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Land managers' preferences towards practice- and outcome-based payments for environmental services are analysed using a labelled choice experiment applied to a Mediterranean oak savannah (dehesa or montado) as a case study. Results indicate that land managers prefer outcome- to practice-based payments, equivalent in terms of environmental targets, most probably because they are opposed to the restrictive practices included as requirements in the latter. This preference strongly depends on the environmental policy objective, with land managers being more willing to participate when the outcome-based payment targets carbon sequestration rather than biodiversity. Willingness to accept (WTA) significantly increases when the payment involves a remote-sensing monitoring system, but only for practice-based payments, hinting at differing views of the monitoring system depending on the scheme type. However, a complementary analysis focusing on acreage decision shows non-significant WTA values for the use of remote-sensing monitoring systems in practice-based payments when the requirement of the area enrolled is relaxed. This suggests that land managers may be trading off monitoring intensity against the probability of defaulting. Significant preference heterogeneity is observed, mostly explained by farms' structural and management characteristics. Results point to strong potential for the use of outcome-based payments with remote-sensing monitoring systems in oak savannahs. • Practice- & outcome-based environment-and-climate schemes (pECS & oECS) are studied. • Discrete and acreage decision is modelled based on labelled choice experiment data. • Land managers' WTA is generally higher for pECS than for oECS. • Much higher WTA for oECS targeting biodiversity, probably due to higher uncertainty. • WTA for using remote sensing monitoring differs for pECS and oECS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing countries have been recently addressing the respiratory health impact of agricultural burnings with innovative environmental policy. In Acre state, Brazilian Amazon, mechanization is subsidized, enabling smallholders to comply with a cap on burned area. To appraise amendments in the policy, a statistical Hicks-Kaldor test was developed and applied to stakeholders' stated choice surveys coupled with an econometric estimate of fire's effect on health. The test unveiled the trade-off between urban dwellers' health and smallholders' production. It also avoided the large disparity of groups in size and in goods valued to result into instability of efficiency assessment across six alternative group weighting schemes. The amendments that increased joint welfare required a great expansion of mechanization supply. Such change, which is not presently feasible at state level, could be piloted at municipal level by relying on the private sector and smallholders' organizations, and also on subsidized credit and power tillers. • A statistical Hicks-Kaldor test, robust to stakeholders' disparities, is devised. • It is applied to a policy replacing agricultural fires with subsidized tractors. • A health and welfare trade-off is unveiled by alternative stakeholder weightings. • · The test proved highly stable across six alternative group weightings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]