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Sequencing an individual's complete genome is expected to be possible for a relatively low sum 'one thousand dollars' within a few years. Sequencing refers to determining the order of base pairs that make up the genome. The result is a library of three billion letter combinations. Cheap whole-genome sequencing is of greatest importance to medical scientific research. Comparing individual complete genomes will lead to a better understanding of the contribution genetic variation makes to health and disease. As knowledge increases, the 'thousand-dollar genome' will also become increasingly important to healthcare. The applications that come within reach raise a number of ethical questions. This monitoring report addresses the issue.

No consensus exists whether women at increased risk for trisomy 21, 13, and 18 should be offered stand-alone rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) or karyotyping. In this paper, the ethical implications of a fast, relatively cheap and targeted RAD are examined. The advantages of RAD seem less robust than its proponents suggest. Fast test results only give a short-term psychological benefit. The cost advantage of RAD is apparent, but must be weighed against consequences like missed abnormalities, which are evaluated differently by professionals and pregnant women. Since pre-test information about RAD will have to include telling women about karyotyping as a possible alternative, the advantage of RAD in terms of the quantity of information that needs to be given may also be smaller than suggested. We conclude that none of the supposed arguments in favour of RAD is decisive in itself. Whether the case for RAD may still be regarded as convincing when taking these arguments together seems to depend on one's implicit view of what prenatal screening is about. Are we basically dealing with a test for trisomy 21 and a few conditions more? Or are there good grounds for also testing for the wider range of abnormalities that karyotyping can detect? As professionals and pregnant women may have different views about this, we suggest that the best approach is to offer women a choice between RAD and karyotyping. This approach is most in line with the general aim of prenatal screening: providing opportunities for autonomous reproductive choice.

This paper explores the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnostic tests (NIPD tests) in prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities. NIPD tests are easy and safe and can be performed early in pregnancy. Precisely because of these features, it is feared that informed consent may become more difficult, that both testing and selective abortion will become 'normalized', and that there will be a trend towards accepting testing for minor abnormalities and non-medical traits as well. In our view, however, the real moral challenge of NIPD testing consists in the possibility of linking up a technique with these features (easy, safe and early) with new genomic technologies that allow prenatal diagnostic testing for a much broader range of abnormalities than is the case in current procedures. An increase in uptake and more selective abortions need not in itself be taken to signal a thoughtless acceptance of these procedures. However, combining this with considerably enlarging the scope of NIPD testing will indeed make informed consent more difficult and challenge the notion of prenatal screening as serving reproductive autonomy. If broad NIPD testing includes later-onset diseases, the 'right not to know' of the future child will become a new issue in the debate about prenatal screening. With regard to the controversial issue of selective abortion, it may make a morally relevant difference that after NIPD testing, abortion can be done early. A lower moral status may be attributed to the foetus at that moment, given the dominant opinion that the moral status of the foetus progressively increases with its development.