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The article comments on the paper of sociologist Serge Moscovici on social psychology. Moscovici believes that social psychology was once becoming an influential crossroads discipline, one that could shape and nurture other social sciences such as economics, anthropology and sociology. Moscovici's solution to the problem of how to become a powerful discipline seems to be along the lines of getting back to basics. Throughout his paper, Moscovici urges other social psychologists to consider the importance of creating rich descriptions garnered through careful, painstaking observations. In various ways an inductivist model of science within a positivist-empiricist framework informs Moscovici's views of the ideal social psychology. Moscovici seems to believe that the positivist-empiricist mode of scientific method is unchallenged within social psychology and sciences more generally. The author stresses the similarities between Moscovici's philosophy of science and that of the most traditional mainstream laboratory social psychologist.

The paper starts by outlining a general perspective in social psychology. It may turn out that social constructivism, the perspective outlined in the early sixties is one of the major contributions of European social psychology to social sciences in general. Whatever its fate, some particular points are made: a) physics is not the only model we have to follow b) the existing ways of explanation can and must be upgraded c) more complex theories are required d) changes in methodological and statistical criteria are expected in order to deal with new and complex phenomena. Nevertheless the main problem today is description and not explanation. That is the discovery and observation of a wider range of new social phenomena. How successful we will he in this endeavor decides if social psychology becomes a major science or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moscovici has ushered in the 'era of social representations', widely welcomed as a European alternative to what are increasingly regarded as the shortcomings of mainline' American social psychology. The rapid and enthusiastic adoption by many psychologists of Moscovici's theoretical approach has not so far evoked a great deal of critical appraisal of the ideas he put forward. The present paper seeks to make a start in filling this gap by an examination of the conceptual structure and sonic of its underlying assumptions. There appear to be a number of internal inconsistencies and some doubt concerning the logical status of social representations'. It is suggested that clarification of such issues, together with the establishment of closer links with the findings of neighbouring disciplines, would help to strengthen what is undoubtedly one of the most stimulating new departures in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are human individuals universally seen to be more real entities (or more entitative, to use Campbell's, 1958, term) than social groups? Although the individual may be seen to be more entitative than social groups in the West, it is unclear whether this is the case in other cultures, especially in East Asia. Two aspects of perceived entitativity are distinguished: psychological essentialism (belief in the presence of essence-like unchangeable properties) and agency (perception that a social entity is an agent), and examined for four social targets (individual, family, friendship group, and society) in three English-speaking cultures (Australia, UK, and USA), three East Asian cultures (Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea), and two continental European cultures (Belgium and Germany). In all cultures, the individual person was seen to possess essence-like unchangeable characteristics more than social groups (i.e. essentialized). As for agency, the individual person was seen to be more agentic than groups in Western cultures, but both individuals and groups were conferred an equal level of agency in East Asia. Individuals may be universally more essentialized than friendship groups and societies, but not always seen to be more agentic, than social groups. Implications of the results for conceptions of individualism and collectivism are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research investigates how the relation between two causes (i.e. whether they co-occur or not) affects the likelihood to discount one of them. In two experiments, two causes were either systematically paired together (positive relation), were paired with many other causes (independent relation), or were never paired together (negative relation). The results indicate that discounting of one of the causes (target cause) depends on the relation with the other cause (alternative cause) and the order in which the alternative cause was presented and produced the outcome alone. If information on the independent outcome of the alternative cause came prior to the joint outcome of the alternative and target cause (forward order), then discounting of the target cause occurred regardless of the relation between the two causes. If, however, information on the independent outcome of the alternative cause came after the joint outcome of the alternative and target cause (backward order), then discounting of the target cause occurred mainly when there was a positive or negative relation between the causes, but not when there was an independent relation. The degree of backward discounting given a positive or negative relation was largely identical. These results are consistent with the retrospective revaluation hypothesis of Dickinson and Burke (1996) and shed new light on the role of the relation between causes on discounting. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short note investigated how expertise in a political scandal moderates whether the activation of this scandal produces assimilation in the evaluation of politicians in general and contrast in the evaluation of specific politicians. It was hypothesized that participants with a rich knowledge about the scandal would display the assimilation and contrast effects whereas those with a poorer knowledge would not. Results tended to support this prediction, suggesting that the impact on judgment of a specific context depends on the amount of knowledge participants possess about this context. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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