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Most of the literature addressing multiple banking assumes equal financing shares. However, unequal, concentrated or asymmetric bank borrowing is widespread. This paper investigates the determinants of creditor concentration for German firms using a comprehensive bank-firm level dataset for the time period between 1993 and 2003. We document that lending is very often concentrated and, consequently, that relationship lending is important, not only for the small firms but also for the larger firms in our sample. However, we also find that risky, illiquid, large and leveraged firms spread their borrowing more evenly between multiple lenders. On the other hand, the degree of concentration increases with the profitability of the relationship lender. Relationship lending may spur financing provided by other banks, especially if the relationship lender is a public sector bank and if the other banks are large or do not have to tie up additional funds in capital.

Although the real exchange rate–real interest rate (RERI) relationship is central to most open economy macroeconomic models, empirical support for the relationship is generally found to be rather weak. In this paper we re-investigate the RERI relationship using bilateral US real exchange rate data spanning the period 1978–2007. Instead of testing one particular model, we build on Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration tests of present-value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062–1088] to propose a metric of the economic significance of the relationship. Our empirical results provide robust evidence that the RERI link is economically significant and that the real interest rate differential is a reasonable approximation of the expected rate of depreciation over longer horizons.

Although the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.

We analyze the impact of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and Bank of England on cross-border credit flows. Relying on comprehensive loan-level data, we find that Fed QE strongly boosts cross-border credit granted to Turkish banks by banks located in the US, Euro Area and UK, while ECB and BoE QEs work only moderately through banks in the EA and UK, respectively. In general QE works at short maturities across bank locations and loan currencies, more strongly for weaker lenders and borrowers, and may have resulted in maturity mismatches in Turkish banks searching for yield. (99 words)