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This article considers the possibility of constructing an authentic environmental ethic from Buddhist sources. It first outlines the major critiques of historical Buddhist approaches to the natural world and parses some of the philological and linguistic barriers to such a construction. It then considers some of the recent philosophical critiques of such a project and reviews the major points of tension between the Buddhist philosophical tradition and the kinds of environmental ethics found in the land ethic and deep ecology. Ultimately, this article asserts that such tension is relieved if we begin from Buddhist philosophical principles and construct an environmental ethic from the ground up. It argues a Buddhist environmental ethic emerges from the combination of the goal of liberating all sentient beings from du'kha, an understanding of du'kha as dependently arising, and a novel recognition of the environment as a major cause of this du'kha. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to focus on the idea of depth developed by Arne Næss, which is related both to his research methodology and some of its anthropological/cosmological implications. Far from being purely a psychological dimension (as argued by Warwick Fox), in Næss's perspective, the subject of depth is a methodological and ontological issue that underpins and lays the framework for the deep ecology movement. We cannot interpret the question of "depth" without considering the "relational ontology" that he himself has developed in which the "ecological self" is viewed as a "relational union within the total field." Based on this point of view, I propose that we are able to reinterpret the history of the deep ecology movement and its future, while rereading its politics, from the issue of depth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common to hear that deep ecology "has reached its logical conclusion and exhausted itself" in a vacuous anthropomorphism and absurd nonanthropocentrism. These conclusions should be rejected. Properly understood, neither objection poses a serious problem for deep ecology so much as for the ethic of "ecological holism" which some philosophers-- wrongly--have taken to arise from deep ecology. Deep ecology is not such an ethic, but is best understood as an aesthetically articulated conception of what, following Robinson Jeffers, may be called "Wild Mind," and such a Wild Mind is characterized--not criticized and condemned--by just that anthropomorphism and nonanthropocentrism critics focus on when they attack the ethic of ecological holism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Arne Naess, his environmental philosophy is influenced by the philosophy of language called empirical semantics, which he first developed in the I 930s as a participant in the seminars of the Vienna Circle. While no one denies his claim, most of his commentators defend views about his environmental philosophy that contradict the tenets of his semantics. In particular, they argue that he holds that deep ecology's supporters share a world view, and that the movement's platform articulates shared principles. Naess, however, rejects this conception of deep ecology, and, moreover, he is compelled to do so because of his long- standing views on semantics. Naess's semantics thus poses a particularly difficult problem for the first group of theorists who endorsed Naess. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the last great philosopher of the will, Albert Schweitzer rejected the radical individualism of Nietzsche and the pessimistic-mystical detachment of Schopenhauer, and instead sought to create a true social ethic. Schweitzer's particular contribution was to move further than Nietzsche to reconcile philosophy with natural science while simultaneously preserving and transforming the sense of mysticism and higher world-order principles from Schopenhauer. He joined this new cosmology to the virtue ethics of Aristotle, and recovered one key element of his ontology of becoming to transcend the Humean "is/ought" gap for ethics. The result is a philosophy that is as much biographical of Schweitzer himself as it is systematic. This result is both the strength and greatest weakness of his reverence-for-life ethic. It is tailor-made for contemporary environmental ethics: it has applications in many strands of environmental thought, including deep ecology, ecofeminism, and ecotheology, and may attract considerable interest from environmental movements that seek to cultivate deep personal conviction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addresses the problem of reconciling environmental holism with the intrinsic value of individual beings. Dilemma in choosing between holism and intrinsic value; Holism in Madhyamika (middle-way) Buddhism; Philosophy of Martin Heidegger; Deep ecology; Holistic conception of nature; Thing-centered holism for environmental ethics; Account against the charges of irrationalism and practical impotence.

Focuses on the biological and reductionistic insights on deep ecology and the social constructivism of nature. Threat posed by human excesses on natural resources; Impact of environmental issues on social justice and human economic societies; Distinction of naturalistic realism from constructivism; Valuation of nature by environmental laws.

Presents a view on environmental ethics based on the article `Deep Ecology and the Irrelevance of Morality,' by Eric H. Reitan. Articulation of a moral rather than a nonmoral position by the `Self-Realization' thesis as propounded by Arne Naess and Warwick Fox; Differences in the ideational structure of the deep ecological Self-Realization thesis with that of respect for the moral law.

Examines Warwick Fox's tripartite characterization of deep ecology. Distinctiveness of popular sense; Tenability of formal sense; Relation between deep ecology and ultimate norms.

Argues against Arne Naess and Warwick Fox's contention that deep ecology is essentially nonmoral. Definition of the deep-ecological notion of `self-realization'; Relevance of morality with deep ecology; Reconciliation of Naess and Fox's `self-realization' with the works of Immanuel Kant; Performance of moral acts from the sheer love of doing so as an Aristotelian virtue.

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