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When suggesting that we-the affluent in the developed world-are legitimate targets of defensive force due to our contribution to global poverty one is likely to be countered by one of two strategies. The first denies that we contribute to global poverty. The second seems to affirm that we contribute, and even that we have stringent contribution-based duties to address this poverty, but denies that such contribution makes forcible resistance permissible. Those in this second group employ several argumentative strategies. In this paper I investigate these strategies for denying the force-related implication of contribution to poverty. I do not argue for political violence or for the permissibility of targeting the affluent, I merely investigate a conditional: if contribution to global poverty generates stringent duties to address it, then this contribution implies permission on the part of the victims to defend themselves with force, or for third parties to use force on their behalf. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the question in the ethics of war as to who shall be given immunity in acts of defensive force. The author argues against the view that the mere fact that some people are not combatants is enough to justify granting them immunity. He suggests, instead, that although civilians are not combatants, and not a threat to the defending party, there might be relations between civilians and the soldiers making it permissible to kill the former to impede the aggression of the latter. However, when there are no such relations, civilians do enjoy immunity, and should not be victims of war, intended or otherwise.