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We introduce a methodology to estimate the determinants of the formation of technology diffusion networks from the patterns of technology adoption. We apply this methodology to wind energy, which is one of the key technologies in climate change mitigation. Our results emphasize that, in particular, long-term relationships as measured by economic integration are key determinants of technological diffusion. Specific support measures are less relevant, at least to explain the extensive margin of diffusion. Our results also highlight that the scope of technological diffusion is much broader than what is suggested by the consideration of CDM projects alone, which are particularly focused on China and India. Finally, the network of technological diffusion inferred from our approach highlights the central role of European countries in the diffusion process and the absence of large hubs among developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An efficient climate policy is based on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and equates marginal abatement costs across all forcing agents affecting climate change. In CBA, the agents' contributions to radiative forcing (RF) must be consistently priced (i.e. the social cost of RF, occurring at a specific time, must be the same regardless of the agent causing it). We present a concept that enables doing so. The Social Cost of Forcing (SCF) is the monetary value of the social damage caused by marginal RF at a given instant (Wm − 2 ). Any forcing agent whose temporal decay profile and radiative efficiency are known can be priced based on it. Prices obtained for distinct agents are consistent in CBA, as long as the same SCF and discounting assumptions are applied. Hence, the SCF is a concise way to communicate social cost information: mutually consistent prices for any set of forcing agents can be obtained based on a single Integrated Assessment Model output, the SCF. We explain the theoretical foundations of the concept and illustrate its practical applications with two examples: (1) we derive SCF-based prices for CO 2 and CH 4 , and (2) we estimate the social cost of albedo changes in a boreal forest stand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International transfers in climate policy channeled from the industrialized to the developing world either support the mitigation of climate change or the adaptation to global warming. From a purely allocative point of view, transfers supporting mitigation tend to be Pareto-improving whereas this is not very likely in the case of adaptation support. We illustrate this by regarding transfer schemes currently applied under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto framework. However, if we enrich the analysis by integrating distributional aspects, we find that international adaptation funding may help both the developing and developed world. Interestingly this is not due to altruistic incentives, but due to follow-up effects on international negotiations on climate change mitigation. We argue that the lack of fairness perceived by developing countries in the international climate policy arena can be reduced by the support of adaptation in these countries. As we show – taking into account different fairness concepts – this might raise the prospects of success in international negotiations on climate change. Yet, we find that the influence of transfers may induce different fairness effects on climate change mitigation negotiations to run counter. We discuss whether current transfer schemes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto framework adequately serve the distributive and allocative objectives pursued in international climate policy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is critical in efforts to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic climate change. Despite uncertainty about the exact form of a future, international REDD+ system, REDD+ carbon property rights would need to be created and allocated with liability assigned for the potential loss of climate benefits in the event of carbon reversal from deforestation. This commentary explores the links between forest property rights and liability, to different REDD+ policy options and their implications for permanence. Should national governments retain liability for permanence then project-level activities that have individually-assigned REDD+ carbon rights may have a higher risk of carbon reversal than policies where rights are assigned to the state. Knowledge of pre-existing forest rights is necessary for some policies implemented with government-assigned REDD+ rights in order to compensate for potential income losses from policy implementation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]