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There is significant and growing interest in better understanding hierarchy in the international system, especially in relation to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Acknowledging the existence of hierarchy in a system implies that there are different social positions (higher/lower), but not why or how a specific differentiation came to be used, nor how it is structured, contested or resolved. This article is interested in contributing to these questions, particularly in the context of heterarchical settings (where more than one hierarchy is present), which is also not fully understood. It uses the first years of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a springboard to reflect upon hierarchy within the so-called 'civilized' group of countries in the immediate aftermath of World War I. This IGO was the first to (1) introduce statistical data to rank countries, with criteria designed to 'objectively' gauge industrial power and (2) establish a geographic allocation of countries in its main decision-making body's structure. Non-European countries and non-great powers had critical roles in establishing these novel ways of dealing with hierarchies and their institutional design in IGOs. One hundred years later, these discussions still resonate with several ongoing cases of contestation in IGOs over 'fair' hierarchical structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whose preferences influence the design of international institutions? Scholarship on the legalization of international politics and creation of international legal institutions largely adopts a state-centric perspective. Existing accounts, however, fail to recognize how states often delegate authority over institutional design tasks to independent legal experts whose preferences may diverge from those of states. We develop a principal–agent (PA) framework for theorizing relations between states (collective principals) and legal actors (agents) in the design process, and for explaining how legal actors influence the design of international institutions. The legal dimensions of the PA relationship increase the likelihood of preference divergence between the collective principal and the agent, but also create conditions that enable the agent to opportunistically advance its own design preferences. We argue that the more information on states' preferences the agent has, the more effectively it can exploit its legal expertise to strategically select and justify design choices that maximize its own preferences and the likelihood of states' acceptance. Our analysis of two cases of delegated institutional design concerning international criminal law at the United Nations and the African Union supports our theoretical expectations. Extensive archival and interview data elucidate how agents' variable information on states' preferences affects their ability to effectively advance their design preferences. Our theory reveals how independent legal experts with delegated authority over design tasks influence institutional design processes and outcomes, which has practical and normative implications for the legalization of international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current binary understanding of membership in international organizations (IOs), especially regional organizations (ROs), creates blind spots and biases in our understanding of who matters in IOs, as well as why and how they matter. Existing scholarship primarily looks at full member-states or non-state actors to capture who influences such organizations. Associated states are often portrayed as passive receivers of IO rules instead of active contributors. We address this blind spot and resulting analytical bias by exploring what types of association relationships exist and how they impact IOs. We propose a novel conceptualization of membership that we call member ness. On the level of IOs, memberness is based on the relative openness of organizational boundaries and stratified access via material and ideational contributions. On the level of states, memberness captures associated states' individual choices to contribute materially and/or ideationally to an IO. Memberness moves away from a purely rights-based understanding of membership (or who you are in an IO) to include a capacity-based understanding (or what you do in an IO). This shift in focus uncovers new channels of influence on IOs. Associated states' material and ideational contributions to IOs constitute three memberness types: payroller, sponsor, and advisor. We argue that these memberness types impact IOs' vitality, design, and performance in previously unrecognized ways. We illustrate these types with empirical examples from ROs across the globe and discuss the implications of memberness for IO research programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), created in 1959 to govern the southern continent, is often lauded as an illustration of science's potential to inspire peaceful and rational International Relations. This article critically examines this optimistic view of science's role in international politics by focusing on how science as a global hierarchical structure operated as a gatekeeper to an exclusive Antarctic club. I argue that in the early 20th century, the conduct of science in Antarctica was entwined with global and imperial hierarchies. As what Mattern and Zarakol call a broad hierarchy, science worked both as a civilized marker of international status as well as a social performance that legitimated actors' imperial interests in Antarctica. The 1959 ATS relied on science as an existing broad hierarchy to enable competing states to achieve a functional bargain and 'freeze' sovereignty claims, whilst at the same time institutionalizing and reinforcing the legitimacy of science in maintaining international inequalities. In making this argument, I stress the role of formal international institutions in bridging our analysis of broad and functional hierarchies while also highlighting the importance of scientific hierarchies in constituting the current international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how analogy-based collective decision-making of member states contributes to the endogenous emergence of informal rules and the incremental change of international organizations (IOs). Decision-making by analogy is an important characteristic of day-to-day decision-making in IOs. Relating current decisions to previous ones through analogies drives incremental change and simultaneously reinforces organizational resilience. Whereas the foreign policy analysis literature shows that analogies can be used as cognitive shortcuts in fuzzy and complex foreign policy situations, we focus on their use to overcome social ambiguity (indeterminacy) of coordination situations in IOs. Drawing on psychological conceptions, we develop two micro-level mechanisms that elucidate the effects of analogy-based collective decision-making in member-driven IOs. Analogy-based collective decisions emphasizing similarity between a current situation and previous ones follow an established problem schema and produce expansive and increasingly well-established informal rules. Collective decisions that are analogy-based but emphasize a crucial difference follow different problem schemas and trigger the emergence of additional informal rules that apply to new classes of cases. The result is an increasingly fine-grained web of distinct organizational solutions for a growing number of problems. Accordingly, an IO can increasingly facilitate collective decision-making and gains resilience. Empirically, we probe these propositions with a documentary analysis of decision-making in the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, established by the United Nations Security Council to deal with a stream of requests for exempting certain goods or services from the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in response to the War in the Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not governed, what legitimate powers any governor may hold, and whose political preferences are instantiated in rules. The array of actors who comprise the current system of global governance has grown dramatically in recent decades. Especially notable has been the growth of private governance organizations (PGOs). Drawing on organizational ecology, I posit that the rise of PGOs is both required and facilitated by disagreements between states that block the creation of what might be otherwise effective intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In a form of "double-negative regulation," states block IGOs, which in turn leave open niches that are then filled by PGOs, which then both complement and sometimes substitute for state law. The organizational ecology approach outlined here extends and refocuses inquiry in systematic ways that give us a fuller understanding of how and why PGOs have emerged as one of the most striking features of the contemporary world order. The key innovations in this paper are to (a) shift the level of analysis from single agents or populations of agents to the entire field of GOs, including states, IGOs, and PGOs and (b) draw on principles of ecology to understand the composition and dynamics of systems of governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many international organizations (IOs) are currently under pressure and the demise of the liberal international order is the talk of town. We theorize that institutional characteristics help to explain why some IOs survive external pressures where others fail. We test this argument through a survival analysis of 150 IOs (1815–2014). We find that the only significant variable explaining the death of IOs is the size of the secretariat: IOs with large bureaucracies are good at coping with external pressures. In addition, IOs with diverging preferences among members and those that are less institutionalized are more likely to be replaced with successor organizations. We find that institutional flexibility included in the treaties does not have an effect on survival. This is surprising because the purpose of flexibility clauses is precisely to deal with external shocks. Finally, we also find that systemic and domestic factors do not explain IO failure. In conclusion, we should not write off the liberal international order all too quickly: large IOs with significant bureaucratic resources are here to stay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organisations cease to exist. International Relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and their organisational embodiments, international organizations (IOs), but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand the conditions under which international organisations endure, we must also explain why they frequently fail to do so. The article formulates and tests a theory of 'IO death' using a combination of population-wide statistical analysis and detailed historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815–2016. I find that exogenous shocks are a leading proximate cause of IO terminations since 1815 and that organisations that are newly created, have small memberships, and/or lack centralised structures are most likely to succumb. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of extensions and refinements to existing institutionalist theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key component of (neo-)functionalist and constructivist approaches to the study of international organizations concerns staff socialization. Existing analyses of how, or indeed whether, staff develop more pro-internationalist attitudes over time draw predominantly on cross-sectional data. Yet, such data cannot address (self-)selection issues or capture the inherently temporal nature of attitude change. This article proposes an innovative approach to the study of international socialization using an explicitly longitudinal design. Analysing two waves of a large-scale survey conducted within the European Commission in 2008 and 2014, it examines the beliefs and values of the same individuals over time and exploits exogenous organizational changes to identify causal effects. Furthermore, the article theorizes and assesses specified scope conditions affecting socialization processes. Showing that international institutions do, in fact, influence value acquisition by individual bureaucrats, our results contest the widely held view that international organizations are not a socializing environment. Our analysis also demonstrates that age at entry and gender significantly affect the intensity of such value change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Independent experts are employed in international organizations to carry out a variety of functions, including conducting independent evaluations of state performance in a given policy area. In the field of human rights, a well-known example of the use of independent expertise in public organizations is that of the United Nations treaty bodies, committees of independent experts in charge of monitoring state compliance with the major United Nations human rights treaties. Considering the sensitive tasks that these experts perform, and the fact that they are elected by states, the question of whether they actually possess the required levels of independence and expertise to fulfil their role arises. This article proposes and applies a framework to study the formal and informal processes leading to the appointment of expert committees in international bodies, and to assess their level of expertise and independence. Data were collected by means of an original survey and 40 semi-structured interviews. The article shows that the overall level of independent expertise possessed by committees is surprisingly high when considering the highly political electoral process. Therefore, it argues that to study the expertise and independence of expert committees, one should conceive of them as groups that might be able to maintain a certain independence from the states that have elected them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Relations literature often refers to states' motivations as revisionist or status-quo oriented. Such attributions are especially prevalent in discourse on the power-transition theory, suggesting that the danger of war rises when a revisionist China catches up to a status-quo US. Such attributions, however, are rarely supported by systematic evidence providing a direct comparison of Chinese and US conduct. We undertake an analysis of how these countries have behaved differently over time according to their policy pronouncements, their participation in international institutions and agreements, and their voting in the United Nations. Our analysis challenges the conventional wisdom that a rising power tends to be revisionist whereas an incumbent hegemon is invariably committed to the defense of the international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prevailing power transition theories focus on hard sources of power to explain why international institutions do, or do not, adapt to shifts in the balance of power among their members. This article argues that, in the wake of such a shift in the balance between emerging and established powers, institutional adaptations depend on both their hard and soft power resources. Soft power matters for institutional adaptations because both emerging and established powers have to justify the use of hard power to their respective audiences. Whether emerging or established powers are able to use the hard power they have depends crucially on rhetorical resources, such as claims of legitimacy and their (transnational) societal resonance. We provide empirical support for our argument through an analysis of the adaptation of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights agreement and the adaptation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa were able to bring about institutional adaptations because they not only had the hard power to undermine the respective institutions, but could also build on civil society support that legitimized their demands or constrained established states' use of hard power to fend off their demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transparency is an important concept in International Relations. The possibility of realizing transparency in practice operates as a central analytical axis defining distinct positions on core theoretical problems within the field, from the security dilemma to the function of international institutions and beyond. As a political practice, the pursuit of transparent governance is a dominant feature of global politics, promoted by a wide range of actors across a vast range of issue areas, from nuclear proliferation, to internet governance, to the politics of foreign aid. Yet, despite its importance, precisely what transparency means or how the concept is understood is frequently ill-defined by academics and policymakers alike. As a result, the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of approaches to transparency in International Relations often sit in tension with their wider theoretical commitments. This article will examine the three primary understandings of transparency used in International Relations in order to unpack these commitments. It finds that while transparency is often explicitly conceptualized as a property of information, particularly within rationalist scholarship, this understanding rests upon an unarticulated set of sociological assumptions. This analysis suggests that conceptualizing ‘transparency as information’ without a wider sociology of knowledge production is highly problematic, potentially obscuring our ability to recognize transparent practices in global governance. Understanding transparency as dialogue, as a social practice rooted in shared cognitive capacities and epistemic frameworks, provides a firmer analytical ground from which to examine transparency in International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the consequences of increasing regime complexity and institutional proliferation on global governance? Does the growing density and overlaps among institutions facilitate or hinder the ability of states to manage transnational threats through cooperation? This article argues that the impact of regime complexity on the effectiveness of cooperation depends not only on the nature of spillovers among overlapping regimes, but also on the cross-institutional strategies of states and non-state actors. I distinguish between two types of strategies through which actors can take advantage of institutional overlaps: (1) “opportunistic” or non-cooperative attempts by states to bypass legal commitments, which tend to undermine the goals of cooperation; and (2) “cooperative” strategies by intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and other principled actors. These actors also engage in regime shifting, forum linking, and other cross-forum strategies to promote their institutional mandates and normative agendas. To probe the plausibility of these theoretical claims, I focus on the case of the anti-trafficking in persons regime. The overlaps between anti-trafficking laws and the migration, labor, and human rights regimes illustrate the different ways in which intergovernmental organizations and their allies in society can exploit institutional overlaps to promote greater cooperation and expand the regime complex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the concept of indirect speech and shows what it can contribute to understanding ‘legitimacy talk’ regarding international institutions. Indirect speech occurs when one kind of illocutionary act is used to communicate another. Examples include euphemism, some forms of politeness and when a request is expressed as a question (‘Can you pass the salt?’). Transporting concepts from pragmatics and sociolinguistics, this article argues that legitimacy talk often serves this function in international politics, operating by expressing specific requests in the form of more generalized legitimacy claims. Understanding this double role of legitimacy talk sheds light on otherwise puzzling empirical phenomena, such as why states frame their demands in terms of legitimacy when they are transparently self-serving, why states with different interests can nonetheless express their demands in the same terms, and why they persist in doing so long after there is any realistic hope of being ‘persuasive’. An analysis of the debate on Security Council reform illustrates the benefits of this approach for the study of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most recent transformation of world order is often depicted as a shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian era in which international organizations are becoming increasingly independent sites of authority. This internationalization of authority is often considered as an indication of the constitutionalization of the global legal order. However, this article highlights that international organizations can also exercise authority in an authoritarian fashion that violates the same constitutionalist principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law that international organizations are usually expected to promote. It is thus an open question which post-Westphalia we are in fact heading to: a constitutionalized order, an authoritarian order, or a combination of both? Based on a conceptualization of post-Westphalian orders as a two-dimensional continuum linking the ideal-typical end points of constitutionalism and authoritarianism, we analyze the United Nations security system and the European Union economic system as two post-Westphalian orders. While we find a remarkable level of constitutionalization in the European Union and incipient constitutionalist tendencies in the United Nations, we also find authoritarian sub-orders in both institutions. Most visibly, the latter can be discerned in the United Nations Security Council’s counter-terrorism policy after 9/11 and European emergency governance during the sovereign debt crisis. The article thus argues that the emerging post-Westphalian order is characterized by a plurality of fundamentally contradictory (sub-)orders coexisting in parallel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the phenomenon of rising powers from a historical materialist perspective. It (1) elaborates the key concepts of historical structures of world order, state–society complexes and transnational class formation, and (2) applies them to Brazil, Russia, India, China and other so-called ‘rising powers’ to account for the nature and extent of the challenge they pose to the existing institutions of global governance. A double argument is advanced: first, the integration of rising powers into the historical structure of global capitalism has reduced traditional sources of great power conflict, and made rising powers heavily dependent on the existing institutional framework established by the liberal West. This facilitates their integration into the existing governance order. However, within the limits of the existing order, two factors lend a heartland–contender cleavage to the politics of global governance: the rising powers’ relatively more statist, less market-driven forms of state, and their subsequent failure to be integrated into emergent transnational capitalist class structures. Consequently, it is not the global governance order itself, but its most liberal features, that are contested by rising powers. The result is that, in contrast to realist pessimism and liberal optimism, the rise of new powers is leading to a hybrid governance order that is both transnationally integrated and less liberal. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is substantial evidence that International Monetary Fund policies are driven by the powerful states which intervene to align policy with their preferences. In particular, many have argued that the United States uses its position as the Fund’s largest shareholder to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a result, a substantial volume of literature argues and presents evidence to support the claim that International Monetary Fund decisions faithfully reflect US interests. My findings extend these claims. Using a new dataset on the presence in International Monetary Fund agreements of binding conditions, which cause the agreement to be suspended or terminated if they are not met, I demonstrate that International Monetary Fund agreements contain fewer binding conditions when a suspension of International Monetary Fund lending plausibly would impose greater hardship on creditor country banks and exporters. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Much of what can be subsumed under the label ‘political cosmopolitanism’ calls for the empowerment of international institutions because of increased global interdependencies. Surprisingly, however, few scholars have asked whether ordinary citizens share this way of thinking. Do people believe that international institutions are desirable because of their superior capacity to solve transnational problems? To address this question, falsifiable hypotheses about the quality of and scope conditions for a minimally defined ‘public political cosmopolitanism’ are derived from the literature and tested using the results of a representative survey of German citizens. I show that there is significant support for what I call the ‘interdependence model’ of cosmopolitan politicization: German citizens’ perception of transnational interdependencies (in terms of functional sensitivity as well as moral commitments) fosters beliefs in the capacity of international institutions to solve problems. Remarkably, this relationship is moderated by citizens’ sense of their own vulnerability, that is, their beliefs that the national government is incapable of solving such problems. The interdependence model has significant explanatory power, spanning different levels of education, and thus disproves claims that cognitive mobilization is a crucial scope condition for cosmopolitan politicization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Constructivists maintain that a shared identity was crucial for explaining the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the multilateral form that it took. I challenge this view, arguing instead that the alliance was based on moralistic trust, the belief that others will live up to their moral obligations. Moralistic trust facilitates the initiation of cooperation, so that states can begin a virtuous circle of trust, collaboration, and enhanced trust. It is also the foundation of the diffuse reciprocity inherent to multilateralism. In two case studies of the domestic politics in the United States of making a multilateral security commitment to Europe, the first being the League of Nations, I demonstrate that identity was not a prominent consideration and did not lead individuals to embrace multilateralism. This social-psychological account improves upon constructivism and rationalism by offering a way to embed ideational variables in studies of strategic interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over recent decades a judicialization process of international dispute settlement procedures has taken place. Yet, the judicialization of procedures remains meaningless if the procedures are not used and accepted by disputing states in practice. Prominent theoretical approaches point to different conditions under which this is to be expected. Realism emphasizes the international distribution of power, institutionalism stresses the importance of the institutional design of international dispute settlement procedures, and liberalism points to the domestic institutional setting of the participating states. The article confronts these theoretical expectations with states’ actual dispute settlement behavior in the international trade regime, the United Nations Security Council, the European human rights regime and the regime on the protection of endangered species in the 1970s/80s and 1990s/2000s, respectively. Its main finding is that, compared to realism and liberalism, institutionalism fares better in explaining the judicialization of states’ dispute settlement behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to the imperative of enforcement, states must threaten defectors with sanctions or reciprocal suspension of international cooperation. I show that in international cooperation between the weak and the powerful, states should nevertheless limit the supply of collective enforcement power. Strong sanctions allow exploitative international agreements, so weak states refuse to engage in negotiations with powerful states in the first place. For powerful states, toothless international agreements are a credible commitment to limit power politics. The result holds even if sanctions can be used only to enforce international agreements and not for coercion. It implies that under power asymmetry, states must accept constraints on the use of power, as opposed to simply maximizing the supply of collective enforcement power. The theory offers a new perspective to international cooperation and a synthesis of the enforcement and managerial schools of international cooperation. It produces precise analytical boundary conditions and generates falsifiable empirical hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agent is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the article analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this puzzle of ‘missing delegation’. The article concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent International Relations scholarship offers valuable rational choice explanations for the design of international institutions. However, the rational design literature has relied heavily on institutional outcomes as evidence for testing models. Such studies must be complemented by research designs that analyze the decisions and bargaining that drive design choices in order to expose causal mechanisms and test a wider range of observable implications. I assess an important rational design hypothesis, that uncertainty leads to flexible institutions, by analyzing the negotiations behind the climate change regime and by considering two distinct institutional outcomes across time. While the hypothesis receives considerable support, significant behavior and outcomes do not conform to its logic. I propose refinements for rational design theory in general and work on uncertainty and flexibility in particular. Rational choice theory speaks to the process of institutional design and should not content itself with predicting -- and testing itself against -- equilibrium outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of the interaction between international institutions as a first step towards building a theory of international interaction. It examines how international institutions may exert causal influence on each other's development and effectiveness and suggests that four general causal mechanisms can elucidate the distinct routes through which influence travels from one institution to another. Institutional interaction can thus rely on transfer of knowledge, commitments established under an institution, behavioural effects of an institution, and functional linkage of the ultimate governance targets of the institutions involved. The article also puts forward hypotheses about the likely effects of specific types of institutional interaction for governance within the international system. The causal mechanisms and types of interaction are mutually exclusive models that help analyse real-world interaction situations. They may also serve as a basis for the systematic analysis of more complex interaction situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If it is correct to say that the UN's policy has been dominated by great powers, then it is also true that the academic debate on the UN's failures in general, and the Rwandan tragedy in particular, has been dominated by an emphasis on Realpolitik, which has limited and precluded analysis of other possible causes of the UN's malfunctions. Power politics alone cannot fully explain why the downfall of 'grand strategies' for the UN envisaged in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace (1992), most notably conflict prevention, was almost as rapid as their emergence. By drawing upon new empirical evidence from interviews and by reflecting on theories of bureaucratization, this article explores one previously ignored mechanism underlying the failure of the Agenda in general and the Rwandan case in particular, namely bureaucratic rationalization. It is argued that bureaucratic rationalization delineates the political manoeuvring space for the UN Secretariat. Bureaucratic thinking is a double-edged sword whose functions may generate severe side-effects in conflict prevention. Its main function is to attain enhanced efficiency, accuracy and stability of decision-making, but sometimes this comes as a Pyrrhic victory. The downside, or dysfunction, of bureaucratization is strict categorization and mechanic behaviour. With regard to the Rwandan case, this article presents new information on the way in which the failure of the UN bureaucracy to overcome the strict separation between the peace settlement and the preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations contributed to the failure to prevent the genocide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I aim to provide a better understanding of the concept 'non-governmental organization' and its implications for the politics of international relations. As the prevailing confusion about the term stems largely from poor knowledge about the politics behind its introduction and function, the overarching question asks how NGOs have been socially constructed as actors on the margins of the international stage. To this end, a sound insight into the little-known conceptual history and background of the term 'NGO' in what might be called a 'Westphalian nomenclature' is given. I suggest that the still prevalent NGO terminology is an outcome of political games played by various actors, restricting and containing the signified organizations. The article provides a non-substantial, functional and politics-oriented definition of the term NGO, which differs significantly from previous attempts to attach meaning to it. It also suggests improved choices of terminology for general International Relations theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In International Relations applications, theorists employing Principal-Agent (P-A) theory have posited that the fact of delegation defines a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) where recontracting threats are the predominant way states influence IOs. Developing a category of delegation to international Trustees, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustees. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. These three factors account for the different politics between Principals and Trustees, a politics aimed at either keeping issues outside of the domain of the Trustee or at rhetorically engaging the Trustee's authority in an effort to persuade the common 'beneficiary' whose loyalty and respect both States and the Trustee seek. In explaining why recontracting threats are not central to Principal-Trustee relations, the analysis bounds the realm in which we might expect P-A theory to apply, and provides a theoretical basis to question the 'rational expectations' claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social and economic policy decisions are increasingly being taken in a global public domain in which national/transnational boundaries arc blurred, and the 'public' domain includes non-stare actors. We argue that a new rights advocacy, advancing economic and social human rights as well as civil and political, is essential to understanding rule-making in the global public domain. New rights advocacy involves traditional human rights and development NGOs, social movement organizations and new 'hybrid' organizations, in using human rights standards and methods to influence states, international organizations, and corporations. The new patterns of NGO engagement arc studied through case studies of advocacy on HIV/AIDS and on the right to water. New rights advocacy constitutes a direct challenge to development orthodoxy, suggests a new interpretation of the social movements protesting globalization, and manifests a complex relationship between NGOs and poor country governments, in which NGOs often advocate on behalf of these governments' sovereign rights to set economic and social policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of integration and the pacification of Western Europe can be seen as one of the most significant developments in international relations at the turn of the century. Yet the European Union (EU) remains under-theorized and neglected in the neoreahst canon. This article explains the difficulty of neorealism at explaining the EU. At a historical level, the breadth and depth of European integration challenge neorealist predictions regarding sustained cooperation, relative gains, interdependence, international institutions, balance of power, and bandwagoning. At a systemic level, the EU manifests anomalous forms of mixed hierarchy and functional differentiation. Neorealist attempts to develop auxiliary theories to account for the anomalies created by the EU has created a degenerative research program that is either incomplete, logically flawed, or empirically false. This article concludes by pinpointing the failure of neorealism, proposing theoretical renovations, and drawing policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member states - even in the case of volatile preventive war dilemmas. Our primary case is post-war Europe. We show that European integration since the early 19 SO's was conceived as a means of committing a temporarily weakened West Germany not to use its future power to pursue military ends in Europe, thereby obviating a preventive war against it. The various institutions that form part of the European Communities, now the European Union, still bear the mark of this goal. In this article, we establish the game theoretic conditions for the existence of binding international institutions as a solution to preventive war. We also provide evidence that the model is a good approximation of what political elites had in mind in the wake of World War II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legitimacy of various institutions including sovereignty, international law and an array of regimes and organizations. Sociologist Jens Steffek's recent contribution to this genre argues that the fragmented or issue-specific nature of international institutions demands a specific form of legitimation. His argument builds on Max Weber's notion of legal rational legitimacy, which rests on the impersonal observance of abstract laws that apply to all parties equally, laws that should be grounded in rationally debatable reasons. Steffek invokes sociologist Jurgen Habermas as the foremost theorist on rational deliberation, and while not treating Habermas's theory in depth, finds the consensual requirements of most international agreements, along with increased dialogue between institutions and their critics, indicative of a discursive justification at work in the processes of international rule formation. From this, Steffek suggests that reasoning or giving reasons is the communicative process that legitimates international governance. The legitimacy is the phenomenon that a social order enjoys the prestige of being considered binding.

Various scholars have suggested that at times national governments use international cooperation to gain influence in the domestic political arena and to overcome internal opposition to their preferred policies. Klaus Dieter Wolf has argued that this practice represents the latest embodiment of a longstanding raison d'état and has provided theoretical foundations for its systematic study. This article assesses the usefulness of this `new raison d'état' thesis as a source of empirical hypotheses about the origins and persistence of international institutions. On the basis of the general logic of the argument, I develop one crucial implication that may be corroborated by cross-national research. In the light of this, the preferences of European governments regarding the institutional depth of the European Union's common foreign and security policy are examined. Overall, the findings presented in this article confirm that `collusive delegation' can be a significant factor in the creation of international governance arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Without universally efficacious contract enforcement, contracting boundaries divide the world into `insiders', with whom we contract freely, and `outsiders', with whom contracting is circumscribed. Boundary types vary and vacillate between territorially defined ones and ones defined on nonterritorial margins (religion, ethnicity or functional specialization). Sovereignty, or sole legal constitutional authority, has always existed alongside other, less formal systems of contractual enforcement. Both early law and economics and early International Relations theory largely ignored this interacting, overlapping web of enforcement institutions; and recent world events highlight the limitations of theories in which the nature of boundaries - and hence the nature of entities themselves - has little impact on the nature of predicted interactions. The contracting branch of law and economics contains useful insights into the material functions of boundaries, the strengths and weaknesses of different types of boundary-maintenance devices, the characteristics necessary for `successful' boundaries and why different types of boundaries might emerge or persist under different conditions. These insights suggest that the coexistence of and historical vacillation between territorially defined boundaries and ones defined on nonterritorial margins should not come as a surprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a discourse approach to the study of legitimacy of governance beyond the democratic state. It starts from the empirical question of how international organizations legitimate their own activities and how they create perceptions of legitimacy in the absence of democratic participation and control. In answering this question the article draws on elements from Max Weber's theory of rational legal domination and on Jürgen Habermas's idea of legitimation through justificatory discourse. This article claims that the legitimacy of international governance hinges upon popular assent to the justifications of its goals, principles and procedures. It thereby also challenges much of the existing literature on legitimacy above the state that regards a democracy deficit a priori as a core problem of international governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International institutions not only increase system effectiveness or output legitimacy, but are also a normatively plausible response to the problems for democracy that are caused by globalization. In this way, international institutions also increase input legitimacy. It is therefore a false approach to pin down the problem of democracy beyond the nation-state as a choice between 'effective problem-solving through international institutions' and 'democratic political processes'. At the same time, it is indisputable that the actual functioning of these international institutions does not meet democratic standards. By correctly pointing to the deficits of current international institutions, sceptics too quickly conclude that most deficits in the working of international institutions cannot be remedied. The sceptical argument is founded on two more or less explicit background hypotheses that can be empirically challenged. The first background hypothesis states that a demos cannot exist at the transnational level. I will modify this statement in theoretical terms and offer some conceptual distinctions that may prepare the ground for further empirical investigation. The second background hypothesis of the sceptics postulates a zero-sum relationship between national sovereignty and supranationality. I will put forward some concrete institutional proposals that undermine the zero-sum logic of the sceptics, concluding that in a denationalized society, democratic legitimacy can only be achieved by a mixed constitution comprising majority procedures and negotiation mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to Colin Wight's article "They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They? Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure Problematique," published in the March 1999 issue of "European Journal of International Relations." The author points out that there is an inordinate amount of misreading, misinterpretation, and misrepresentation going on in understanding Wight's article. He further defended that in his paper, he was subjecting the agent/structure problem to a poststructural gaze and was careful to point out in note 11 that he was offering one reading of the agent-structure informed by the poststructural literature. And that the author never declared himself as anything, as surmised by Wight.

Although the agent-structure problem has been the subject of intense debate within International Relations the focus has been on epistemological problems or reconceptualizations of structure. This article attempts to redress the balance between agents and structures by outlining a theory of agency that shows the manner in which agency is embedded within, and dependent upon, structural contexts. The article takes as a starting point Roxanne Lynn Doty's poststructuralist attempt to address the agent-structure problem and provides a critique of her attempt to locate agency in the indeterminancy of structures. Doty's poststructuralist approach to this problem re-inscribes structuralist determinism predicated upon empiricist ontology. Specifically, it is argued that Doty's approach to this perennial problem tests upon — (i) a mischaracterization of the problem; (ii) an oppositional logic; and, (iii) a series of misunderstandings of the accounts of agency and structure embedded within contemporary approaches to this problem. The article suggests a multi-layered approach to the issue of agency in an attempt to go beyond the aporia identified by Doty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]