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Chinese cultural conservatism used to participate in shaping the course of modernization to a large extent. In this paper, I aim to describe a hidden lineage of Chinese cultural conservatism of the twentieth century that is still alive and appears to be more and more influential in mainland China. Relying on several ideas developed by Neo-Confucians of the early twentieth century, Gan Yang's paper in 2007 represented a contemporary revival of Chinese cultural conservatism. More importantly, in recent years, this kind of revival of conservative discourse went through another big change, which not only matters to the self-underpinning of the legitimate basis of the current regime, but also combined with the political conservations related to the Hong Kong protest of 2019–2020 explains why this country is so ideologically different from the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a well-acknowledged central economic and diplomatic policy of the Chinese government, which was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013. This paper intends to discover the relationship between the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI and its implementation. By using content analysis, this paper analyzes Chinese President Xi's speeches from 2013 to 2020 about the BRI, as well as official statements of the Chinese central government. It identifies the public diplomacy narratives of the BRI: an assemblage of constantly changing policy settings that accommodates various economic and political interests. Also, this paper draws on differences between countries joining the BRI or not, and several case studies to elucidate the implementation of the BRI. Different from repetitive literature that explores either the BRI narratives or its implementation, this paper contributes by combining and comparing the two. Despite positive interpretations of the BRI the Chinese government has adopted, the paper argues that there are no deceptive tricks with skeletons in the closet of the Chinese government, as the BRI public diplomacy narratives are, in general, consistent with its implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is highly development-oriented and appeals to developing countries whose wish is to catch up with developed economies. China has called for co-construction of the BRI with all and sundry, particularly with African countries, which it has considered important and strategic in actualizing the BRI project. The call for co-construction echoes well with the African partners, who are keen on leveraging the BRI for their own development. Tied to China's status as a rising economic power, both partners have agreed to align the BRI with the African Union's development agenda for complementary and beneficial development. Our paper revealed that although the call for co-construction of the BRI is a welcomed initiative, there are potential setbacks that abound, and therefore offered strategies for responding to China's call for co-construction of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of a larger study, this paper presents findings from my exploration of discourses about China-US geopolitics through popular discussions on Chinese international students (CIS) who are attending American universities during the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. The study seeks to advance scholarship for international students attending American colleges, with particular implications for Chinese students, as agents of geopolitical relations. In doing so, it investigates (a) how these students are represented in American media and (b) the criticality of international geopolitics in the mobility of international students. The findings reveal that American popular media sources assume a tone when writing about CIS that may stem from a deeper anti-Chinese sentiment that exists in the US. They also suggest that American institutions of higher education, and American companies that employ CIS after graduation, treat these students as imported subjects/objects that support America's intellectual and economic advancement. In doing so, the media perpetuates narratives of geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, while representing CIS as unwitting agents of those tensions. The study seeks to advance scholarship on international students attending US colleges, particularly those from China, during an era of rising populism and right-wing movements in the US coupled with rapidly deteriorating US-China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the ideational motivations behind China's connectivity projects, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and aims to explore which values these infrastructure projects seek to promote. The article is based on various published sources, including Chinese official, and public policy statements. Specifically, those statements and policy papers are qualitatively analyzed through a reflection of their manifested message against the background of Chinese International Relations-related discussions on Chinese worldviews. Based on this analysis, the article argues that China's connectivity projects may be perceived as part of China's ideational competition with the West, culminating in the presentation of "Chinese values" as a viable alternative to "universal values." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an ongoing debate about whether China's growing economic presence in the Middle East will eventually make it more politically assertive on the Middle Eastern affairs. This paper demonstrates, from a theoretical perspective of "path dependence," that China's promotion of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" since the 1950s as the guiding doctrine of its foreign relations has forged a "path" for China to follow, along which it has made and repeated promises against interventionism and imperialism to other countries including the Middle Eastern ones. It, in turn, has created a situation where moving away from that "path against interventionism and imperialism" will cause huge damage to China's reputation as a reliable non-interventionist partner to the Middle Eastern countries, and the "Global South" in general. As a result, China has refrained, and will arguably continue to refrain, from being too politically assertive on the Middle Eastern affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since China has formally joined the WHO-backed global COVID-19 vaccine initiative known as COVAX, there is a presumed notion that China's vaccine diplomacy will make a significant contribution to the international public good and thus uplift Beijing's role as the rule-maker of international order. To scrutinize this, the paper asks if China succeeded in proliferating its weaponized vaccine policy to obtain maximum diplomatic gains and soft power projection to intensify its international image, geopolitical power, and domestic politico legitimacy. The authors argue that despite its vaccine diplomacy demonstrated the robust governance capacity and responsibility to be a great power. Yet, Beijing's geopolitical influence and international image are significantly overrated and not enough to play a more prominent role in the global power fulcrum/equilibrium. On the contrary, China enjoys a leading position on the domestic political front. Its successful portrayal of China's vaccine provision in the global market and remarkable configuration to leverage a deep-rooted nationalism has fundamentally provided China with a powerful rationale to divert its public's attention from Beijing's earlier inadequate handling of the outbreak. The evaluation of the paper reveals that China's vaccine diplomacy's influence in promoting international image and geopolitics is limited but has successfully stabilized its domestic political environment and enhanced its domestic legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The weaponization of racialized imagery has been a common feature of geopolitical contestation in contemporary history. The paper critically examines the historical genesis of Sinophobic narratives, which have been common features of the big power geopolitical contestation in the Pacific. The globalization of capitalism in the nineteenth century and the West's attempts to penetrate the Chinese market and exploitation of its resources led to tension, skirmishes and wars. The myth of racial European superiority and corresponding inferiority of the Chinese was weaponized as an ideological justification for colonial domination, exploitation of cheap labour and appropriation of China's resources and wealth. In recent years, the Sinophobic paranoia has been exacerbated by China's Belt and Road initiative, a strategy at global economic and technological supremacy to counter the West's dominance. This competition for global hegemony is played out in various parts of the world and the Pacific included. The paper critically discusses various historical factors associated with Sinophobia in the context of the USA, France and Australia and how these have influenced these countries' contemporary approaches to Chinese expansionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's vigorous involvement in the Pacific Island countries (PICs) is often surmised by scholars of international relations (Wesley-Smith 1; Pryke 2) to be primarily motivated by geopolitical calculations. This paper argues that China's increasing presence in the Pacific Islands indeed helps China create a "sphere of influence," but such geopolitical dynamics are characterized not merely by China's response to its perceived containment imposed by the USA and its allies in the region, but also by China's willingness to engage with PICs on its own terms. This is reflected in China's multifaceted approaches to offering economic assistance and expanding its economic and political presence in the region. China has increasingly cemented its strategic partnership with PICs by pursuing its traditional strategy of "non-interference" that satisfies PICs' demands for political independence and self-determination. China reaps not only economic but also geopolitical benefits from its intensified economic, and by extension, political, and strategic partnership with PICs, thus assisting its rise at the systemic (global) level. This paper examines the rationale behind China's economic and political approaches to the region and evaluates its promises and pitfalls as regional power dynamics continues to evolve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper employed a geo-economics approach to investigate the twofold Chinese geopolitical intentions behind the execution of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China financed the CPEC project to overcome energy security and terrorism in Xinjiang. The paper examines the correlation between economic development and security objectives by answering the following key questions. (a) Whether CPEC has the potential to alleviate China's energy and security dilemma? (b) To what extent CPEC can act as a lever to achieve security interests? The paper argues that geopolitical and geo-security concerns motivate Chinese leadership to use the geo-economics approach. The $65 billion investment in the construction of CPEC has mammoth potential to revitalize the Chinese dream to achieve security through economic and infrastructure development. For Beijing, infrastructure and economic development along the corridor belt would guarantee peace and security in Xinjiang and an overland route of CPEC for energy supplies will circumvent the Malacca dilemma alleviating the threat to the Chinese energy lifeline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars and analysts have sought to clarify the Chinese Communist Party's motives for carrying out the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a series of infrastructure investments in countries across the globe. While many emphasize Beijing's geopolitical interests, this paper argues that the BRI should also be understood as a large-scale effort to create business activities for Chinese companies and workers outside of China. We define the contours of this "building out" strategy by analyzing the stages that typify BRI projects: project selection, project financing, project construction, and post-construction operation and management. Our analysis draws, in large part, on data that we have compiled from a sample of BRI projects. After showing macro-level trends in the data, we offer three in-depth case studies to clarify the underlying mechanisms at work. Our findings suggest that BRI projects are engineered to direct finance and construction bids to Chinese companies, which are typically state-owned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The heavy-metal pollution of the consumer-electronics industry has been a serious environmental problem in China. Since 2010, Chinese ENGOs have taken a few measures to address this challenge. Under the influence of other stakeholders, Chinese ENGOs have only played a limited role. To further explore the potential of domestic ENGOs, it would be necessary to understand how they have approached the heavy-metal challenge and why their contribution has been moderate. By using the method of "process tracing," this paper presents a preliminary attempt to trace and generate localized knowledge of Chinese ENGOs' approach and the influence of other stakeholders. Specifically, this paper divides the actions of Chinese ENGOs into the following three phases: initial participation, progressive involvement of MNCs, and collaborative tracking and online disclosure. Then, it traces the participation of Chinese mass media, domestic suppliers, local governments, and communities. It argues that the following six constraining factors have contributed to shaping the limited role of those Chinese ENGOs: (1) the complexity of the consumer-electronics supplier network; (2) Chinese ENGOs' lack of leverage on MNCs; (3) Chinese ENGOs' shortage of financial and human resources under a broad agenda; (4) domestic mass media's lack of long-term interest; (5) reluctant participation of Chinese suppliers and local governments; and (6) conflicting interests within local communities. Three policy options for further exploring the potential of Chinese ENGOs are discussed, including financial and technical support, further engagement of international ENGOs, and supportive policy-making and interregional coordination by local governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's burgeoning economic and security activities abroad have given rise to suspicions and criticisms of its intentions. As Buddhism is a shared faith and heritage among many Chinese; an integral part of national identities of Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia; a proud legacy in India; and a major religion in Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan, winning over the trust and friendship of neighboring Buddhist countries has emerged as an important Chinese diplomatic initiative, especially under the current Xi Jinping leadership's enterprise to revive the Silk Road. Having over 245 million Buddhists, 28,000 Buddhist monasteries, 16,000 temples, and 240,000 Buddhist monks and nuns makes the promotion of Buddhism a rich source of soft-power, or "soul power," for China, generated from its heavy investments in building Buddhist institutions and engaging Buddhist groups in these countries. However, there are external and domestic challenges in using Buddhism as a Chinese foreign policy vehicle. The paper analyzes what the objectives of China's Buddhist diplomacy are; which personnel, organizations, or state bureaus in China make China's Buddhist diplomacy; how is it carried out; what the targeted institutions and personnel in the affected countries are; the reactions from these countries; and the extent to which a Communist regime is able to carry out its promotion of Buddhism in Asia despite its professed atheism. The analysis is conducted through the spectrum of two major perspectives in international relations literature: neo-realism and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6 %, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70 % of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increase of cross-Strait economic activity, the interaction between Taiwanese business people and the Chinese government has gradually changed. As Taiwanese investment grew in volume, so did the number and frequency of contacts between the parties; a more institutionalised form regulating these contacts was established as a result. Nowadays Taiwanese businessmen have become an identifiable factor in Chinese governmental policy implementation; the process also has far-reaching implications. This paper argues that Taiwanese capital has become a Chinese governmental security asset and examines the importance of this factor when discussing conventional government/business interaction. This paper concludes that a superior national interest guides the warm welcome given by the Chinese government to Taiwanese businessmen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's polluted air has seriously affected the health of the Chinese population. This paper uses attribution theory to investigate how Chinese newspapers and non-Chinese newspapers presented smog in China and attributed causes and responsibilities. Built on previous studies, this study adopted covariation model within attribution theory and painted an interesting picture of smog coverage by Chinese and non-Chinese newspapers because of the apparent differences in perspectives. The criteria further provided folder for elaboration on explaining why the different coverages attributed causes as they did. Implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalist discourse has long been an important apparatus in modern politics. This paper showed a sharp, yet subtle departure of the Chinese government in its current manipulation of nationalism. Instead of the hardcore revolutionary rhetoric, the new phase of nationalist discourse incorporated many elements of Confucianism to better consolidate the communist regime. Using the 2015 military parade as an example, this paper analyzed how the Chinese central government evoked sentiments and consciousness of nationalism by utilizing and interweaving Confucianism elements of family value, benevolent (Ren), propriety (Li), equilibrium, and harmony into the party-state's official nationalist discourse. Significance of such organized endeavors in political discourse is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emergency management system is an important part of the current national governance system. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China's emergency management agencies have been reformed many times, and the emergency management system has been significantly improved in continuous development. China's emergency management can be divided into four stages from 1949 to now, forming three generations of the emergency management system. This paper introduces the organizational characteristics of China's emergency management in four stages, expounds on the main characteristics of the three generations of the emergency management system, and puts forward some key points of improving China's emergency management system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese foreign policy has multiple sources, and the incentives that are driving its behaviour have grown from the domestic/international, as well as from regional, economic, normative, multilateral, and cultural levels. Foreign policy-making in China is becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated. This special issue is drawn from some edited papers presented in the joint workshop between Fudan and Durham Universities on Chinese foreign policy on 29-30 March 2010. By assessing the economic, domestic, regional, global and cultural sources of Chinese foreign policy, we aim to illustrate the various sources and to locate possible ways to consolidate the transitional process, and to spur future endeavour facing China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role of the Chinese in a Southeast Asian business cum societal context; from different approaches towards Chinese-ness via different notions of intra- and inter-ethnic relation towards a critique of the idea of a Chinese diaspora in a Southeast Asian context. The article argues that a culturalist reading of Southeast Asian Chinese modes of engaging in capitalist practices and societal entrenchments constitutes a deception that produces a variety of stereotypes of Chinese-ness, thus disregarding the complexity and dynamic developments within the ethnic Chinese community region-wise. Finally, in relation to Chinese business practices in a Southeast Asian context the paper suggests that cultural notions of guanxi and xinyong do not form a basis for doing business the Chinese way, but only options; that intra-ethnic relations do not play an important role in transnational Chinese linkages, and that contemporary conceptions of Chinese identity are always negotiated with the dominant ‘other’ so as to secure the construction of an economic ‘room’ or space from where business can be conducted in an overall societally acceptable manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2019, Trilateral Cooperation celebrated its 20th anniversary. As China, Japan and South Korea are close trade partners, economic cooperation is a focal point in Trilateral Cooperation. This paper endeavours to examine and explain China's approach towards the institutionalization of trilateral economic cooperation from 1999 to 2019. The findings indicate that China was supportive towards institutionalizing trilateral economic cooperation, but it was less proactive in recent years. This is explained by two factors, namely, (a) the declining economic interdependence between China and other member states and (b) the shift in China's regional strategy with the introduction of new regional initiatives by China, especially the Belt and Road Initiative. The findings of this study cast doubt on the critical juncture approach and the alternative explanation on balancing which perceives China's participation in Trilateral Cooperation primarily through the lens of Sino-US relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews several of the key issues that underlie the development and expansion of think tanks in China from both a domestic and international perspective. Substantively, the review focuses on the need to develop criminological think tanks in China due to the well-documented relationship between rapid urbanization, social displacement, and crime. Though work on urbanization, social disorganization, and crime has existed for over half a decade in Western criminology, it suffers from a lack of research outside of the Western and usually more specifically American, cultural context. To advance this call for research, the paper identifies 14 generative research programs in the areas of the Routine Activities Theory, Social Bonds Theory, and Institutional Anomie Theory pursuable by Chinese criminological think tanks. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some potential barriers to the successful production and dissemination of criminological research in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and to what extent can China be more accurately understood? Is China best understood as it is or through theories that appear to reveal its nature? John Wong is an example of the former approach, a pursuer of economic realism in the discipline of economic analysis. This paper first describes John Wong's conceptual model of Chinese economic development, which consists of three major components: Singapore as the reference point; economic scale as the first adjusted variable; and economic development phase as the second variable. The paper further explores sources of his choice of methodology through the positionality of his research. He cannot be neatly categorized in any existing school of economic analysis of the Western academic tradition but pursues his accurate understanding of China through pragmatism; his institutionalized research position constitutes the methodological foundation for his research strategy and conceptual framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking pride in the vibrancy and transparency of democracy, countries such as the USA have prioritized the spread of democracy in its foreign policy. The admirable impact that this political agenda has garnered across the globe pushes us to ponder what China would offer as it aspires for a more prominent position on the international stage. Particularly, how would China foster its image in Asia and, as a result, earn a favorable voice and even all-out support from Asian countries, countries economically underdeveloped and politically volatile? This paper sets out to answer this question by critiquing whether or not popular perceptions of China's political system impact how Asians perceive China's influence in general. Conducting statistical analysis using the fourth wave of Asian Barometer Survey (2016) to assess the above argument, we find that Asians who lend their support for China are more keen to the economic opportunities that China's growing economy offers their country than they are of China's political system. In short, China's authoritarian regime type does not factor into Asians' perception of China, except when individuals are highly educated with and committed to democratic principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between anti-Japanese popular nationalism and China's approach towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese political tension from 2001 to mid-2006. Among various factors that may affect the relationship, this research focuses on the interaction between the government and the public expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. Throughout most of this period, Sino-Japanese political relations were seriously strained by historical, territorial and other controversial issues, which stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment in China. However, it was only between 2003 and the spring of 2005 that mass anti-Japanese protests were allowed, or at least tolerated, by the Chinese authorities and played a role in Beijing's handling of Japan-related controversies. The paper examines China's domestic political situation during the leadership transition from the third to fourth generation of leaders, which it claims drove the Chinese government's lenient response to popular anti-Japanese protests and enhanced the prospects for popular nationalism to affect the government's approach towards Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years an increasing number of works on EU international actorness have begun to focus on notions of “normative, value-driven external policy”. However, the majority of these works tend to uncritically analyse EU foreign policy without considering its internal complexity and the existing national, supranational and intergovernmental dynamics. This paper first sheds light on these issues by proposing an original theoretical and analytical framework to study European, rather than merely EU, normative foreign policy. Secondly, this paper attempts to empirically apply such a framework in the specific case of European human rights promotion in China. What emerges is that in the case of China, and Asia more broadly, Europe appears more as a normative trap, where the interaction of EU institutions and member states originate policies not in line with the EU human rights normative basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recounting Hong Kong's chief executive election in 2007, this paper charts the unexpected appearance of an “unauthorized” candidate and the occurrence of vibrant campaigning. Further, as electoral competitiveness increased, the liberal form of authoritarian rule that has characterized politics in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) began to change in ways that parallel the electoral authoritarianism practiced in Singapore. This paper argues that such change, if regularized and enhanced, may bring greater stability to the HKSAR’s politics, yielding greater legitimacy, popular compliance, and hence, new efficiencies in control. Even so, analysis of the chief executive election shows that this competitiveness was strongly resisted by the central government in Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the Chinese policy community's interpretations of identities, which potentially shape the soft power policies of China. It couples soft power to identity through a discourse analysis of the language used by the Chinese state in relation to soft power. It builds on a number of earlier theorizations that associate soft power with identity as a discursive phenomenon. The results highlight the use of strategic disrespect in China's soft power discourse. In the context of global cultural competition, and in particular the South-South cooperation framework, it is argued that the practitioners of the Chinese discourse present China's 'Self' as a soft power and the Western 'Other' as a hard power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the construction and reconstruction process of anti-American icons in contemporary China, this paper compares the patterns of interactions between the Chinese government, intellectuals and general public during four events centering on China-US relations: the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, the early 2001 plane collision incident, the September 11 attacks, and the 2003 war in Iraq. The article suggests that the proliferation of anti-American icons in China does not only point towards the existence of anti-foreign ideologies. It is also a channel for different players in China to advance their personal and group interests. As long as tolerance from Beijing is signalled, much nationalist rhetoric is a coded way of directing limited dissent at the Chinese state itself, but how exactly the Chinese public hold the “nationalist flags” — which is allowed by the party–state — against the “red flags” of the same regime remains relatively unexplored. Filling up such an intellectual vacuum is the central focus of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on how the Chinese are represented in the international business literature. Chinese cultures are packaged to make knowledge about the Middle Kingdom more accessible to a general audience. The ways in which these packaged cultures are framed and constructed will be questioned here. Drawing inspiration from Foucault, this article identifies four traits of a packaged culture – it mediates, it asserts the uniqueness of the culture, it selectively packages the culture and it claims that cultural differences matter in business. These traits will form the basis for comparing and examining three methods of packaging a culture, namely the general-macroscopic, ethnographic present and critical emergence approaches. This paper concludes that researchers should reflect on the power they yield when they represent another culture, and that the general public may privilege theories that are accessible rather than sound. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's new Silk Road policy, titled 'One Belt, One Road,' signals a proactive turn in China's regional policy towards Central and West Asia. The policy has two dimensions: First, China aims to revitalize the old Silk Road exchange of goods, ideas, and people with trade, energy, and transportation projects. Second, armed with these new connections, China aims to redefine the territories the old Silk Road encompasses as a region in the contemporary international system. Turkey, as one of the countries at the westernmost end of the historic Silk Road, and one of the target countries of China's new Silk Road diplomacy, welcomes the increasing economic and technological exchange with China. Establishing better contacts with China fits suitably in Turkey's new foreign policy orientation. While the foreign policies of the two countries seem to be compatible, Turkish domestic political dynamics and public opinion hinder further engagement between the two ends of the Silk Road. The negative public opinion towards China manifests itself in the form of media coverage, protests and lobbying and, at times, it derails bilateral relations. This paper assesses the prospects for bilateral relations in the light of these developments. The paper starts with a historical analysis of Sino-Turkish relations and proceeds with various dimensions of the current relations. Then, it provides an analysis of various public opinion surveys in order to grasp the nature of the Turkish public opinion towards China, and it offers a media framing analysis in order to decipher the specific ways the image of China is constructed in Turkish public opinion. The last part of the paper discusses the domestic political actors that have a role in the perceptions and policies toward China in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Xi Jinping era, China is actively implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) around the globe. Under the BRI, infrastructure development has become the main agenda for China to create connectivity. One of the infrastructure projects in the energy sector is the Nam Ou Cascade Hydropower Project. The Nam Ou River is a tributary of the Mekong River located in Laos and borders China. For Laos, this project is part of their vision to be "The battery of Southeast Asia." Therefore, this article attempts to explain that Nam Ou Hydropower has implications for China's dominance in the Mekong region. The circle hydro-hegemony is used as the conceptual framework for analyzing the phenomenon. This article also applies a qualitative method with secondary data. The article shows that the Nam Ou Cascade Hydropower Project in Laos elevates China's influence in the Mekong region. By actively pulling and pushing its neighbors into cooperation, China exercises its power as an upstream country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Australian public's concerns about a potential war with China has recently seen a sharp rise. This study utilizes Google Trends data to gauge the public agenda. Drawing from the Google Trends data in Australia between April 2013 and March 2023, several original conclusions are reached. Firstly, since 2017, the Australian public has strongly associated China-related war activities or threats of war with Australia. Secondly, since early 2020, the concerns of the Australian public towards a potential war with China has significantly increased. This result aligns with findings from conventional polls. Furthermore, these concerns reached its peak in March 2023. Lastly, the fluctuations in the Australian public's concerns regarding a potential war with China can be attributed to policy and media agendas, with their specific roles varying across different periods. This study contributes to the debate on Australia's China policy by introducing some novel empirical evidence and methods to academia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)" has been gaining attention, but the evaluation of the scheme is still unsettled due to its multifaceted nature. This paper examines the basic characteristics of the initiative, disaggregates the initiative into separate dimensions, and traces Japan's responses toward BRI from 2013 to 2018. From 2013 to 2015, the Japanese government and the Diets committee have discussed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) membership issue intensively. Only after 2015, the discussion covered the BRI, wider topics. By looking at responses by the Japanese government, the initial response until 2016 was "non-participation;" however, after 2017, the government has shifted attitude to "conditional engagement" through business cooperation in the third countries especially plus-sum dimension. Such a shift has been backed by a concurrent risk-hedging approach represented by the Indo-Pacific strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper tries to make an assessment of the borderland regions of China and India with a focus on Xinjiang, Tibet, Kashmir and the Indian Northeast. The paper looks at the conflict in India and China's periphery, how these conflicts have evolved with time and how they have changed their character with the passage of time, from the 1950s until the present day. After looking at some background, the paper primarily focusses on three key issues which impact on all four of the conflicts: the rise of ethnic nationalism, the impact of external forces on the conflict and the human rights situation. After making an assessment of the political situation, the paper looks at the areas of similarity and differences between the four regions. Methodologically, a bottom-up approach was taken and in-depth unstructured interviews were carried out with people from the conflict zones that the paper considers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how the situation in China's most northwestern province-level unit Xinjiang has affected China's overall foreign relations since disturbances in its capital Ürümqi in July 2009. Xinjiang's most populous ethnic group is the mostly-Muslim Uighurs. The paper assumes a framework that puts a high priority on China's facing west. Though no more important than the eastward-looking foreign policy that has dominated Western analysis, the paper sees China's facing west perspective as deserving more attention than it has received. Russia and Central Asian countries have been positive about China's economic aims in the region. However, friction has increased with China's rise, Chinese authorities tending to blame Xinjiang's disturbances on Islamism in Central Asia. China resents the USA for giving asylum to Rebiya Kadeer, president of the anti-China World Uyghur Congress. In 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushed the idea of a 'New Silk Road' in Central Asia for peaceful economic development. China has long espoused the 'Silk Road' idea, developing its own 'Silk Road Economic Belt.' Damaged due to the 2009 riots, the China-Turkey relationship has improved because of various visits and agreements since 2010. The paper balances the dominantly economic Silk Road concept against Islamist terrorism. It argues that the aims of the Silk Road and Silk Road Economic Belt are sensible and practical, with positive economic relations the main trend. However, although the Central Asian 'zone of conflict' is a lesser trend, tensions are serious and long term, especially those caused by Islamism and Islamist terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are different driving forces behind Chinese foreign policy decision-making. Norms, principles, and interests and the subtle combinations of them, I argue in this paper, are the major driving forces on the input side, while the domestic situation of a specific country and international pressure undercut China's policy deliberations. By contrast, the form of government of a specific country under discussion is not an important variable. In this paper, I use China's policy toward Myanmar as a case study. The findings prove that the integration of norms, principle and practical interests has formed the powerful impetus that drives China's policies toward Myanmar. Among these factors, the interests China has identified in general and stability on its 'doorstep' in particular play a dominant role, while the norm of human security and the principle of non-interference are embedded in its policy deliberations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea's behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China's indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing's ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea's behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China's indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China's emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the rise of China present a threat or an opportunity for Southeast Asia? One of the most revealing arenas in which this will be determined will be within the context of regional institution-building. For a region that is perennially associated with under-institutionalisation it is remarkable just how many initiatives have been proposed recently. Such institutions, may be important venues within which 'asymmetric regionalism' may be manifest and perhaps managed. The paper provides an assessment of this process through an analysis of China's relationship with Southeast Asia. The paper initially provides a brief theoretical introduction which explains the relationship between regional development and its possible impact on inter-state relations. Following this I provide an analysis of the political economic and strategic dynamics that are shaping and being shaped by regional initiatives. Finally, I assess how successful ASEAN's efforts have been to engage China via regional mechanisms has actually been. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though acknowledging that ethnic Chinese cooperate in networks in which they feel ‘comfortable’, scholars dispute what it is that makes ethnic Chinese cooperate transnationally, and they disagree as to what extent these networks can be regarded as independent of nation-state regimes. Phrased differently, there is no agreement on the contents of this ‘comfort zone’ and on how it is created. Scholarly debate focuses on ethnic Chinese businesses and on the nature of transnationalism, but fails to address the process of transnationalising businesses. By considering the different perspectives on transnationalism, identity and business development among ethnic Chinese, this paper analyses the process of transnationalisation of Malaysian Chinese small and medium enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using both quantitative and qualitative data, this paper extends Joseph Nye's analytical framework on soft power to the China case, in order to provide a more balanced and updated analysis of the country's power status. We argue that the rise of China is not simply an expansion of hard power; it has also been accompanied by tremendous efforts to develop soft power. Soft power helps Beijing redraw geopolitical alliances in ways that will propel its rise as a global power. This process is nevertheless complicated by the deficiency of its soft power resources and the uneven progress in projecting the soft power abroad. The paper concludes that despite Beijing's growing ability to shape other people's worldview or political agenda, soft power remains Beijing's underbelly and China still has a long way to go to become a true global leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of whether the way bribery is practiced in China is such that corruption might be compatible with rapid economic growth during the boom years between 2000 and 2007. In particular, it examines whether bribery based on diffuse reciprocity transforms a corrupt relationship from one based on short-term egoistic gains (looting) to one based on long-term gains (profit maximizing), with the assumption that such a form of bribery will lead the parties to maximize total gains and hence will encourage long-term growth rather than short-term predatory looting. More broadly, the paper inquires whether a regime of informal property rights based on bribery and diffuse reciprocity might compensate for the shortcomings of an imperfectly constructed and incomplete set of formal property rights such as has emerged in post-Mao China and thereby improve the prospects for economic growth. The paper concludes that while bribery based on diffuse reciprocity may encourage the parties directly involved in such corrupt exchanges to maximize their total long-term gains, so long as bribery remains a private good and an informal property rights regime based on bribery remains subject to abrupt and catastrophic revision due to its illegal nature, 'bribery with Chinese characteristics' cannot be characterized as growth enhancing and thus cannot be a major explanation for why the Chinese economy grew rapidly during the 'third boom.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feudal Japan was one of the countries within the cultural space of Chinese characters and maintained a "tributary diplomacy" relationship with China. However, although it was part of the Chinese tribute system, Japan was not a typical tributary state like Korea or Vietnam at that time. Therefore, Japan's tribute activities with China, in addition to the similarities inherent in this activity, also had many unique characteristics. This article places Japan's tribute activities in the context of the region and compares them with China's tribute activities of Korea and Vietnam at the time to draw out similarities and differences. At the same time, the article derives the characteristics and essence of Japan's tribute activities at that time, contributing to an understanding of the nature of Japan–China relations in the past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran-China relations have strengthened over the past decades. From an economic point of view, Iran has been an attractive destination for the Chinese businesses that are in search of new markets to expand the scope of their economic activities through trade, investment, and partnership. China has at the same time offered Iran a valuable alternative to the western economies, which gradually (and partly due to the economic sanctions imposed on Iran) decreased their level of engagement with Iran. Moreover, the relationships between China and Iran have expanded gradually to military and security cooperation. This paper will examine the development of various aspects of Sino-Iranian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism in various forms has been a fixture of modern Chinese politics and society; however, its form has changed and over the past decade or so, the CCP has begun to appropriate China's cultural nationalism through its extensive use of propaganda and by other less nefarious methods. This paradigm shift embodies the deliberate manoeuvring that state nationalism is exerting on cultural symbols, concepts and legacies in China. Through imagery and emotionally laden political marketing that favour Party policy and rule, this form of nationalism surreptitiously caters to the cultural tastes of, and appeals to, the emerging middle class of contemporary Chinese society. It is a more nuanced and creative type of propaganda. Using the 2009 China Central Television (CCTV) Moon Festival (Mid-Autumn Festival) Gala as a case study, this paper examines Party-state appropriations of cultural nationalism. The Gala is a rich reservoir of moon-inspired traditional Chinese cultural elements, and the intriguing manoeuvring of these culturally bound images and iconography signifies a new propaganda strategy that combines poetic nostalgia, poignant romance and abstract philosophical pursuit, through which cultural elements are skilfully woven into a patriotic and nationalist appeal. These traditional cultural signifiers, illusions and fantasies serve the Party's political aims as it attempt to reinforce its legitimacy by forging a culturally bound national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR literature has become inundated with different descriptions for the future of international order. The coming age is purportedly marked by China's ascendancy, American decline, a leaderless "no-one's world", or multiple competing modernities. Yet the global fight against climate change or shared COVID-19 strategies convey a different image of the world's predicament. The situation appears paradoxical: increasingly tense great-power relations are mixed with ever-strengthening interdependencies. This article contributes to these debates by exploring how global orders as well as regionalism today are increasingly defined by various types of connective functional links between intentional actors at various levels of social organisation. To enable a nuanced analysis, the article introduces an analytical framework composed of six connectivity logics, namely cooperation, copying, cushioning, contestation, containment, and coercion. These play out differently within material, economic, institutional, knowledge, people-to-people, and security spheres. The utility of this article's approach is demonstrated through empirical examples related to the policies of key actors in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article surveys recent legislative and policy changes on foreign investments in four Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway). Until recently, only Finland had national legislation on foreign investments, although historically the Nordic countries were forerunners in introducing foreign investment controls. A general rethink in the USA and the European Union on the links between liberal economies, investment policies and security has occurred in recent years. This has cast investments by enterprises from major authoritarian countries, foremost China, in a different light. Rather than investment numbers as such, or realised risks related to Chinese investments, a 'causal narrative' has emerged in the Nordic countries that draws attention to the nature of the Chinese party-state and its' unclear relationship to Chinese companies, underlining potential strategic motivations and security risks behind Chinese investments. Rapidly changing risk perceptions have driven legislative and policy changes on foreign direct investment (FDI), e.g. investment screening. Chinese investments have thus become riskified, to use a term coined by Olaf Corry. Shifting risk perceptions have similarly preceded previous 'formative epochs' in Nordic FDI legislation in the early twentieth century, after the Second World War and at the end of the Cold War. Each formative epoch has been characterised by a distinctive 'risk profile'. We postulate that these shifting risk perceptions significantly shape the reception of FDI as a key channel of cross-border connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to analyze the development of three aspects of Chinese Studies, namely Sinology, China Studies, and Chinese Overseas Studies in Malaysia. Each aspect corresponds to different levels of looking at China: civilizational, state, and ethnic. It also examines how identity politics in Malaysia shapes the development of these fields and how these fields created different images of China. Sinology depoliticizes China and presents the magnificent Chinese culture as a positive element in Malaysian nation-building project. Chinese Overseas Studies de-centers China and examines the multiple identities of the Chinese people. China Studies were officially pursued under the agendas of inter-civilizational dialogue and friendship between China and Malaysia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By tracing the origin and evolution of Chinese nationalism, this paper finds that the dialectical relationship between the Chinese "self and the foreign "other" has provided the cultural-institutional context for the construction of its national identity. The positional change of the Chinese actor in the self-other interaction--resulting from the institutional shift from the tianxia order to the Westphalian system--and the consequent national humiliation have been embedded in the Chinese collective memory and given rise to the consensual norms ingrained in the national identity. Viewed through the lens of political sociology and identity politics, China's tenacious struggle for national rejuvenation can be construed as a social practice guided by these memory-encoded social norms. Due to the protracted and ambivalent nature of the state's purposive action in attaining great-power status on the international stage, the confidence of the resurgent state is compromised by an acute sense of frustration. This identity predicament has engendered a peculiar Chinese state emotion, which has profoundly influenced the in-group members' evaluation and perception of out-group entities and their behavior in the antagonistic intergroup relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper illustrates the links between China's nation building exercises and its efforts to promote the country as a 'brand'. By using the examples of the Shanghai Expo, China's national image films and the revival of Confucius, I show how Chinese soft power is both inward and outward looking. Understanding this dual role of soft power is important in comprehending the underlying motivations behind China's attempts to create and manage its identity as orderly, prosperous and legitimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]