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Incumbent incentive for competence-signaling and lack of voter information are generally thought to be factors that increase the prevalence of political budget cycles. These mechanisms should be more prevalent in new political units. Since the creation of new political units is rarely exogenous, however, serious endogeneity issues would be an issue for empirical studies of this subject. To overcome these problems, I use a Danish local government reform—which amalgamated some (but not all) Danish municipalities, thereby creating new political units—in a way that is arguably quasi-experimental to study whether political budget cycles are larger in new political units. Contrary to theoretical predictions, political budget cycles seem to be of a smaller scale in the new municipalities, but only regarding budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The findings are of wider interest for discussions about the mechanisms behind context-conditional political budget cycles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on the size and quality of public education using a quantitative political economy model that allows for a heterogeneous immigrant population. Our analysis distinguishes between short and long-run effects and accounts for the consequences of naturalization and assimilation. We use the model to analyze Spain's large 2000–2008 immigration wave. We find that immigration led to a 15% increase in public enrollment in the short run, together with a 3% reduction in public education spending and almost a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of native households using private schools. Depending on the eventual degree of assimilation, these trends will be greatly intensified or mitigated once immigrants naturalize and gain the right to vote. Our analysis suggests that assimilation in terms of family size and the value assigned to children's education are the most relevant dimensions quantitatively. We also show that immigration policies that favor one group over another can significantly alter the overall effects of immigration on the schooling system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs a simple theoretical political economy model to analyze the dynamic interactions between redistribution, public good provision and cultural integration of minority groups. Cultural differentiation erodes the support for general public good provision and vertical redistribution, reducing in turn the attractiveness of adoption of the mainstream culture by the minority groups. Our model shows the possibility for multiple politico-cultural steady state trajectories depending strongly on the initial degree of cultural differentiation in the society. An exogenous increase in income inequality is shown to increase the likelihood of multiple steady state trajectories. In a context with multiple minority groups, cultural fragmentation favors integration into the mainstream culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides a new angle on the relationship between political decisions and exchange rates. We link a conventional exchange rate modeling approach to the literature on the political economy of exchange rates and studies dealing with the role of policy announcements for financial market expectations by addressing the impact of policy uncertainty on exchange rate expectations and forecast errors of professionals. Our results show that expectations are not only affected by announcements but also by the degree of uncertainty regarding the future stance of economic policy. We find that forecast errors are strongly affected by policy uncertainty compared to expectations, suggesting that the effect of uncertainty is not efficiently accounted for in market expectations. Our main findings hold for economic policy uncertainty, fiscal policy uncertainty and monetary policy uncertainty. In addition, the estimates for the Japanese yen suggest a safe haven role of the yen since higher policy uncertainty in the US results in an expected appreciation of the yen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Certain democratic institutions tend to persist in some countries whereas they are frequently reversed in others. Focusing on strong constraints on executive power as one such institution, this paper theoretically studies the cross-country differences in the costs of relaxing these constraints. The model features two political parties that stochastically alternate in office according to a political uncertainty parameter. In each period, the incumbent can make reversible investments into the future government's ability to reform executive constraints. The main results indicate that more competitive elections and higher degrees of policy polarization between the political parties lead to high and persistent levels of investment into the society's stock of “democratic capital”. These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive constraint-regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authoritarian regimes have surpassed democracies in foreign reserve accumulation since the Asian Financial Crisis. Two prominent institutionalist theories could explain this diverging trend in reserves: First, the political business cycle theory, suggesting that reserves are reduced before an election. Second, the veto player theory, implying that a high number of veto players increases the de facto independence of central bankers, who are reluctant to invest in reserves. A time-series cross-sectional analysis for up to 182 countries over the period 1990–2013 shows that democratic governments tend to reduce their reserves before elections. While veto players do not affect reserves directly, a high number of veto players tends to limit a political business cycle before an election. Elections and veto players do not have an influence in authoritarian regimes. Election cycles tend to explain why democracies have relatively fallen behind in a period of massive reserve accumulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central question in political economy is whether decision-making in representative democracies is biased towards local public investments or other types of policies which have locally concentrated benefits. The model by Weingast et al. (1981) predicts that a legislature with members from different areas will spend more in total on local public goods when the geographic constituency of each member is small. I test this prediction using panel data on the 18 Norwegian regional councils, exploiting that the geographic allocation of regional council seats varies considerably over time. Consistent with the theory, I find robust evidence that investments in regional public roads are lower when many council members come from the more populated areas in the region. This gives a more direct test of the prediction by Weingast et al. (1981) than existing empirical evidence, which concerns the relationship between public spending and legislature size. I find similar but less robust results for the maintenance of existing roads. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this study is to improve our comprehension of the role played by project complexity and institutional quality as possible drivers of the choice between open auctions and negotiations in a sample of Italian municipalities. Controlling for project characteristics, for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at municipality level, our main results suggest that projects that are more complex are more likely to be procured with negotiated procedures. On average, a rise in the project complexity index from the 25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution increases the probability of procuring the project with a negotiated procedure by about 6%–8%. However, our results also suggest that the impact of complexity might be more relevant in the case of projects procured by municipalities located in provinces characterized by low levels of corruption. Moreover, we also find that complex projects are associated to longer delays in their execution, larger rebates and to higher probabilities to be awarded to local firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Breyer and Weimann (2015) suggest interpreting the results of our study on Morals and Markets (2013a,b) in “the opposite way”. In the following, we briefly discuss why this claim is unwarranted. We hope that these clarifications will help inspiring future work on causal effects of markets and other institutions on moral values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies suggest psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, including that conservatives are more overconfident. We use a behavioral political economy model to show that while this is undoubtedly true for election years in the current era, there is no reason to believe that conservative ideologies are intrinsically linked to overconfidence. Indeed, it appears that in 1980 and before, conservatives and liberals were equally overconfident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses and provides experimental evidence on the role of emotions and, in particular, the neglected role of endogenous affective relationships (bonding) in three key areas of political economy: (i) appropriation, with compliance or resistance as response; (ii) competition for access to appropriation and its potential for escalation and de-escalation of the inherent conflict; and (iii) determinants of (large scale) collective action. To that purpose, a series of experiments on power-to-take games and public good games are presented and put into perspective. Furthermore, the relevance of an affective social ties model for explaining these experimental findings is investigated. Finally, some important political economic implications are addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers generally have powerful incentives to attract votes by strategically manipulating public policies, for instance by increasing public spending during election periods or by implementing ideologically valued policies for their electoral base. At first sight, public theaters and orchestras appear an unlikely domain for such tactics. Highbrow culture is elitist and provides few jobs to artists as voters (patronage). However, we argue that policymakers indirectly target a larger highbrow culture-consuming voting public, as this public is more likely to go voting, to actively engage in politics, and to influence other voters' political behavior through political and sociological multiplier effects. We find evidence of such manipulation tactics in Germany, 1993–2010. Artist numbers increase during state-level, and even more during municipal-level, election years (electioneering). More tentatively, leftwing party power increases cultural subsidies and jobs in Eastern states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes to date (1993–2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf and the Shapley–Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant differences between member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does not hold up for the Shapley–Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role that political factors play in the investment location decisions of multinational enterprises. It has been found that foreign direct investors shy away from countries with excessive government spending, especially when this spending is directed towards the military. They also seem to have a slight preference for leftist executives and be negatively predisposed toward situations in which the ruling party has held power for prolonged periods of time. Ceteris paribus , more FDI flows to countries that have presidential systems, established political parties and where the party of the executive controls all houses with lawmaking powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks empirically the question about potential nonlinearities in the relationship between political competition and economic growth in global perspective. Kernel estimation is employed to analyze this link using cross-sectional data for the time span 1988–2007. To take into account the mix of categorical and continuous data types encountered here, I apply the generalized product kernel approach. Across various measures of political competition, the findings do suggest the presence of nonlinearities, and indicate a differential impact on growth for the various components of political competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: I study diversity in views expressed by economists regarding appropriate economic policies. The dataset is for voting by economists on the German Council of Economic Experts, over the period 1971–2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is having been nominated by the trade unions, which results in being some 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion. The voting pattern confirms that ideological identity through the channel of political appointment influences economists' voting behavior. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: According to reputational models of Political Economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We use a dynamic panel data estimation strategy to test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977–2000, using social and welfare spending and surplus as policy variables. We are unable to find significant differences between the fiscal policies of term-limited chief executives and other types of government, while when we look at presidential systems only, lame ducks appear to be more likely to cut public spending. This contrasts with previous empirical results based on US states and international data. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Why do some States default on their debt more often than others? We argue that sovereign default is the outcome of a political struggle among different groups of citizens. It is less likely to happen if domestic debt-holders are politically strong and/or the costs of the financial turmoil typically triggered by a sovereign bankruptcy are large. We show that these conditions are in turn more likely to be present if a country has a strong middle class and/or a sufficiently independent central bank. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]