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By exploiting a unique and proprietary dataset comprising granular deal- and tranche-level data on a global portfolio of securitisation deals, we empirically test the buffer vs the signalling hypothesis of credit enhancements in securitisation. We do so by focusing on one internal credit enhancement associated with the design of financial securities in securitisation, i.e. subordination. This study provides novel evidence on the role played by subordination in securitisation, suggesting that a real dichotomy between the buffer and signalling effects does not hold. Our findings indeed highlight that subordination serves both as a buffer against observable risk and as a signal of unobservable credit quality to third-party investors in the market; moreover, our results are robust to a wide battery of robustness tests. Our findings, of international relevance, contribute to the literature on information asymmetries between originators and investors and offer new policy insights in light of the recent agreement reached by European lawmakers with national governments to revive the European securitisation market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large literature has developed on the distinction between hard and soft information with much of this literature focused on displacement of soft information with hard information. We investigate whether the propensity of loan officers at local branches to incorporate soft information in the credit scoring process is affected by the geographical distance between the branch and the bank's headquarters. We find that hardening soft information is significantly sensitive to branch-to-headquarters distance. We also find that organizational distance affects time for loan approval, increasing approval time for applicants receiving a good credit score (i.e. low probability of default) originated at distant branches and reducing approval time for applicants with poor credit scores (i.e. high probability of default). Finally, we find that on average organizational distance has no direct impact on the likelihood of the occurrence of negative credit events. However, the final rating being equal, the hardening of soft information has an influence on loan performance that varies with organizational distance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the presence of spatially based communication frictions within banking organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]