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What role do human relationships play within the moral domain? There appears to be a lot of agreement that relationships play an important role in and for morality, but certainly not any foundational one. Yet, there has been a recent interest in seeking to explain the foundation of morality in relational terms. According to these relational proposals, the very foundation of impartial morality, and in particular the domain of "what we owe to each other" can be found in the same normative structures that are characteristic of interpersonal relationships and the partial reasons they give rise to. This suggestion has been met with serious criticism, according to which any seeming appeal to a so‐called moral relationship does no work in grounding morality and the obligations that we owe to each other. The present paper intends to challenge this conclusion by arguing that the objections rendered are not decisive, as a result of which we can begin to make sense of the idea that we do share a reason‐giving relationship with each other in the moral sphere. The moral relationship, the paper argues, is one we simply share with each other in virtue of our shared vulnerability to attitudinal injury as rational agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Best known as a political philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre is also a critic of the modern university. The paper examines the grounds of MacIntyre's criticism of modern universities; it offers an assessment of the philosophical debate occasioned by MacIntyre's writings on the topic; and it proposes a way of taking this debate forward. The debate is shown to be centered around three objections to MacIntyre's normative idea of the university: that it is overly intellectualist, parochial, and moralizing. The merits of these objections are considered and a different interpretation of the normative core of MacIntyre's conception of the university is presented: realization and promotion of the common good. An analysis is offered of the kinds of common good universities may serve to realize, including practices internal to the institution, education of a public, and flourishing relationships in various social roles. The implications of this neo‐Aristotelian analysis of the normative core of universities are also shown to be at odds with some of MacIntyre's explicitly stated views on the role of universities in forming an educated pubic and educating students for work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Although the best‐known Hegelian objection against Kant's moral philosophy is the charge that the categorical imperative is an ‘empty formalism’, Hegel's criticisms also include what we might call the realizability objection. Tentatively stated, the realizability objection says that within the sphere of Kantian morality, the good remains an unrealizable ‘ought’ – in other words, the Kantian moral ‘ought’ can never become an ‘is’. In this paper, I attempt to come to grips with this objection in two steps. In the first section of the paper, I provide an initial reading of the objection, according to which Hegel agrees with Kant's formulation of the realizability problem but disagrees with the specific Kantian solution, namely, with the Kantian idea of the highest good and the doctrine of the postulates. In the second section, I go on to argue that this reading is potentially too superficial and offer a more far‐reaching interpretation whereby Hegel is ultimately targeting fundamental distinctions (between, for instance, reason and sensibility) of Kant's moral theory. I end by employing these more far‐reaching results of Hegel's objection to sketch some features of Hegel's alternative ethical view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on 'malformed', 'irrational' or 'distorted' emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional fit of emotions is not towards an evaluatively loaded world which is independently given and, at best, represented by emotions, but towards a world shaped through the impact of emotions themselves. Sartre's idea of emotions 'magically transforming' reality for the subject so that the latter is better able to cope with problematic aspects of practically relevant situations encapsulates the world-shaping capacities of emotions, which are thus not reserved for a restricted class of emotions. Recognition of the transformative powers of emotions will also direct attention away from their seemingly representative elements to their normative and practical aspects and offer a new basis for delineating the criteria for judging them. The plausibility of this position is discussed with reference to some of Sartre's examples, such as fear, sadness and horror, but also with reference to Joan Didion's account of grief in The Year of Magical Thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first-person experiences, such as emotions and sense-perceptions. An in-depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the constitutive conditions for mathematical-numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Significant issues remain for understanding and evaluating the Quinean critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. These issues are highlighted in a puzzling mismatch between the common philosophical attitude toward the critique and its broader intellectual legacy. A discussion of this mismatch sets the larger context for criticism of a recent tradition of interpretation of the critique. I argue that this tradition confuses the roles and relative importance of indeterminacy, a priority, and analyticity in the Quinean critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluates the work of Robert Pippin regarding the philosophical problem posed by modernism. Pippin's analysis of the philosophy of Georg Hegel; Doubts on the philosophical work of Georg Hegel; Doubts concerning the interpretation of Pippin; Criticism on the arguments advanced by Pippin on the problem he perceived in modern philosophy.

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a 'strong conception' of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of 'being-with' by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the 'weak conception' of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," by Ludwig Wittgenstein is presented. It explores the symbolic significance of the paradox of incongruous ideas. It examines the mysticism and absurdity of other works of analytical philosophy. An overview of some of the specific points of interest in the book is also considered.

A literary criticism of the book "Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's 'Genealogy'," by Christopher Janaway is presented. It addresses the dimension of the book in its careful and illuminating discussion of genealogy, which depicts implicit opposition to the views on life of Arthur Schopenhauer. It examines the book's general allegiance on the criticism of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche concerning Kantian-Schopenhauerian characterization of aesthetic experience in terms of disinterestedness.

Examines Judith Butler's criticism of Michel Foucault's understanding of the body. Foucault's incoherent understanding of the body; Butler's argument for the incoherence of Foucault's position; Foucault's suggestion that cultural construction of bodies should be understood on the model of inscription.

Looks into the criticism of philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on mechanistic explanation. Designation of the explanation as a subordinate or inferior status; Teleology as the truth of mechanism: Focus of Hegel on a philosophical problem concerning explanation itself.

Presents a response of the author to authors Sydney Shoemaker and Lucy O'Brien who criticized the book "Shoemaker" written by the author. Details of comments of Shoemaker and O'Brien on the book; Theme of the book.

Discusses genealogy as history, as critique and as a kind of writing. Origin of morality; Genealogy of morals; Critical content of genealogy.

Analyzes the nature of synthetic a priori and cognitive normativity in the concept of pure reason by philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Distinction between synthetic and analytic judgment; Analysis of cognition as a product of the powers and activities of the mind; Explanation of knowledge based on the actions of the mind; Focus on Kant's account of mathematical proof and transcendental idealism.

Examines the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy by comparing his works, 'Tractatus' and 'Philosophical Investigations.' Analysis of foundationalism; Theory of linguistic representation; Distinction between significant propositions and nonsensical statements; Focus on rational calculatio, discursive reasoning and the exercise of imagination.

Investigates developments in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein by comparing his works, 'Tractatus' and 'Philosophical Investigations.' Deflationary conception of philosophy; Distinction between sign and symbol; Propositions about the nature and purpose of logical analysis; Evolution of Wittgenstein's philosophy; Wittgenstein's retractions of philosophical positions.

Focuses on Robert Brandom's pragmatic philosophy of language. Combination of formal pragmatics and inferential semantics; Conception of autonomy to distinguish rational legislation from acts of pure free choice; Emergence of discursive practice from an amalgam of a prepredicative world-interpretation; Consequences of the conceptual realism adopted by Brandom.

Proposes that Georg Hegel's 'theory of recognition' is intended as an answer to a specific question in his sytematic philosophy. Theory of ethical life of the ethical community; Need for an adequate account of Hegel's speculative notion of freedom; Identification of the 'state' in a 'state' theory of freedom.

Evaluates the pragmatist themes in Georg Hegel's idealism. Comments regarding the procedure used; Questions regarding the use of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant; Discussion on the philosophy of Hegel; Analysis on some of the main arguments of the philosophers.

Focuses on the written work of Rolf-Peter Horstmann regarding the intellectual legacy of philosopher Georg Hegel. Conception of systematic philosophy of Hegel; Discussion on to questions posed by Horstmann.

Deals with the intellectual legacy of philosopher Georg Hegel in modern philosophy. Presentation of several observations; Ontological claim of Hegel; Methodological claim of Hegel; Epistemological claim of Hegel.

Deals with the written work of Terry Pinkard that shows how Georg Hegel transforms Immanuel Kant's morality of rules and maxims into a morality of practices. Conditions in which the philosophy of Hegel and Kant differs; Strength of the transformation of Kant; Philosophy and phenomenology according to Hegel; Hegel's description of the life of absolute spirit.

Explains that the idealist thesis contributes to the pragmatist strategy of philosopher Georg Hegel for understanding the nature of the determinateness of the content of empirical concepts. Definition of idealist thesis; Analysis on pragmatist thesis; Phenomenology.

Comments on the written work of Robert Stern that tackle the issues raised by writer John McDowell's effort to supersede the philosophy of Immanuel Kant with that Georg Hegel. Claims of Stern; Interpretation of John McDowell; Criticism on the arguments of McDowell; Analysis on the philosophy of Kant and Hegel.

Outlines the way in which John McDowell, author of the book `Mind and World,' presents the relation of philosophers Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel. Significance of the writing of McDowell; Strategy of assessing Kant through his relation to Kant; Stance of McDowell on several issues in philosophy.

Focuses on the work of philosopher Georg Hegel that criticizes Immanuel Kant's philosophy on morality. How did Hegel utilized Kant's philosophy to usher a distinctive philosophy of his own; Doctrine of the highest good; Difference in the moral implications philosophy of Kant and Hegel.

Discusses the arguments raised by philosopher of Georg Hegel to the problem of freedom in modern philosophy. Nature of Georg Hegel's denial of dualism and incompatibilism; Obstacles to understanding the nature-spirit relation; Concentrated statements of Hegel's position; What makes Hegel's arguments on the nature of freedom different from the philosophers who have been influenced by Christian tradition.

Comments on the article written by Jurgen Habermas which appeared in the July 1999 issue of the `European Journal of Philosophy' which discussed Georg Hegel's role in deconstructing epistemology. Basic ideas of mentalist epistemology; Questions raised by Habermas on the dynamics of development of philosophy from Immanuel Kant to Georg Hegel.

Focuses on John Stuart Mill's discussion of the sanctions of the principle of utility. What could motivate a person to act in accordance with the utility principle; Discussion on psychological hedonism; Distinction between will and desire.

Views the theories of Theodor Adorno on art and criticism. Struggle between two tendencies; Discussion on autonomy of art by Kant; Overview on art in the highest human vocation by Hegel.

Presents Aristotle and Friedrich Nietzsche's theories of tragedy. Contrast between the two philosophers; Discussion on pity and terror; Distinction between mercy and pity.

Investigates a perceptive-epistemological dimension of ethics. Some insights into French philosopher-theologian Simone Weil's writings on ethics; Process of ethical renewal according to Iris Murdoch; Moral attention and moral vision according to Martha Nussbaum.

Discusses the philosophical problems of skepticism about other minds and skepticism about the external world. Skepticism about other minds and the external world according to philosopher Stanley Cavell; Link between skepticism and tragedy; Phenomenology of perception according to Maurice Merleau-Ponty; Opposition of Ludwig Wittgenstein to skepticism.

Presents a response concerning a critique on an article about the philosophy of language of Stanley Cavell. Rules and grammar; Internal relations and the two-tier model of grammar; Human voice of philosophy.