memory is impaired by a change in context at 6 and 12 months of age but is unaffected at 18 and 24 months of age. The findings are discussed in relation to hippocampal development and the proposed developmental step in memory at 9–10 months of age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When infants catch a rolling ball by intercepting its trajectory, the action is prospectively controlled to take account of the object’s speed, direction and path. We complicated this task in two ways: by occluding a portion of the ball’s path with a screen, and by sometimes placing a barrier that blocked the ball’s path behind the screen. In two experiments we manipulated visual information about the barrier and the ball’s trajectory to see how this would aid 9–month–olds’ performance. Anticipatory reaching was possible but difficult with a partially occluded trajectory; actually catching the ball was aided by full view of the trajectory although timing of reach onset was not affected. Full sight of the barrier and trajectory through a transparent screen prevented inappropriate reaching, whereas sight of the barrier alone through a ‘window’ in an opaque screen did not. We interpreted these results as evidence for decreased performance as cognitive load increased with the loss of visual information. In contrast to anticipatory reaching behavior, search for the ball after it disappeared behind the screen was facilitated by the opaque window condition, confirming previous studies that found superior search with opaque versus transparent screens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explore questions of how human infants begin to perceive partly occluded objects, we devised two connectionist models of perceptual development. The models were endowed with an existing ability to detect several kinds of visual information that have been found important in infants’ and adults’ perception of object unity (motion, co-motion, common motion, relatability, parallelism, texture and T-junctions). They were then presented with stimuli consisting of either one or two objects and an occluding screen. The models’ task was to determine whether the object or objects were joined when such a percept was ambiguous, after specified amounts of training with events in which a subset of possible visual information was provided. The model that was trained in an enriched environment achieved superior levels of performance and was able to generalize veridical percepts to a wide range of novel stimuli. Implications for perceptual development in humans, current theories of development and origins of knowledge are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leslie B. Cohen and Harold H. Chaput, Connectionist models of infant perceptual and cognitive development, p.173. Gary F. Marcus, The modules behind the learning, p.175. Yuko Munakata and Jennifer Merva Stedron, Modeling infants’ perception of object unity: what have we learned?, p.176. Linda B. Smith, Teleology in connectionism, p.178. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the components of the mechanisms of development of unity perception in infants. Impact of computational modeling on cognitive development; Interactions of mediated response and environment; Factors contributing to visual system development.

Previous research has shown that, by the age of 3 to 4 years, children rely not only on perceptual similarity but also on shared category or other underlying structures to draw analogies. The present study extends this work by showing that children as young as 3 years old detect consistent relationships between colours and facial expressions of emotions – two phenomena that share no physical characteristics, violate conventional categories and have no obvious environmental contiguity. Two explanatory hypotheses are put forward: (a) learning by convention, which is explored against the standard of adults’ and older children’s matching patterns, and (b) reliance upon a common underlying but perceptually unavailable dimension – operationalized in terms of emotion and colour preferences in the context of the present study. Both explanatory approaches are discussed and avenues for future work are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are 3-year-old children capable of making mentalistic ascriptions to describe the actions of adults as well as peers? Forty-four children (21 girls) aged 3-0 to 3-11 viewed picture sets of adults and peers performing various activities. Children's descriptions of the pictures were coded as either mentalistic or behavioristic. Children on average preferred mentalistic descriptions of adults as well as peers. Preference for mentalistic descriptions was unrelated to verbal ability or age. Meta-analytic techniques showed the consistency of present results with past findings based upon both similar methods and natural language observations of linguistic production. Meta-analysis also revealed a strong effect of situational context on children's preferences for mentalistic versus behavioristic descriptions of others, with item content accounting for up to 70% of variance in child responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of sensitivity to stability in infants. Relationship between the age of infants and looking times; Influence of differences in stimulus shapes on looking times; Appearance of sensitivity to impossibility before instability; Significance of physical abilities in understanding support relations.

Experiments using a preferential looking method, a perceptual judgment method, and a predictive judgment method investigated the development, from 7 months to 6 years of age, of sensitivity to the effects of gravity and inertia on inanimate object motion. The experiments focused on a situation in which a ball rolled off a flat surface and either continued in linear motion (contrary to gravity), turned abruptly and moved downward (contrary to inertia), or underwent natural, parabolic motion. When children viewed the three fully visible motions, both the preferential looking method and the perceptual judgment method provided evidence that sensitivity to inertia developed between 7 months and 2 years, and that sensitivity to gravity began to develop after 3 years. When children predicted the future location of the object without viewing the motions, the predictive judgment method provided evidence that sensitivity to gravity had developed by 2 years, whereas sensitivity to inertia began to develop only at 5-6 years. These findings suggest that knowledge of object motion develops slowly over childhood, in a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, the same system of knowledge appears to be tapped both in preferential looking tasks and in judgment tasks when children view fully visible events, but a different system may underlie children's inferences about unseen object motions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents the author's reaction to the article "The foundations of mind; Origins of conceptual thought," by Jean Mandler which was published in a previous issue. Critique of the points raised by Mandler; Twists given to the procedural-declarative distinction; Reasons why some methods tap perceptual knowledge and others conceptual knowledge.