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he September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, and repeated warnings that the next targets could be Germany, England, France, or Italy show how vulnerable Europe is to new threats, from instability in regions far away, from failed or failing states and from the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the past, many Europeans have seen such problems as America's to deal with, or no one's. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Prague, the Czech Republic, on November 21st-22nd, 2002, and in the European Union's subsequent deliberations about the best use of its own embryonic rapid-reaction force, European leaders will commit themselves, at least on paper, to take on farther-flung responsibilities. After half a century of being wrapped up chiefly in their own affairs, Europe must think urgently about how best to defend themselves and their interests anywhere in the world. Although Europe has prided itself on their civilizing "soft power", most European governments recognize that more hard power, military capability, in short, is required. The go-anywhere NATO that is to be proclaimed at the summit will in any case face the old NATO's problems: too few fleet-footed capabilities, with smart weapons and secure communications, of the sort that America displayed in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and which are needed to win wars. The Iraq debate at the United Nations has been an all-too-familiar case-study in how Europeans get themselves at cross-purposes, with an activist Britain, a cautious France and an ohne mich Germany all pulling in different directions. America easily leads the world in almost every dimension of power. But Europe, with its bigger population and not much smaller gross domestic product, reckoned to be larger, in fact, until America's faster growth and the depreciating euro reversed the honors, has considerable heft, and that weight will grow as the EU takes in more members.

The article discusses the shortage of Arabic linguists in the United States and its impact on national security. The various inquiries into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are full of worrying statistics. The army had filled only half its authorized positions for Arabic translators; a shortage of translators at the Federal Bureau of Investigation meant that thousands of hours of audiotape had gone untranslated; the Central Intelligence Agency had not been through countless technical papers about foreign countries' scientific research; and, of course, the spying agencies were woefully short of Arabic- and Farsi-speaking agents. There are said to be just 1,850 known Arabic-speakers in the U.S. army. By and large, the demand in Iraq has been filled by locals of variable quality--and loyalty. "Heritage" speakers--American citizens who can still speak their native languages and understand the culture--are offered signing bonuses of up to $3,000 by the army. Congress has given more money for foreign-language training.

This article focuses on the varying strategies of United States presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry for the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. Unkeen, despite repeated Republican taunts, to reveal the names of the mystery foreign leaders that he has claimed are rooting for him in the election, John Kerry can hardly be pleased with the one endorsement he does appear to have won--from North Korea's boss, Kim Jong Il. Senior Bush people claim Mr Kim would break out the champagne at a Kerry victory, seeing him as a soft touch. Democrats claim the growing North Korean nuclear threat proves that George Bush's high-handed manner with friend and foe alike has made America less safe. Mr Kerry has long said he would deal with the nuclear issue in direct talks, as North Korea has been demanding, rather than through more cumbersome, and so far unsuccessful, six-way talks that also include South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. But there are few illusions, even among Democrats, that there is an easy deal to be had. Given North Korea's mendacious past, any deal would need tough verification rules to convince Congress that it was worth the paper it was written on.