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Should developed and developing countries reduce emissions in complete harmony? To answer this question, we develop a simple North–South model of trade in which homogeneous firms in the South produce intermediate goods, heterogeneous firms in the North produce and export final goods, and pollution travels across countries. Using our framework, we first analytically show that without international policy coordination, Northern environmental policies may or may not deliver an employment double dividend (EDD) in the North but has no effect on the aggregate employment and emissions in the South. In contrast, Southern environmental policies never deliver an EDD in both countries. With international policy coordination, common environmental policies may or may not deliver an EDD in both countries. Whether the Northern, Southern, and common environmental policy improve welfare is uncertain across all cases with or without international policy coordination. We then numerically show that, to maximize world welfare, the North must impose much stricter environmental regulations than the South. In a baseline scenario, unless both countries initially regulate to some extent, international policy coordination is ineffective. When people suffer more badly from pollution as it accumulates, however, it can be effective. This is more likely in the presence of transboundary pollution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using firm-level patent data from 1978 to 2015, I examine the impact of market-based environmental policies on innovation in energy storage. My results highlight the role of environmental taxes, feed-in tariffs for solar energy and tradable certificates for CO 2 emission to promote firms' patenting activity, whereas renewable energy certificates and energy efficiency certificates discourage it. These results imply the need for more stringent market-based environmental policies to incentivize innovation in energy storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the importance of environmental care for the growth and development of the global world and how One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) can help to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa for economic cooperation and long-term sustainability. Paper, based on bibliometric analysis and utilizing Web of Science Core Collection database for calculation, summarizes total OBOR publications in terms of quantity, citations, regions, disciplines, institutes and explains about the most productive countries. Results reveal that total OBOR papers indexed in Web of Science was found 2508 where there were 1335 articles and 854 proceedings papers marking 87.3% of total OBOR research. We find the most productive direction of environmental science and global climate change and work related to environmental policies. Results show that China has contributed 73.3% (1755 publications) to global OBOR publication and have received 69.3% of all citations to "One Belt One Road" publications. Highest average citation level was from Canada, Portugal, and Spain while China's average citations were quite low though very close to average world level. Internationally collaborated publications had more citations than the publications prepared by authors of one country. The paper concludes that environmental concerns should be kept in mind while focusing on the growth and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes strategic environmental policy when polluting firms engage in overlapping ownership arrangements (OOAs) under differentiated duopoly with quantity competition. Specifically, we focus on two pollution control instruments: emission taxes and standards. The key findings are as follows: (i) Compared to the case without ownership, the optimal environmental tax rate and absolute standard are higher (lower) when the polluting firms' products are complements (substitutes). (ii) Both the tax and standard policies are equally efficient in their effects on the firms' output and abatement decisions, consumer surplus, environmental quality, and social welfare, regardless of whether the differentiated products are complements or substitutes. (iii) If the government sets equity share and emission tax (or standard) simultaneously to maximize social welfare, the optimal equity share may exceed 50% for OOA firms producing two complements and is inversely related to the degree of product complementarity. Our results have welfare implications for the choice of environmental regulation between taxes and standards, when equity share is exogenous, or when the government determines an optimal mix of equity share and emission tax (or standard). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an editorial introducing a special issue of the journal "Environmental Economics & Policy Studies" that focuses on the relationship between environmental sustainability and smart city development. The editor highlights the urgent need for transformative approaches to address environmental challenges in urban areas and emphasizes the potential of smart technologies to optimize resource utilization and catalyze sustainable urban transformations. The collection of research articles in this special issue offers diverse perspectives on the topic, examining the interconnectedness of technological innovation, policy interventions, socio-economic dynamics, and environmental outcomes. The editor hopes that this collection will inspire collaborative efforts to build smarter, more sustainable, and equitable cities. [Extracted from the article]

This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy for non-point source pollution in a Cournot duopoly competition with product differentiation. Under linear price and cost functions, the optimal environmental policy is determined. In the case of non-point source pollutants, the standard policies cannot be applied since the government has limited information about the individual emissions; only the total size of the pollution is known. The firms want to earn as high as possible profits by selecting most appropriate output levels and abatement technologies. The government wants to maximize the social welfare by the selection of the uniform tax rate. The optimal decisions are determined in a two-stage process. In the second stage, the firms determine their outputs, taking the technologies and the tax rate as given. In the first stage, the firms select abatement technologies with a given tax rate, and the government selects the optimal tax rate with the given choices of the firms. Under asymmetric information, the government constructs the welfare function with uncertainty on the firms’ outputs and determines the optimal tax rate by maximizing the welfare expectation and minimizing the welfare variance. Since the best reply of the government has a complicated form, the Nash equilibrium is numerically and graphically determined. It is shown that ambient charge tax charge effectively controls the total concentration of NPS pollution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]