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Environmental policy in the United States (US) is known for its media-specific approach to problems, and scholars have argued that this is ineffective. To combat these problems, some have argued for a more coordinated, integrated approach to policymaking. With Congressional gridlock prohibiting legislative solutions, the Obama administration offers some examples of a regulatory path to policy integration. Importantly, these efforts do not entail significant organizational remodels, which can be difficult to adopt. Three different 'types' of policy integration from the US Environmental Protection Agency and Bureau of Land Management are described. These cases serve as a potential roadmap for broader implementation of policy integration within the fragmented US bureaucracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of environmental market-based policy instruments (MBIs), such as cap-and-trade and biodiversity offsetting programs, have extensively documented MBI's market-like features, including the ways they incentivize producing environmental quality, risk subordinating nature protection to capital accumulation, and are supported by state-driven projects of market-building ('re-regulation'). A less emphasized dimension of MBIs is examined: the ways these institutions are founded upon a substantial thickening of state infrastructural power, which amounts to expanding state control over economic and environmental life in ways that outstrip processes of re-regulation. Appreciating the linkages between MBIs and expanding state control over environmental quality may help explain routine conservative resistance to these policy developments. Affinities between MBIs and regulatory thickening also call into question the degree to which MBIs should be thought of as 'liberalizing' policy instruments and suggests that, perhaps counterintuitively, the growth of MBIs may present new opportunities for expanding public control over environmental quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Renewable energy (RE) illustrates well the logic of ecological modernisation (EM). This logic has successfully transformed RE from a fringe idea owned by largely environmental actors to a mainstream one embraced by a broader constituency. This mainstream embrace inevitably (re)shapes the renewables enterprise. Not all renewables actors today are driven by environmental goals. Instead, key actors, particularly in corporate or community domains, nurture competing norms and aspirations. How the renewables project is envisaged and the goals it is directed to serve can thus differ considerably. Understanding these differences is important since transformations in the energy domain will not only impact climate protection but shape social futures in significant ways. The analysis proceeds in two interrelated steps: first, empirically – conducting an exploration of some of the main projects and actors in the contemporary Australian RE space; and second, theoretically – considering these empirical developments through an EM lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failure of societies to respond in a concerted, meaningful way to climate change is a core concern of the social science climate literature. Existing explanations of social inertia display little coherence. Here, a theoretical approach is suggested that integrates disparate perspectives on social inertia regarding climate change. Climate change constitutes a potential cultural trauma. The threat of cultural trauma is met with resistance and attempts to restore and maintain the status quo. Thus, efforts to avoid large-scale social changes associated with climate change constitute an effort to avoid cultural trauma, and result in social inertia regarding climate change at individual, institutional, and societal levels. Existing approaches to social inertia are reviewed. An intellectual framework utilizing the work of Pierre Bourdieu is proposed to integrate these different levels of social interaction. Social processes that maintain social order and thus avoid cultural trauma create social inertia regarding climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our understanding of the determinants of public concern about climate change relies heavily on survey research in the United States. But can those findings be generalized to the rest of the world? Analysis of the Pew Research Center's 2015 Global Attitudes Survey shows fairly similar patterns in the English-speaking Western democracies and, to a lesser extent, western Europe, but party identification and political ideology matter much less in most of the globe, and demographic factors have very different impacts. Female, younger, and less religious people tend to worry more about climate change in English-speaking Western democracies. In most of the world, however, concern is only weakly correlated with gender, rises with age and religiosity, and is more strongly correlated with education. A new measure of commitment to democratic values proved to be the most consistent predictor of concern globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The normative debate surrounding consumption-based emissions accounting, conceived of as a method for constructing national emissions inventories, is investigated. The focus is to examine whether such accounting would be more just than the current method of production-based accounting. It is argued that there is no good reason to think that consumption-based accounting would be less just, and some reason to think that it would be more just. The consequences of this for the overall question of whether to adopt consumption-based accounting are also investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent has the European Union (EU) had a benign or retarding effect on what its member states would have undertaken in the absence of EU climate policies during 2008–2012? A measurement tool for the EU policy's effect is developed and shows a benign average EU effect with considerable variation across countries. The EU's policy effectiveness vis-à-vis its member states is explained by the EU's non-compliance mechanism, the degree of usage of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, and national pre-Kyoto emission reduction goals. Time-series cross-sectional analyses show that the EU's non-compliance mechanism has no effect, while the ex-ante plans for using Kyoto flexible mechanisms and/or the ambitious pre-Kyoto emission reduction targets allow member states to escape constraints imposed by EU climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Obama's climate change record is assessed by looking at his success in translating policy goals into policy outputs (laws or regulatory action) during his time in office. Obama's campaign speeches are examined to identify specific promises to take action on climate change before proceeding to examine whether, how and with what success he managed to act upon these pledges. Obama is shown to have set out a multi-pronged approach to deal with climate change in his campaign speeches and succeeded in translating many of his goals into policy outputs. This finding contributes to debates about Obama's 'green' credentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new dataset of organizational testimony at U.S. Congressional hearings on environmental protection is used to examine how social movement organizations use issue expertise to gain access to the policy process. Environmental movement organizations (EMOs) are shown to testify in greater numbers at hearings that consider proposed legislation, compared to hearings that are exploratory or investigatory in nature. The increased representation at legislative hearings is unique to EMOs; other kinds of organizations do not obtain similar increases in legislative access. These findings suggest that, due to their scientific expertise and perceived legitimacy, EMOs receive privileged access to the policy process relative to other organizations affected by environmental policy and at a later stage than has been proposed by prior work examining social movement access to the policy process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The link between environmental frames and policy outcomes in China is explored. Environmental nongovernment organizations' (ENGOs) issue interpretation and presentation affect environmental policy changes. The notion of 'frame alignment' is introduced, and it is argued that it can serve to link ENGOs' advocacy needs and frame resonance among different stakeholders, thus successfully promoting advocacy. Based on in-depth interviews and analysis of news reports over a span of 10 years, it is found that where ENGOs are able to align their issue frames with those of the central state and media, the resulting frame resonance smooths policy change. In contrast, where ENGOs adopt conflict frames critical of state authorities, the absence of alignment leads to a slim chance of policy change. The findings shed light on why some ENGOs successfully create linkage and achieve their desired outcomes while others fail to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of technological development depends on citizens' social acceptance, whereas several challenges related to the understanding of citizens' reactions to renewable energy and its policies are identifiable. Most importantly, the gap between general attitudes towards the environment and specific voting behaviour regarding environment-friendly policy proposals calls for an explanation of how a policy's design causes citizens who might otherwise support environmental measures to express opposition in direct democratic votes. Therefore, how policy design and policy information impact opinion formation is investigated. Salient aspects are identified, and the different types of information or qualifications that may cause opposition are considered. This new approach reveals that citizens, in environmental decision-making, do indeed consider policy design and policy information, which they regard as conditions for support, and that the type of policy information matters since citizens do not consider all of the policy details when they make decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, innovative governance architectures have been progressively promoted across European Union (EU) environmental and climate policies with the purpose of improving the effectiveness of intervention through better cross-sectoral policy integration and increased involvement of sub-state and non-governmental actors in the policy process. By combining the theoretical insights of polycentric governance and the concept of usage, the case of the Covenant of Mayors (CoM) is analysed to uncover the extent to which this voluntary programme has empowered local authorities within the EU strategy for sustainable energy by encouraging coordination and learning. This illustrates how a range of policy variables determined the dynamics of the programme's implementation in Italy and the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leadership dynamics between the European Council, the Council and the Member States in European Union (EU) environmental policy since the 1970s are analysed. The puzzle is that, although the EU was set up as a 'leaderless Europe', it is widely seen as an environmental leader, albeit sometimes as a one-eyed leader amongst the blind. While differentiating between leadership types, it is argued that the European Council has the largest structural, the Council the most significant entrepreneurial, and the Member States the most important cognitive and exemplary leadership capacities. Most day-to-day environmental policy measures are negotiated by the Environment Council (in collaboration with the European Parliament). The European Council's increased interest in high politics climate change issues is largely due to the EU's global leadership ambitions. Member States have traditionally formed environmental leadership alliances on an ad hoc basis although this may be changing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy evaluation has grown significantly in the EU environmental sector since the 1990s. In identifying and exploring the putative drivers behind its rise - a desire to learn, a quest for greater accountability, and a wish to manipulate political opportunity structures - new ground is broken by examining how and why the existing literatures on these drivers have largely studied them in isolation. The complementarities and potential tensions between the three drivers are then addressed in order to advance existing research, drawing on emerging empirical examples in climate policy, a very dynamic area of evaluation activity in the EU. The conclusions suggest that future studies should explore the interactions between the three drivers to open up new and exciting research opportunities in order to comprehend contemporary environmental policy and politics in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last three decades, ecological modernisation (EM) has emerged as a powerful political discourse, in which economic growth, environmental protection and energy security are mutually reinforcing. Here, the trajectory of EM in the European Union is traced, using a discourse analysis of the seven Environmental Action Programmes. The discourse articulated in these documents points towards an encroaching 'double depoliticisation'. First, political decisions are discursively constructed as a matter of market rationality rather than a democratic process that engages with different political positions. Second, EM is reified as the only feasible solution, and alternative and contesting discourses are marginalised. Thus not only are political differences erased from the discourse, but the discourse is itself removed from political debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core themes and research questions of this volume, centred on the nature of environmental policy change in the European Union (EU), are laid out. An original heuristic framework to capture different dimensions, mechanisms and processes of policy change is presented. In order to contextualise the current situation, where EU policy scope has reached maturity and faces an uncertain future trajectory, EU environmental politics is divided into particular eras, looking closely at the nature of change in each period. This volume interrogates the extent to which change has occurred, the conditions or context within which it did/did not take place and the implications arising from stasis or change. The contributions to the volume are introduced and placed into the context of the broader trajectory of EU environmental policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has had a profound effect upon its members' environmental policy. Even in the United Kingdom (UK), the EU's most recalcitrant member state (historically labeled the 'Dirty man of Europe'), environmental policy has been Europeanised. As the UK moves to the EU's exit door it is timely to assess the utility of Europeanisation for understanding policy dynamics in the UK. Drawing upon interviews and extensive engagement with stakeholders, this article analyses the potential impact of Brexit upon environmental policy and politics. The analytical toolkit offered by de-Europeanisation is developed to identify the factors that drive and inhibit de-Europeanisation processes, thereby providing insights that may be applicable in other settings. Disengagement and policy stagnation are presented as more likely environmental outcomes of Brexit, with capacity emerging as a central explanatory variable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades. The EU's deepening and widening has led researchers to expect more non-compliance with EU environmental legislation. In fact, however, the implementation gap has narrowed over the past 25 years. Except for Southern enlargement, taking on new member states has not exacerbated the EU's compliance problem in the field of environmental policy. Nor has the expansion of the environmental acquis. This is explained by the European Commission's strategies of managing and enforcing compliance. EU environmental policy has become less demanding on member states since it increasingly tends to amend existing rather than set new legislation. Simultaneously, the Commission has developed new instruments to strengthen member state capacities to implement EU environmental legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing scholarship on climate governance has not sufficiently considered the relationship between climate leaders/pioneers and followers. Because of the global commons nature of climate change, unilateral leadership or pioneership by one or a small number of actors will be insufficient to combat climate change effectively. The need to take seriously the relationship between leaders and followers is all the greater in the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which emphasises diffuse, bottom-up action. The relationship between leaders and followers in polycentric climate governance is unpacked in this contribution. What types of actors can be climate followers? Through what pathways can followership emerge and how can we capture the essential characteristics of leader-follower relationships? What conditions facilitate (or hinder) followership? The utility of the approach is illustrated using cases of EU climate leadership and (non-) followership of other actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have petroleum and power companies and their European industry associations responded to the EU emissions trading system (ETS)? Responses can be political, directed externally towards the initiation and reforms of the EU ETS itself, or internally and market-based, directed at low-carbon solutions. Proactive response strategies shape companies’ leadership potential. Variation in responses is explained by two models that differ in assumptions about corporate behaviour as well as the wider multilevel regulatory context in which companies operate. Responses are found to have converged within the two industries, with reactive companies following the proactive ones. Secondly, responses between the two industries increasingly diverge, with the power industry becoming much more proactive than the petroleum industry. The main explanation is found in the differing relevance of the two models and the wider regulatory context, particularly differing exposure to international competition and weak international climate agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate climate leadership and its relationship with state regulations are discussed. First, a typology defining corporate climate leadership is introduced and distinguished from the other strategic behaviours corporations may adopt in response to climate change. A conceptual framework to explore the mechanisms enabling corporate climate leadership within a given policy system is then presented. This framework is applied to two big Swiss food retailers, considered as typical of corporate climate leaders, firms that showed an early interest in climate protection, as a result of ecological values, third actors’ lobbying and particular market incentives. Most importantly, the two companies were set in motion by a regulatory framework that featured stringent policy goals associated with flexible instruments and economic sanctions. The importance of these findings for understanding the role of corporate leadership in polycentric climate governance is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear energy was a defining topic of German environmentalism from the 1970s to 1990s. An analysis of the transformation of Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) shows that anti-nuclear protests, which are frequently depicted as a prototypical example of ‘new’ social movement activism, were only a temporary phenomenon. From the 1970s, NABU gradually transformed from a traditional nature conservation organization into an environmental lobby organization that addressed nuclear energy, other health hazards and environmental risks. These topics were perceived through the notion of mutual assured destruction that emerged with the cold war nuclear arms race. With the end of the cold war and the government’s decision to phase-out nuclear energy, NABU began to rediscover its neglected focus on nature conservation. Nature walks and wildlife monitoring schemes replaced sit-ins, political rallies and civil disobedience against the construction of nuclear reactors. Since 2000, the goals and strategies of German environmentalism have increasingly turned back to the ‘old’ social movement activism of traditional nature conservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) has contributed to the institutionalization of environmentalism. Putting environmental INGOs in comparative perspective, it is argued that differences in authority among INGOs are an important determinant of the strategies that INGOs adopt and the ultimate influence they are able to achieve. This claim is illustrated through an examination of the changing political opportunities for INGOs and a case of a recent private governance initiative, The Sustainability Consortium. The status maintenance concerns of leading INGOs encourage them to adopt incrementalist and pro-market policies that help launch weak governance schemes and frustrate many other environmental INGOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on environmental nongovermental organizations (ENGOs). It refers to the support of activities of less-institutionalized, more radical activists by ENGOs in various ways. It describes the symbiotic relationship between ENGOs and radical environmental activists. It explains the role of ENGOs in some sociologists of social movements. It highlights the external institutionalization of ENGOs which did not eclipse less institutionalized forms of direct action and should not be exaggerated.

The European environmental movement has been reconfigured since the introduction of the pan-European public interest environmental law group based on the model founded in the USA around 1970. Yet it has been claimed that there is a low degree of success in transplanting legal practices from one national space to another. Examination of the successful transplantation of a US legal model to the European context by the law group ClientEarth shows both that this claim is false and why it is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friends of the Earth’s (FoE) ‘Big Ask’ campaign played a critical role establishing the path-breaking UK Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008. FoE exploited the window of opportunity that opened in climate politics during 2006, first to win cross-party support for the Bill and then to strengthen its content. It then rolled-out the ‘The Big Ask’ across Europe, helped by an innovative collaborative seminar programme with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Multiple Streams Framework is used to identify FoE as an effective policy entrepreneur shaping the agenda-setting process. This contributes to the policy entrepreneurship literature where there are relatively few examples of effective collective entrepreneurship by environmental non-governmental organizations and makes an original empirical contribution through a detailed analytical narrative about a remarkably successful environmental non-governmental organization campaign. Qualitative methodology is employed, drawing on public and private documentary sources and interviews with key campaigners, politicians and officials involved in climate policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which organisations saw their positions on two contentious issues reflected in the Irish climate law of 2015, and what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? These questions are answered drawing theoretically from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and by conducting a network analysis of survey data collected from the organisations involved in the national climate policy process. The study finds that several institutionally important or economically powerful organisations, particularly those involved in the agricultural sector, as well as the government parties saw their preferences reflected in the law. This resulted in legislation that excluded binding emission reductions targets, differentiating it from similar laws introduced in other European countries. Organisations in favour of stronger regulation formed a coalition to advocate for their positions, but they largely failed to get their way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tackling China's grave environmental problems increasingly turns on questions of sub-national interjurisdictional relations. What are the conditions under which neighbouring localities cooperate in stewardship of the natural environment? What factors give rise to interjurisdictional conflict such as pollution spillovers? Through a combination of empirical and theoretical reflections, a research agenda to better understand these issues is outlined. First, China's recent innovative approaches to the promotion of interjurisdictional cooperation are examined. An in-depth case study of interjurisdictional ecological protection 'redline' zones underscores the difficulties of inculcating environmental neighbourliness between local governments. Yet, a precise diagnosis of the problem remains elusive because too little is known about the underlying drivers of interjurisdictional relations in China. An analytical framework that draws insight from contemporary China studies and comparative environmental governance scholarship is offered for the study of inter-jurisdictional environmental relations in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does increasing government transparency in an authoritarian regime, absent electoral forms of accountability, change outcomes? The case of China, which has adopted a number of open governance and public information laws, is examined to see whether increased transparency by local environmental protection bureaus affects key environmental outcomes, specifically reductions in air and water pollution. Several unique environmental performance measurements, developed by the authors, are used to supplement standard government-reported measurements of environmental outcomes, and a widely used environmental transparency index (the PITI). By testing information that is newly supplied to the public, but already available to government, government and public monitoring are distinguished from one another, and the effect of public knowledge of government functions is tested. In the absence of a mechanism for the public to hold local government accountable, public transparency alone has no impact on outcomes other than information provision itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the space of a few years, China's global image with regard to environmental matters has significantly improved. Particularly since Xi Jinping's coming-to-power in 2012 China's reputation in the global climate change regime has improved markedly and it has gained accolades for a new determination to reverse environmental degradation at home. China's incipient green transformation is partly due to a new actor constellation in environmental governance, a striking feature of which is the prominence of ad hoc campaigns that offer quick results but that may undermine the creation of law-based enforcement mechanisms in the long term. Another development -China's increasing use of emerging technologies and big data analytics - has given rise to new forms of government-business alliances. These new players and innovative approaches have injected momentum into China's environmental governance system and suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, authoritarian regimes can be responsive to citizen demands under certain circumstances. Yet it remains to be seen whether long-term environmental goals can be met, due to a pervasive lack of accountability, the weakening of civil society and heavy constraints on public participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, donors pledged to 'jointly mobilize' $100 billion/year for climate finance by 2020. The Copenhagen Accord and other agreements do not specify who should provide how much of this collective target beyond the general principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC), according to which the more responsible a country is for climate change and/or the more capable of paying, the more climate finance it should provide. Two additional burden- sharing mechanisms may explain how much climate finance donors provide: willingness to pay or 'greenness' and self-interest. These mechanisms are tested to determine which best explains current patterns in climate finance commitments by analysing bilateral climate aid. There is evidence for capability--richer countries provide more climate aid. In contrast, responsibility, greenness or self-interest do not induce more climate aid commitments. Better understanding the drivers of climate aid helps to mobilize more climate finance, and advances understanding of (sectoral) aid allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese state is squarely 'back' in the business of environmental governance with an increasing number of policy innovations or experiments to resolve environmental issues. These have been mostly enacted through the 'experimentation under hierarchy' framework, undergirded by compensation- for-performance incentive structures for local agents. Based on on-site ethnography in local China, a critical analysis is presented of low-carbon city policy experiments - one of the most prominent environmental policies introduced in the past decade. Using lessons from the agency theory, it is hypothesized that outcomes of these policy innovations are contingent on different policy dimensions. Although a number of positive outcomes have been achieved in output-oriented dimensions, the fundamental difficulty of specifying all aspects of complex, multidimensional work tasks involved in low-carbon city development has frequently led to policy unmaking. The findings raise important questions about China's tendency to rely excessively on compensation- for-performance structures to promote environmental policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issue frames portraying climate science as uncertain are cited as a key impediment to new climate change and energy policies. However, some have recently argued that the debate over policy impacts, especially policy impacts on consumers, has become more politically salient than the debate over science. This study applies qualitative content analysis to 340 documents from the conservative think tank, the Heartland Institute, to test whether certain policy frames have become more common among leading opponents of climate policy in the United States. The results indicate a continued reliance on science framing, with more directed attacks on climate scientists and fewer frames stressing the uncertainty of climate science. An increase in the use of policy frames related to effects on consumers also suggests that opposition to climate policy is taking new forms as the political debate evolves, with ramifications for climate change policy opposition on an international scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ways in which climate adaptation is understood in the European Union is examined via three key policy documents: the Strategy on adaptation and the Green and White Papers that preceded it. Drawing on Poststructuralist Discourse Theory, light is shed on the implicit values and assumptions that underpin this recent policy initiative. The findings demonstrate a tension between the declared ambition to act on adaptation and implicit suggestions that nothing really has to change, and the challenge can be addressed by market and technological innovations, and by mainstreaming adaptation into existing sectoral policies. The policy discourse effectively serves to depoliticize choices societies make in response to climate change, presenting adaptation as a non-political issue. Insight into European adaptation discourse enables deeper understanding of recent policy developments and opens up possible entry points for critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU) climate/energy targets and policies are poised for the first full climate policy cycle - from adoption and implementation of the policy package for 2020, to reform for 2030. A dynamic approach to the ways in which EU policies affect policy development is developed by applying theories of domestic implementation, policy feedback and integration. Implementation experiences in Poland - the ‘least climate ambitious’ EU member state - affected Polish preferences for reformed EU policies. Existing EU policies, their ‘fit’ with Poland’s energy interests and change in anticipation of future EU policies explain much of the variation in preferences. Second, policy feedback from Poland significantly affected the EU 2030 climate and energy framework. As yet, the EU has succeeded only partly in gathering momentum through a ‘snowball’ effect whereby positive policy feedback from implementation generates further steps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fossil fuel divestment movement has been a vibrant novel development in climate change politics in recent years, particularly in North America. Here, the character of the discourse used to promote divestment as a strategy is explored. The divestment discourse is shown to rest on four overlapping narratives, those of war and enemies, morality, economics and justice. All four are clearly discernible in statements from movement activists, in coverage of divestment campaigns by major news sources and in the movement’s aims, objectives and strategies covered in alternative media. The war narrative, with the formulation of fossil fuel companies as enemies to be overcome to ensure survival, is the dominant narrative. By polarising climate action and identifying an antagonist against which to mobilise, divestment discourse has articulated climate change as an explicitly political phenomenon, in contrast to the primarily consensus and collaboration-based approaches that have predominated in climate politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) concept is increasingly associated with environmental activism in nations with prominent resource extractive industries. Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) deploy it as a campaigning strategy to contest corporate activity, in particular, the environmental sustainability of existing or planned commercial projects. Drawing on two prominent Australian ENGO campaigns – against Seafish Tasmania’s Abel Tasman vessel and Tassal’s proposed fish farm operations on Tasmania’s east coast – the SLO strategy is assessed in the context of the governance literature, arguing that it constitutes ‘governance via persuasion’, a mode that incorporates appeals to normative values. Australian SLO campaigns are primarily directed at the state, promoting opportunities for ENGOs to shape reviews and revisions to environmental regulation alongside governmental and corporate actors. SLO campaigns are therefore a contemporary expression of environmental strategies seeking regulatory change in contrast to ENGO-led private governance initiatives that often bypass the state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Under what conditions do critical events trigger large-scale public discussion and mobilisation, and can these lead to policy change? In a comparative study of nuclear energy policy after the Japanese Fukushima disaster in March 2011, a theory-development approach is adopted, mobilising data collected from national news agencies’ newswires, public surveys, legislation and parliamentary databases, and newspaper editorials in 12 established democracies between March 2011 and March 2013. The analysis suggests two main hypotheses that can guide future research: critical events are more likely to trigger policy change when intense (contentious) mobilisation from policy challengers aligns with the views of the general public, and is backed by major political allies; and critical events are more likely to trigger intense (contentious) mobilisation when policy challengers articulate their opposition around pre-existing policy debates on the issue and resort to pre-existing organisational and mobilisation resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global circulation of the word ‘fracking’ seems to testify to a setback for energy transitions, a nexus that has not yet received much scholarly attention. In light of this, the controversy over fracking is understood as furthering infrastructural changes that are central to energy transitions. Infrastructure should not be understood as materialityper sebut instead as sedimented but ultimately discursive elements that can be reactivated and rearticulated. Examining ‘infrastructure’ from the point of view of discourse theory places the focus on infrastructural change. Prior to 2011, the oil and gas infrastructure in northern Germany was largely invisible to the public. The subsequent reassembling of production with fracking facilitated the politicization not just of that term but also of the whole infrastructure. Instead of routinely reproducing the infrastructure, subjects that had formerly dominated the field were confronted with new and heterogeneous voices that challenged their agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new framework for analysing subnational policymaking is applied to climate governance in the ‘twin towns’ of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen. Low levels of resource interdependence between central and local government in England mean that Newcastle Council has to rely heavily on other horizontal actors to achieve its climate objectives. In contrast, Gelsenkirchen Council receives substantial support from higher tiers of government, which gives it greater control over policymaking within the locality. Greater independence between tiers of government can make it more difficult for subnational bodies to adopt the kind of ambitious policies that may be necessary to combat wicked and/or significant policy challenges such as climate change. Instead, interdependent ‘joint-decision’ systems, which facilitate mutual support across tiers of government, may be better equipped to ensure that subnational public bodies have the capacity to act appropriately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main achievements of the debates on deliberative democracy and democratised science are investigated in order to analyse the reasons, meanings and prospects for a democratisation of global environmental policy. A deliberative systems approach, which emphasises the need to explore how processes in societal spheres interact to shape the deliberative qualities of the system as a whole, is adopted. Although science plays a key role in this, its potential to enhance deliberative capacity has hardly been addressed in deliberative theories. The democratisation of science has potential to contribute to the democratisation of global environmental policy, in that it also shapes the potential of deliberative arrangements in the policy sphere. Deliberative arrangements within the policy sphere may stimulate the democratisation of science to different degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on the works of U.S. President Donald Trump for environment and politics in first 100 days of his administration. Various topics discussed include environmental policies framed by him, protection of climate in the U.S., Paris climate agreement and climate policy. Author further discusses warnings related to environment given to Trump's administration, conferences on climate financing and executive order issued by Trump for canceling the Clean Power Plan (CPP).

Can environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) foster an environmental race to the top? The ways in which different enforcement mechanisms in North-South PTAs affect the implementation of environmental standards in developing countries are examined. It is argued that environmental provisions in European Union (EU) and United States (US) PTAs will be effective in instigating policy change in partner countries, although the timing of the effect will vary significantly. Fines and sanctions in US PTAs incentivize partner countries to reform during the negotiation process. Reform in EU PTA partners is predicted to occur during agreement implementation as a result of the EU's policy dialogue approach. Illustrative evidence is provided and the hypotheses are tested using statistical estimations of EU and US PTAs with environmental provisions on developing countries' environmental policy reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the state of the economy condition public concern for the environment? Scholars have long argued that environmental preferences decline during economic downturns as individuals prioritize short-term economic needs over longer-term environmental concerns. Yet, this assumption has rarely been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny at the individual level. The presumed link between economic and environmental preferences is revisited, using the first individual-level opinion panel (n = 1043) of US climate attitudes, incorporating both self-reported and objective economic data. In contrast with prior studies that emphasize the role of economic downturns in driving environmental preference shifts, using a stronger identification strategy, there is little evidence that changes in either individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions are associated with decreased belief that climate change is happening or reduced prioritization of climate policy action. Instead, the evidence suggests that climate belief declines are associated with shifting political cues. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of political conflict over environmental policy globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy forums are lightly institutionalized and stable forms of governance networks that include administrative authorities, interest groups, and scientists. They are said to produce different types of outputs, from simple actor coordination to position papers and implementation documents, but their productivity has also been questioned. Metagovernance strategies can improve the capability of policy forums to produce outputs. To determine how different metagovernance strategies influence the capability of forums to produce joint position papers, 29 policy forums in the Swiss environmental sector are compared through a qualitative comparative analysis. Results indicate that metagovernance strategies such as state actors as forum members or majority decision rules need to be combined with small forum size or low actor heterogeneity. Furthermore, forum foundation by the state complicates the production of position papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA), launched in 2014 to mobilize non-state and subnational climate action in the run-up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is conceptualized as an orchestration attempt where the French COP21 and Peruvian COP20 presidencies together with the United Nation Secretary General’s office and the UNFCCC Secretariat enlisted non-state and subnational actors to influence states. Using a method seldom used in global governance research to reconstruct the intervention theory of the LPAA, the assumptions and expectations underpinning its performance are unveiled, suggesting a series of micro-steps between input, output and outcome that the evaluator must link causally to understand the LPAA’s performance. This contributes insights for orchestration theory and global climate policy, suggesting that leadership and institutional environment were conducive for the LPAA’s creation. The benefits and challenges of reconstructing intervention theory in global governance research are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global climate change governance is under increasing pressure to deliver meaningful action. It is now widely agreed that a low-carbon growth path requires major transformations of energy systems. The ways in which the 10 largest oil and gas companies in the world present their rationales for addressing climate change and their activities related to climate action, including the oil and gas companies’ involvement in international climate diplomacy, are examined. How these major companies in different world regions seek to influence states and other actors are illustrated through their actions on climate change. The analysis highlights the relations between state and non-state actors and our understanding of the allocation of responsibility in climate change politics. Novel empirical findings contribute to new insights into the climate change activities currently underway in the oil and gas sector, with implications for both the theory and practice of climate change governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cities have come to play an important role in the global governance of climate change, and are increasingly recognized as a crucial component of the post-Paris climate regime. Based in part on their jurisdictional authority, shared commitment to action and disdain for negotiations, there is considerable optimism that cities can meaningfully contribute to the creation of an effective bottom-up global response. Focusing on the processes through which cities themselves are being steered towards particular actions and objectives, attention is directed towards the recent explosion of efforts to engender coordinated efforts and activities between cities through the conceptual lens of orchestration. The practice of orchestration is unpacked, and the importance of identifying who orchestrates, how, and in the service of which/whose objectives is highlighted. Thus, analysis is oriented towards the politics and power dynamics of orchestration, and a step is taken towards critically assessing the promise and potential of ongoing activities in the realm of global urban climate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. Based on work with Duncan Snidal, an argument is made for a more strongly experimental approach. First, VCS should encourage designed, controlled policy experiments consistent with scientific standards. Second, even where formal experiments are infeasible, VCS should treat commitments as informal experiments, orchestrating them to promote innovation, comparability, analysis and systematic learning. Collaborative initiatives and other governance organizations can act as orchestrators, encouraging and supporting formal and informal experimentation through persuasion, technical and material assistance, recognition, third-party assistance and other incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can public engagement assist in the development of just processes and outcomes in adaptation discourse and policymaking? A concern with justice is at the center of thinking about adaptation that is not only resilient, but also public, engaging, and transformative. Theoretically, the intersection of adaptation, transformation, and environmental and climate justice is examined, before exploring the specific concerns and normative foundations for adaptation policy articulated by local governments, environmental groups, and local residents engaged in adaptation planning in Australia. Despite a discursive disconnect between governmental focus on a risk or resilience-based approach and a community concern with the vulnerability of basic needs and capabilities of everyday life, deliberative engagement in adaptation planning can both address issues of justice and represent a transformative practice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]