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This paper examines the siege of the Gaza Strip, a self‐governing Palestinian territory, since 2007. Research on sieges tends to concentrate on the coping strategies of besieged communities, humanitarian issues associated with the impacts, humanitarian access, and the prioritisation of needs, with little or no attention paid to reconstruction. However, Gaza is unusual as a siege environment within which reconstruction has become a high priority in the aftermath of its three destructive wars with Israel. Following an overview of research on sieges in contemporary warfare and a brief contextualisation of Gaza, this paper examines why reconstruction outcomes have varied over time through the application of a theoretical framework that stipulates the importance of four key factors: time; needs; scarcity; and political context. Based on an analysis of these variables, Gaza was found to be a most‐likely case for reconstruction under siege. Nonetheless, the large‐scale reconstruction necessary to transform Gaza has not been actualised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the political nature of reconstruction in Lebanon in the wake of the 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006. It illustrates the extent to which Arab and Gulf States assumed a major role in the reconstruction effort that followed the fighting. A significant competitive dynamic attached itself to the reconstruction of Lebanon, with external actors attempting to protect and defend their favoured constituencies via reconstruction activities. The reconstruction endeavour reflected Lebanon's internal political divisions as well as wider regional competition. Using the metaphors of ‘software’ and ‘hardware’, the study examines how in general many Western states and Western-backed international institutions favoured governance programming (software) while many Arab and Gulf State donors preferred physical reconstruction projects (hardware), often with an emphasis on large-scale, high-visibility infrastructure projects. The paper argues that the latter were able to connect more effectively with the political culture of Lebanon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Israeli–Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006, although brief, had a lasting impact on the region and prompted an intense humanitarian response. The conflict raised challenging questions for the United Nations (UN) about how to assist a middle-income yet extremely vulnerable population in a context where global and local relations are highly politicised. This paper focuses on two key questions that emerged from the humanitarian response. First, how can humanitarian agencies, and particularly the UN, improve the protection of civilians, and was what they did in Lebanon enough? Second, how can humanitarian agencies create partnerships with local actors and still remain true to core humanitarian principles when local actors are fiercely divided along confessional lines and influenced by external actors, and when some, such as Hezbollah, are parties to the conflict? This paper argues that despite the importance of protection and partnerships to the humanitarian response, their role in the UN emergency response still falls short. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand evacuation behaviour in a case of spontaneous evacuation. During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, more than one-third of residents in north Israel spontaneously evacuated—the remainder stayed in situ. Using a telephone survey of 665 respondents residing in north Israel, we were able to characterise the behaviour of evacuees and non-evacuees. The main reasons cited for evacuating were fear of injury to self or family, the effect on children, inability to remain in a protective space, and family pressure. The main reasons cited for remaining at home were no suitable alternative, did not perceive a high level of danger, had to go to work, and there is no place like home. There were no significant differences with regard to most socio-demographic characteristics of the population. These findings should aid emergency managers in preparing the population for a future emergency and in engaging in effective dialogue with the population during an emergency on the evacuation option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediate provision of information to the public is vital during mass casualty incidents (MCIs). Failure to implement rapidly a communication response system may result in the public overwhelming hospitals. This paper shares Israel's experience in developing and maintaining a national system for supplying information on the location and identification of casualties. ADAM interfaces online with hospitals' patient registration systems, and allows for immediate electronic transfer of designated data. The system permits information centres to access information on which hospital has admitted identified and unidentified casualties. The latter are photographed at the entrance to the hospital and the picture is stored in ADAM. The system enables hospitals and municipalities to ensure immediate availability and accessibility of information and thus (in our belief) mitigate the concerns of family and friends. Use of such an interface system is recommended as an integral element of emergency preparedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The July 2006 war waged by Israel on Lebanon caused an estimated USD 1 billion of direct (financial) damage to infrastructure. However, it generated also significant indirect (economic/inter-temporal) costs. One sector that suffered considerably in this respect was agriculture, the main source of income for 30–40 per cent of Lebanese. This paper's main objective is to develop a methodology to estimate the total—direct and indirect—cost of the war to agricultural crop production, using an area of south Lebanon as a focal point. The indirect loss assessment viewed inter-temporal reductions in crop production values as the opportunity cost of not working fields due to the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Various crops were evaluated for two scenarios (50 and 100 per cent damage due to UXO) over UXO-clearance periods of five and 10 years. The results indicate that any damage estimates that include only direct losses will under-estimate total losses by 80 and 87 per cent for the five- and 10-year periods, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]