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The launch of the national carbon emissions trading (CET) market has resulted in a closer relationship between China's CET market and its electricity market, making it easy for risks to transfer between markets. This paper utilizes data from China's CET market and electric power companies between 2017 and 2023 to construct the spillover index model of Diebold and Yilmaz, the frequency-domain spillover approach developed by Barun'ik and Křehl'ik, and a minimum spanning tree model. The comparison is made before and after the launch of the national CET market. Subsequently, this paper examines the market spillover effects, as well as the static and dynamic properties of network structures, considering both the time domain and frequency-domain perspectives. The research findings suggest the following: (1) There is a strong risk spillover effect between China's CET market and the stock prices of electric power companies; (2) There is asymmetry in the paired spillover effects between carbon trading pilot markets and the national CET market, and differences exist in the impact of risk spillovers from power companies between the two; (3) The results of the MST model indicate that the risk contagion efficiency is higher in the regional CET pilot stage compared to the national CET market launch stage, with significant changes occurring in key nodes before and after the launch of the national CET market; (4) Both the dynamic spillover index and the standardized tree length results demonstrate that crisis events can worsen the risk contagion between markets. Besides offering a theoretical foundation and empirical evidence for the development of China's CET and electricity markets, the findings of this paper can provide recommendations for financial market participants as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's green credit has mostly been invested in new energy areas with positive environmental externalities in recent years, while coal power enterprises have been neglected. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among government, coal power enterprises, and banks to clarify the key factors and mechanisms for coal power enterprises undergoing green transformation. The research results show that: Firstly, to realize the spontaneous green transformation of coal power enterprises, spontaneous profitability must be achieved before the removal of policy incentives, which is reflected in the continuous increase in electricity price, carbon emission trading price, and decrease in green transformation cost. Secondly, the green credit adjustment factor cannot determine whether a company chooses to undertake green transition, but it provides a valuable window of green transition for companies. When the relative benefits of green transformation projects are greater than the relative costs, coal power enterprises will undergo green transformation spontaneously. Thirdly, lower green credit interest rates are not better. An optimal green credit interest rate exists, that allows coal power enterprises to obtain the longest transition window in which to achieve spontaneous profitability for green transition projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]