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The claims of those who are compelled to migrate are, in general, taken to be more urgent and pressing than the claims of those who were not forced to do so. This article does not defend the moral relevance of voluntarism to the morality of migration, but instead seeks to demonstrate two complexities that must be included in any plausible account of that moral relevance. The first is that the decision to start the migration journey is distinct from the decision to stop that journey, through resettlement; the latter may involve voluntary choice, without that voluntarism impugning the involuntary nature of the former. The second is that the migration decision of the individual might be voluntary, even while that individual's family or social network might be compelled to insist upon some particular individual member's migration. That is, the fact that any particular person might be free to refuse migration does not contradict the fact that the group in question does not have the effective freedom to avoid the migration of some group members. Once these two complexities are understood, I argue, the moral relevance of voluntarism in the ethics of migration becomes more complex and nuanced than is generally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arc of the Moral Universe and Other Essays, Joshua Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 426 pp., $39.95 cloth. doi: 10.1017/S0892679412000342 This volume collects eleven of Joshua Cohen's [...]

Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Amartya Sen (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 224 pp., $24.95 cloth, $15.95 paper. Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Kwame Anthony [...]