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Big data mining and analytics help uncover hidden patterns and correlations in business. It serves as the optimal tool to interpret the behavior of companies in specific environments. Built on the large amount of data obtained from various sources, this paper examines the relationship between the tone of corporate social responsibility(CSR) reports and the degree of information asymmetry between investors and managers. Python software is used for data collection, text analysis, and word frequency statistics. The results show that the tone of the social responsibility report reduces the degree of information asymmetry, indicating that the tone of the social responsibility report has an incremental information effect. Further analysis shows that the tone of CSR reports significantly reduces information asymmetry in companies with optimistic forecasts and high media attention.

The Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is a long-term corporate welfare policy that allows employees to share the profits and growth benefits of the enterprise by owning the ordinary share of the enterprise. It has always been a research hotspot at home and abroad. Sustainable growth refers to the healthy and sustained growth of enterprises. ESOP has been re-implemented in China since 2014. Using dual fixed effects model, this paper empirically analyzes 6940 observations of Chinese listed companies from 2014 to 2018. We study whether ESOP can improve the sustainable growth rate of enterprises by allowing employees to hold equity, linking their personal interests to the interests of enterprises, and thus playing an incentive and supervisory role to effectively reduce enterprise agency costs. In the research process, we find that the data can help us objectively analyze the economic management problems of enterprises. However, when using the data for analysis, the correlation coefficient and significance should be analyzed together.

Using a sample of Chinese enterprises pledge during the period 2008-2017, this paper investigates the cost management behavior of enterprises during the pledge period of major shareholders’ stock rights. Our findings show that with the increase of the equity pledge rate, the cost stickiness of enterprises is enhanced. Further analysis shows that the behavior that the controlling shareholder invests the equity pledge funds to a third party weakens the cost stickiness of the enterprise. We further contribute to the literature on sticky cost and equity pledge by discussing the strategic choices of major shareholders to avoid risks during the equity pledge period.