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EU competition law appears to interpret fairness in B2B trade relations as "equal opportunities to trade" for market actors. A positive and pragmatic inquiry into the relevant regulations, cases and doctrines support that approach. This contribution suggests a new definition for these practices under EU competition law. Accordingly, any trade practice representing supremacy in bargaining power - usually dominance - and distorting the equal opportunity to trade of one or more trading partners could be conceived as unfair trade practices (UTPs) under EU competition law. Thus, these practices restrict competition according to EU competition law. Indeed, the EU Commission, Parliament and many Member States have emphasized the restrictive effects of UTPs even when practised by non-dominant undertakings. UTPs could include all kinds of trade practices toward trading partners, regardless of the industry and environment in which they occur, whether online or offline. This definition can also relieve competition lawyers from inefficient exploitative/exclusionary abusive conduct divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the provisions of the regulations governing competition and antitrust law in the context of European jurisdiction. It explores the theoretical argument of the regulation primarily in the European Union by considering its conceptual implications to other relevant jurisdictions. It also examines the meaning of the framework citing that the integration of economic aspects, as well as political and cultural elements constitutes the core of democratic governance. Furthermore, it analysis the regulatory practices developed to protect free elections as well as free speech in economic competition.

The article offers information on the perspectives of lawyers and economists on the CRA paper, which focuses on the use of selective distribution by luxury goods suppliers in Europe. It states that the goals of vertical restraints is enacted with geographically segmenting the market, raising barriers to entry for competitors and reducing competition between suppliers. It indicates that vertical restraints can be a tool for better exploitation of monopoly power and anti-competitive zeal. It emphasizes that vertical restraints must be enacted in the form of either retail price maintenance or selective distribution agreement to effectively tackle the alleged free-rider problem.