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In the context of sub-global participation in greenhouse gas mitigation efforts, this paper investigates the effectiveness of a Canada-U.S. emissions bubble under their existing regional trade agreement. It also explores the potential economic impact of carbon tariff harmonization through the implementation of a common Canada-U.S. external border tariff adjustment as a mean to address competitiveness issues. Using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model the paper finds that the creation of an emission bubble between the two countries could improve efficiency. The findings also suggest that a carbon tariff harmonization policy could give rise to distributional issues among Annex I regions and could fail to mitigate the negative competitiveness impacts of carbon abatement policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon dioxide emissions abatement in a group of countries can result in increased emissions in non-abating countries. This effect has been referred to as carbon leakage. The Kyoto Protocol calls for a number of industrialized countries to limit their emissions while other countries have no abatement commitments. This paper assesses the sectoral and regional determinants of the leakage in a static multi-sector, multi-regional computable general equilibrium model. In baseline estimates based on our model, the Kyoto Protocol leads to a carbon leakage rate of 10 percent. A decomposition technique is applied which attributes increases in CO[sub 2] emissions by non-participating countries to specific sectors in the abating countries. This information is important for the debate on the tax exemptions for certain industries in the participating countries as it provides information for the most- and least-leakage contributing sectors of the economy. Additional calculations indicate the need for caution in the carbon tax design. Exemptions of any sector from a carbon tax are not justified because they lower welfare in a region. The degree of sectoral and regional data disaggregation, and international capital mobility do not change the leakage rate significantly. Fossil-fuel supply elasticities and trade substitution elasticities are crucial determinants for projecting the total Worm emissions of CO[sub 2]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyse infrastructure needs of the European natural gas market in response to decarbonisation of the European energy system. To this end, we use numerical modelling and apply the Global Gas Model. We investigate three pathways of future natural gas consumption: i) a decreasing natural gas consumption, following the scenarios of the EU Energy Roadmap 2050; ii) a moderate increase of natural gas consumption, along the lines of the IEA's New Policies Scenario; and iii) a temporary increase of natural gas use as a "bridge" technology, followed by a strong decrease after 2030. Our results show that current import infrastructure and intra-European transit capacity are sufficient to accommodate future import needs in all scenarios. This is despite a pronounced reduction of domestic production and a strong increase in import dependency. However, due to strong demand in Asia, Europe must increasingly rely on exports from Africa and the Caspian region, leading to new infrastructure capacity from these regions. When natural gas serves as a "bridge" technology, short-term utilisation rates of LNG import capacity temporarily increase instead of instigating large scale pipeline expansions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With federal policies to curb carbon emissions stagnating in the U.S., California is taking action alone. Sub-national policies can lead to high rates of emissions leakage to other regions as state-level economies are closely connected, including integration of electricity markets. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we estimate that California's cap-and-trade program without restrictions on imported electricity increases out-of-state emissions by 45% of the domestic reduction. When imported electricity is included in the cap and "resource shuffling" is banned, as set out in California's legislation, emissions reductions in electricity exporting states partially offset leakage elsewhere and overall leakage is 9%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the question of how investments in imperfectly competitive electricity markets interact with a price on carbon. The analysis is based on a dynamic numerical Cournot model calibrated to the German market and focuses on (a) the level of investments and technology choice and (b) welfare impacts under optimal carbon pricing. As a special feature, we also restrict access to one technology (coal) to strategic players ("technological market power"). The main results are: (a) In the long-run prices reach competitive levels due to entry by the competitive fringe. If technological market power prevails, this can only be accomplished through high carbon prices. (b) Investment levels and technology choice show different patterns under market power and perfect competition. (c) Apart from driving investments, carbon pricing also renders old carbon-intensive capacities unprofitable and thus induces more extensive fleet turnover. (d) Welfare almost always increases as a result of carbon pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assesses the economic effects of carbon emission restrictions in Egypt. Alternative specifications in which the sensitivity of estimates of the costs of emissions restrictions is analyzed; Model constructed for the analysis; Four broad categories which the data requirements to implement the model can be classified; Scenarios of emissions reductions; Effects of increasingly restrictive limits on annual emissions.