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Some sizeable, favourable, forecast revisions from the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) allowed the Chancellor to announce a significant loosening of the fiscal stance in October's Budget, while still maintaining the same margin for error against his fiscal mandate. However, forthcoming changes in the treatment of student loans in the public finances mean that the prospects of a further loosening in the fiscal stance look slim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

▀ There has been widespread misinformation in and outside Parliament about the economic case for Brexit. Outside Parliament, the rival groups – those with a negative assessment of Brexit and those with a positive one – have set out their arguments but these have huge differences in the factual and intellectual support they each bring to the debate. The group predicting a negative effect have published a wide set of empirical appraisals from academic and related research teams of the case for leaving and that against it. This, largely rigorous statistical analysis, finds strong and clear evidence of the large costs to leaving. The camp predicting a positive result for Brexit, in contrast, relies on one academic source for its case; the Cardiff University Macroeconomic Institute led by Patrick Minford. This has reported its predictions of the effects of Brexit which in contrast to the other camp, show large positive effects to growth and other key parts of the UK economy.▀ We assess the empirical quality of these two cases and conclude that the economic modelling of the Cardiff group is insufficient for them to give an adequate empirical estimate of the costs and benefits of Brexit; the Liverpool model it uses has a sparse overseas sector and does not differentiate between EU and non‐EU trade for example, so is unsuited to analyse the effects of changes in these. Our verdict is that, based on the evidence, Brexit in almost any form would be damaging to the UK.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year., Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017-18, down from 2.2-2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017-18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion-driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%., The size of the initial global market sell-off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months., One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect - but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will 'stick' than our new baseline forecasts assume., Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent months have seen the Government's endeavours to cut public sector borrowing stall. The UK's vote to leave the EU will now throw previous fiscal plans up in the air via both a likely slowdown in the economy and the possibility of a discretionary fiscal loosening. But the latter could prove a silver lining for the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely - in line with our own new forecasts - a recession is unlikely., Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though 'stand-alone' recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses., Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one-third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two-thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017., Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a 'rescue package' of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deficit reduction continues to be a slow process. And while the Government officially remains on course to meet its objective of a budget surplus by the end of the decade, it will not take much to knock that target off course, including an acceptance of the implausibility of current plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Net inward migration from the EU has been running at record levels in recent years, although the steep increase in new National Insurance numbers issued suggests that the official data may be understating the level of immigration. There was a clear step up in inflows after both expansions of the EU into central and eastern Europe, while the relative strength of the UK labour market has been an important driver of the more recent rise in inflows., High levels of immigration have helped to offset the impact of an ageing population and ensured that the UK has enjoyed stronger labour supply growth than many of its peers. With migrants typically being better educated than their UK-born counterparts, the quality of the stock of labour has also improved, and migrants have been found to have a net positive fiscal impact., But there have been some downsides, with evidence that high immigration has had a small dampening impact on wages. That migrants tend to head to London and the other southern regions over other destinations has exacerbated the imbalances in regional housing markets., Given that a desire to have greater control over immigration is usually one of the key motivations for those favouring Brexit, a vote in favour of leaving the EU is likely to see the UK abandon the policy of free movement of labour. This would probably see the UK extend the points-based system that it currently uses for non-EU countries to include EU migrants., Our modelling suggests that the adoption of a 'populist' immigration policy which lowers net inward migration by 60,000 a year could reduce the level of GDP by 1.1% in 2030 compared with our baseline forecast. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price-sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate., Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016., Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer., Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by 'Brexit' we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI., In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and 'spillover' benefits boosting economy-wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to 'crowd out' investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors., That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand., However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost., Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a major market for UK exports, the EU is not quite as significant as the headline statistics suggest and one which is likely to continue declining in relative importance. The static tariff cost of a worst-case 'Brexit' is estimated to be around ¼% of GDP, a modest sum., But the dynamic cost could be higher. And certain industrial sectors look vulnerable, notably aircraft and chemicals where sales to the EU account for over 40% of total (domestic and overseas) demand and EU tariffs are relatively high., Moreover, exports to the EU would also face non-tariff barriers, which would be of particular relevance for the services sector. That services firms export much more to the rest of the world than to the EU suggests that they are well versed in overcoming such barriers. But financial services would face particular risks from Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of the past couple of months have led us to push out our call for the first UK rate hike from February 2016 to May 2016. The financial market turmoil of late summer, increasingly dovish commentary from the MPC, the enduring strength of sterling and the likelihood of lower inflation over the next six months are all factors which point to the first rate hike coming later., This is a modal forecast which is consistent with our baseline forecast playing out. But the escalating downside risks would imply a mean forecast which shows the first rate hike coming even later still and the subsequent path of monetary tightening being shallower. This explains why the expectations of financial markets may appear to be more bearish than our own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A consistent drop in public sector net borrowing in the first half of the year has stalled recently. And signs of a weaker pace of growth in the economy also points to borrowing in 2015-16 not falling as fast as the OBR expects. But evidence that the economy's potential is stronger than previously believed may allow an easing of the longer-term fiscal squeeze. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chancellor's post-election 'Summer Budget' saw pragmatism trump ideology, with a relaxation of the squeeze on departmental spending and a slower path of deficit reduction. But the price for this was a sharp cut in the welfare budget and a hike in taxes. Overall, fiscal policy is set to remain a drag on the economy.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several charts are presented which shows economic forecast for Great Britain from 2004-2019 which include household consumer expenditure, short-term interest rate, and government financial balance.

The pace of deficit reduction has continued to disappoint against a relatively healthy economic backdrop. Structural changes in the labour market and income tax receipts auger against a dramatic improvement in 2015. Longer-term, the implausibility of spending cuts implied by current fiscal plans points to borrowing continuing to run ahead of official expectations... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The solid pace of expansion in the economy has still yet to be matched by a commensurate improvement in the public finances. And with deficit reduction proving grindingly slow, a question mark continues to exist over the feasibility of current fiscal ambitions... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several charts are presented that show economic forecasts for Great Britain from 2002-2017 including household consumer expenditure, real gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate.

The UK's export performance since 2008 has been disappointing, especially when sterling's depreciation in 2008-09 is taken into account. This reflects a deterioration in relative wage costs, particularly relative to the US and Germany. In the four years from Q2 2009, export volumes grew by 17%. In contrast, Germany's exports grew by 34% over the same period. The poor performance of exports is one of the key reasons for lacklustre growth in the UK, with GDP still below pre-crisis levels... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A list of tables showing economic forecasts for Great Britain is presented, which include gross domestic product components, cross exchange rates, and labout market indicators.

The first decade of monetary policy independence saw a period of low and stable inflation, but over the past six years this has given way to higher, and more volatile, inflation. The increase in inflation rates has both external and domestic origins. Higher commodity prices, in particular food, and rising prices of manufactured goods imported from emerging markets have been important. In both cases the sharp depreciation of the pound in the aftermath of the financial crisis has compounded the impact on the UK. There has also been a marked step upwards in domestic inflationary pressures which has largely come from administered & regulated prices, such as domestic energy prices and university tuition fees. These categories account for just 10% of the inflation basket, but over the past six years they have contributed 0.9ppts to an average CPI inflation rate of 3.1%... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumer spending has consistently disappointed since the onset of the financial crisis, hampered by a severe squeeze on real wages and the need to deleverage. Spending is currently more than 3% lower than the late-2007-peak, a marked contrast with previous recoveries when spending had risen well above previous peaks by this stage. However, the consumer finally showed signs of life in 2012 following a firm rebound in real household incomes. This improvement was driven by robust growth in employment, weaker inflationary pressures and the high uprating of social benefits... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an outlook for the impact of rising oil prices on the global economy for 2012-13. During the forecast period, the price of oil is expected to range between 116 U.S. dollars and 160 U.S. dollars amid a drop in its embedded risk premium. It cites renewed tensions between western governments and Iran as a key threat to the price of oil. Based on a simulation model, an oil price hike is expected to lead to stagnant U.S. growth and a mild recession in Great Britain.

The article presents an economic outlook for Great Britain for 2012-15. For the 2012-13 period, borrowing figures will be affected by the transfer of the Royal Mail pension fund into the public sector. It expects bank rate to remain at 0.5% until late 2013, while the British pound is expected to gain further against the euro amid an unresolved debt crisis. A 0.4% growth in gross domestic product is projected in the first quarter of 2012.

Several charts are presented that show economic trends and forecast for Great Britain from 2001-16 including unemployment rate, gross domestic product and trade and balance of payments.

The article provides a detailed economic forecast for Great Britain as of October 2011. The lag in tax revenues will likely continue for the year, but the economy's gradual recovery from next year will enable the government to slowly lessen the deficit. It sates that sterling will remain weak, although as the Greek default unfolds, some strengthening against the euro is likely, and that consumer price index (CPI) inflation will slow sharply in the first half of 2012.

Several charts are presented that outline economic forecast data for Great Britain, including gross domestic product (GDP) components, trade and balance of payments, and inflation indicators.

The article presents an outlook on the economic sector of Great Britain. It relates the success of the government in reining in spending in the three months to May 2011. It outlines the factors that would put an end to the current high rates of inflation, including the rise of value-added tax (VAT) and the recent increases in commodity prices. The percentage points contributed by oil prices and food prices to the consumer price index (CPI) rate in June 2011 are provided.

The article presents a detailed economic forecast for Great Britain. Fiscal and monetary policies are discussed together with an examination of prices and wages, commercial activity and consumer demand. The housing market appears to be more resilient than expected. The corporate sector which is important to the prospects for recovery has come out of the recession in relatively good financial health. Broadly, the labour market improved with an increase in employment as indicated in data from the International Labor Organization (ILO).

The article presents tables which support the economic forecast report for Great Britain including data on Gross Domestic Product and its Components, Inflation Indicators and Personal Sector Net Financial Wealth And The Money Supply.

The article discusses an economic outlook for Great Britain from 2008 to 2015. It is noted that tax revenues have recovered following strong performances by cyclical elements, such as corporation tax. Consumer price inflation (CPI) went up in December 2010, with petrol and food posting the highest increases. Charts are presented that show values of economic indicators, which include demand, consumption and gross domestic product (GDP).

Charts are presented that show forecast values of economic indicators in Great Britain from 1999 to 2014, which include real gross domestic product (GDP), consumer prices and unemployment rate.

The article discusses an economic outlook for Great Britain to 2015, particularly regional mortgage repossessions. Factors that influence mortgage possessions rates include debt service ratio, unemployment rate and access to refinancing opportunities. It is predicted that there would be a small upturn in possessions order due to low house prices in 2011 and withdrawal of income support.

The article presents an economic outlook for Great Britain, particularly the impact of public spending cut on the labor market. The labor market showed resilience during the recession but indicators show that the market has become affected, with private sector hiring remaining low. Unemployment may increase given the combination of falling public sector unemployment and minimal job creation.

This article provides an outlook for trends in the British economy in 2010 and 2011. It expects the government's fiscal tightening to affect the economy. It expects consumer spending to grow in 2011. The article also sees a risk of higher levels of unemployment due to reforms to the benefit system. A further drop in living standards is also noted.

This section presents tables of economic indicators of Great Britain in 2010, including gross domestic product (GDP), balance of payments and exchange rates.

This article provides an outlook for the performance of the British economy in 2010. It highlights a risk in terms of the sustainability of an economic recovery because of the plan of the government to eliminate the structural budget deficit. It also assesses some potential to make further savings through welfare reform. The article also expects interest rates to fall due to concerns about the global economic recovery.

The article discusses the fiscal tightening measures being implemented by the government of Great Britain and how it can affect overall economic growth. The fiscal retrenchment, initiated by British Chancellor George Osborne in June 2010, aimed to eliminate the structural budget deficit while protecting economic recovery. A comparison to the Canadian experience in the mid-1990s describing how government spending cuts can lead to economic recovery is presented.

The article discusses the major role of the housing market in the economy of Great Britain and how its recovery could impact overall economic growth. It states that the housing market measures economic growth as higher rates in house prices suggests higher consumer spending and better economic outlook. It is said, however, that the boom in the housing sector is faced with concerns such as falling incomes, higher taxes, and expensive mortgage lending rates.

The article presents an economic outlook for Great Britain from 2009-2014. It details information on the British economy including the government's fiscal policy and monetary policy as well as information on prices and wages. Issues regarding the outlook on consumer spending and how they impact the overall economy are tackled. Economic data including government borrowings, inflation, and export are presented.

The surprise UK vote on 23 June to leave the EU caught markets on the hop. There was a strong initial equity sell-off but this has faded - world stocks are already back at their pre-referendum level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have lowered our forecast for UK economic growth following the vote to leave the EU on 23 June. GDP growth is now forecast at 1.1% in 2017 and 1.4% in 2018, and the medium-term outlook has also been nudged down. We have also lowered our forecast for all of the main industrial sectors, with the biggest reductions in the long-term forecasts for construction and manufacturing, although the weak pound could provide some short-term boost to the latter., Our baseline forecast assumes that the government triggers Article 50 by the end of this year and that the UK leaves the EU by end-2018. We assume that the government draws a red line under the freedom of movement and thus loses access to the single market. Trade relations revert to WTO rules., A number of factors determine the relative impact on each sector. First, in the short term, heightened uncertainty will hit business confidence, causing firms to delay capital spending. Second, less favourable trade relations with the EU could see export-oriented sectors migrate production away from the UK. Finally, restrictions on migration will reduce the potential size of the labour force., Consequently, investment-oriented sectors such as construction and machinery have seen some of the largest downgrades. Moreover, transport equipment is heavily exported to Europe, so increased trade barriers could see some production move out of the UK. Meanwhile, labour shortages could weaken growth prospects in labour-dependent sectors. In addition, the vote has created uncertainties around the long-term viability of London as Europe's major financial centre., The outlook for more consumer-focused sectors is less downbeat, although an uptick in inflation may erode household purchasing power in the near-term, and the multipliers from lower economic activity are likely to permanently reduce household incomes in the long term relative to our last baseline [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section presents an economic forecast for Great Britain. It sees a tightened fiscal policy in the country in early 2010 with the restoration of value-added tax (VAT) to 17.5%. Inflation is expected to be dragged by the labor market conditions as unemployment continues to rise into next year. Meanwhile, exports are believed to recover as global demand rises again and the competitiveness of pound grows.

Several charts are presented that lists economic forecasting for Great Britain including gross domestic product, households' sector income and expenditure and trade and balance of payments.

The article examines whether recession will bring about a rebalancing of the economy of Great Britain. It cites the roots of the current world financial crisis and deep recession. It discourages the government from imposing tighter regulation or higher taxation. It predicts that high value-added manufacturing are likely to be the main growth areas.

The article examines whether the British economic recovery will outpace other major economies. It discusses the impact of the crisis in the banking sector on major economies. Surveys of confidence have greatly improved, leading to a significant rally in global equity markets and a notable decline in financial stress levels. Due to the popularity of variable rate mortgages and high levels of home ownership, British consumers will benefit more than most from low interest rates.

The article presents economic forecast for Great Britain for 2009. It examines the fiscal and monetary policy of the country. Consumer price index inflation declined by 2% in June, while retail price index inflation was set by 1.6%. It also discusses the country's quarterly gross domestic product growth for the first quarter.

The article discusses the role of quantitative easing (QE) in pulling Great Britain out of recession. It states that the policy of QE aims to boost the money supply and bring down key borrowing costs in order to counter the recession and the risk of getting into deflation. According to the article, QE has been implemented because conventional monetary policy approaches could no longer be used. It is inferred that despite the introduction of this policy, a rapid recovery in the country's real economy is not expected.

The article presents an economic outlook for Great Britain as of April 2009. An overview of forecast on the country's fiscal policy, monetary policy, and prices and wages is offered. It discusses the impact of the recession on the British economy. Consumer spending is forecast to decline by 3.3% in 2009, followed by a further decline of 0.6% in 2010.

The article delves into the possible impact of economic recession on the long-term growth prospects in Great Britain. Net migration in Great Britain peaked in 2004. However, with evidence suggesting that migration from A8 countries is slowing, inward migration is said to have been dampened by recession. Forecast reveals that net migration is expected to decline to 80,000 in 2009. The non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) is expected to grow from 5% to 6.5% until 2010, resulting to low employment rate. There will also be lower level of new houses to be required in the future due to a declining British population.