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The introduction to the EJSP special issue brings together recent literature on allyship. We present and discuss different definitions of allyship and highlight a multiple perspectives approach to understanding the predictors and consequences of allyship. This approach suggests that engagement in allyship can be driven by egalitarian and non‐egalitarian motivations and that the behaviours identified as allyship can have different meanings, causes and consequences depending on whether researchers take into account the allies' perspective or the disadvantaged groups' perspective. We use this approach as an organizing principle to identify themes that emerge in the papers included in this special issue. We start with four papers that consider the perspective of the advantaged group, followed by two papers that consider the perspective of the disadvantaged group. Finally, we introduce two theoretical papers that examine the relations between disadvantaged groups and allies, and we set out directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines social‐psychological factors that can facilitate and hinder public support for conservative agendas over time. Using four waves of longitudinal panel data from Chile (N = 2,394), we estimated the between‐person and within‐person associations among individuals' self‐reported conservative ideologies, political disaffection, civic behaviour, political attitudes towards democracy and social change, and their support for conservative (vs progressive) social movements over time. As expected, between‐person increases in social dominance orientation (SDO), right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), right‐wing self‐categorization, and political disaffection correlated positively with support for conservative social movements. Between‐person increases in people's social change beliefs, support for democracy, and civic participation predicted less support for conservative social movements over time. Within‐person increases in RWA and SDO correlated positively with conservative social movement support, whereas civic participation correlated negatively with it. Results provide novel evidence for the dynamic processes underlying support for conservative/progressive agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of globalisation has gained tremendous momentum over recent decades, resulting in unprecedented human interconnectedness and awareness of global concerns. The current special issue of the European Journal of Social Psychology brings together 10 papers that address this development. This special issue showcases different perspectives on the psychological processes that underlie the cognitive and behavioural responses to the global challenges humankind has created and is now facing. In introducing these contributions, we identified three emerging topics for social psychological theorising and application vis-à-vis globalisation and global concerns: (i) supranational identification and attachment, (ii) political and ideological responses to globalisation and global concerns, and (iii) global protest and change. We integrate these topics by highlighting some future prospects of this emerging field of research and its significance for understanding social change in these tumultuous times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The construction of national identities through political discourse is a growing field of interest to social psychologists, particularly as many countries face changing demographics, borders and social realities as part of globalization, immigration and continued political integration and conflict. Through an analysis of 17 key speeches by Serbian politicians over the past 25 years, the present paper explores the question of how politicians, as entrepreneurs of identity, discursively manage the relationship between identity continuity and political change over time, in attempts to construct the future of a nation. We particularly explore this issue in the context of Serbia's present political aspirations toward joining the European Union. The findings indicate that (i) political change becomes negotiated within the framework of established and legitimized identity discourses that have developed over time, and (ii) while history is frequently drawn on to support political agendas, it is successful to the extent that this history offers a sense of cultural continuity rather than a coherent narrative of historical events and time periods. We conclude by arguing for the benefits that a diachronic approach to political discourse can offer social psychologists interested in the discursive construction of national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power is an inescapable feature of human social life and structure. This paper addresses the nature of power. The standard theory is that power is the capacity for influence and that influence is based on the control of resources valued or desired by others. However, there have always been problems with this theory and new ones have appeared. The paper summarizes the standard theory and its problems, outlines the different meanings of power and presents a new theory emphasizing group identity, social organization and ideology rather than dependence as the basis of power. It proposes that power is based on persuasion, authority and coercion. A key point is that the theory changes the way these processes have been understood by reversing the causal sequence of the standard theory. The latter argues that control of resources produces power, power is the basis of influence and that mutual influence leads to the formation of a psychological group. The three-process theory argues that psychological group formation produces influence, that influence is the basis of power and that power leads to the control of resources. Implications of the theory for social change, coercion, prejudice and the extent to which power is a social evil are briefly noted. The challenge is to study how power emerges from and functions within social relationships with a definite social, ideological and historical content rather than reifying it as an abstract external force producing generic psychological effects. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emerging literature suggests that the success of social movements depends, partly, on their ability to garner support from third‐party groups. One factor that appears to predict support is social movements' use of nonviolent (compared to violent) strategies to achieve their goals. However, this literature is not definitive. Herein, we report the results of a meta‐analysis of research that has assessed the effect of the use of nonviolence on third‐party support (k = 16, N = 4598). A small‐to‐moderate positive effect was observed, d = 0.25. Additionally, research that used a control or baseline comparison group suggested that using nonviolent strategies marginally (p =.090) increased people's willingness to help the movement (d = 0.17) while adopting violent strategies did not increase or decrease people's willingness to help the movement (d = −0.03). Publication bias was evidenced by bigger effect sizes of published (vs. unpublished) studies. Target (i.e., state vs. social issues) and location of the protest (i.e., domestic vs. foreign) were not significant moderators, whereas the context (i.e., real vs. hypothetical scenarios) was, although marginally. Results suggest that it behooves social movements to adopt nonviolent strategies if third‐party support is desired. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aims of the current paper are to contribute to theorizing in the field of collective action and also to bring this body of research closer with the literature on climate change. We suggest integrating the concept of social norms into the social identity model of collective action, to investigate the determinants of individuals' collective climate action intention. We argue that perceived social norms will be helpful in understanding the social identity-collective action link. Consistent with the proposed model, participants' (N = 538) intention to take part in a neighborhood-based climate protection initiative was predicted via all of the model constructs (social identity, perceived collective efficacy, and group-based emotions) but most strongly so by the perceived participation norm, which also fully mediated the effect of social identity on participation intention. Further analyses suggested that the emotional motivation to engage in collective climate action was based on group-based guilty conscience rather than anger. Discussion focuses on the importance of social context in understanding and combating climatic change, the emotionally flexible motivations behind different forms of collective action, and the role of group identification in interventions aimed at promoting pro-environmental behavior. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Societal changes involving power reversal may pose challenges to system justification by a subordinate minority group that had previously held a more privileged position. Derived from originally exploratory qualitative investigation, this paper presents an account of endorsement of justifying the status quo versus the voicing relative deprivation in the context of post-Soviet Estonia. Experiences of alternative societal arrangements in history were actively deployed by (minority ethnic) Estonian Russians to generate temporal comparisons with the past as a cognitive alternative to the present status quo and give voice to experiences of relative deprivation. A struggle for positive social identity was interpreted to motivate Estonian Russians to mobilize the past as a cognitive alternative to delegitimize the status quo. By contrast, Russians were portrayed as invaders, and the Soviet past was represented as unjust by (the majority ethnic) Estonians, whereas the present system was depicted as fair and equitable. Mutually, polemical representations of history and narratives of identity provide the lenses through which the legitimacy of new societal arrangements following the major social change is interpreted. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a rejoinder to Plods critique of the social psychology of conflict published in this Journal. The rejoinder reviews the history of American social psychology, the meaning of 'conflict resolution', the nature of the dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma, and other related matters which Plon has apparently misconstrued. The rejoinder criticizes Plon's crude 'economic determinism' version of Marxist theory and briefly considers the role of power in politics. The characteristics of the present author's social-psychological approach to conflict is outlined, and it is suggested that such an approach has direct relevance to the intellectual concerns of those who seek to bring about social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The present research examined the perspectives of both White and Black racial justice activists on the roles of White allies in the struggle for justice for Black people in the United States. Study 1 used Q methodology, a mixed‐methods approach, which identified four distinct perspectives about the role of White allies from a sample of activists (33 White and 22 Black Americans): (1) mobilize to support Black leadership, (2) interpersonal activism, (3) avoid dominating Black people's efforts, and (4) lifelong learning. In Study 2, we interviewed activists (22 White and 12 Black Americans) to understand their evaluation of, and preference for, each of perspective identified in Study 1. Thematic analyses showed that each perspective had its pros and cons regarding considerations of how to best use ingroup advantages without dominating the movement. Our findings contribute to our understanding of potential tensions in solidarity‐based social movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional definitions of political ideology state that right‐wingers support system stability, whereas left‐wingers support social change. However, during the last decade many right‐wing movements have been on the rise and demanded far‐reaching changes. We argue that both left‐, and right‐wing protestors reject the status quo, and are motivated to change it – albeit in opposing directions: either to increase equality (progressive social change), or inequality (reactionary social change). In two studies (NStudy1 = 453, NStudy2 = 614), both left‐, and right‐wingers scored lower on system justification than moderates. Further, latent profile analyses showed that supporters of progressive social change were characterized by low system justification and left‐wing ideology, whereas supporters of reactionary social change were characterized by low system justification and right‐wing ideology. This indicates that right‐wingers do not necessarily support system stability – instead, they reject the status quo and promote change in the direction of greater inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leadership is central to understanding social continuity and change, though rarely features in the study of collective action. Across three experiments (total N = 687), we examine how followers' support for pro‐change leaders (Experiments 1–3) and pro‐status quo leaders (Experiments 1–2) varies as a function of leader alignment with group normative trajectory, the presence (vs. absence) of competing leaders, and shared group membership with followers. When pro‐change leaders were aligned with the normative trajectory of the group, they elicited higher collective action and voting intentions compared to pro‐status quo leaders (Experiments 1–2). When change leaders were non‐aligned, participants instead supported the pro‐status quo alternative (Experiment 1–2). Finally, the presence of leadership contests with aligned change leaders (Experiment 2) and pro‐status quo leaders (Experiments 2–3) reduced collective action and support for non‐aligned change leaders or those facing a polarised followership. Implications for research at the nexus of leadership and collective action are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last quarter of a century, social psychological research on collective action has grown exponentially and progressed through four distinct phases. While the first phase showed that identity, efficacy, and injustice motivate the aggrieved to protest on behalf of their ingroup, the second phase acknowledged that protests could involve collaborations between the disadvantaged and their advantaged allies. The third phase of research examined reactionary movements by integrating ideology and acknowledging that advantaged groups can protest to protect or expand their privileged status. The research showcased in this special issue highlights a fourth phase of collective action by illustrating its dialectical nature and recognising the opposing agendas advanced by structurally disadvantaged and advantaged groups. We also advance a two‐dimensional taxonomy differentiating between the goals (Inclusive vs. Exclusive) and societal implications (Challenge vs. Defend the Status Quo) of collective action. In doing so, we provide some of the necessary conceptual and definitional foundations for the next generation of research on collective action and social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

`In two recent papers Paicheler(1976, 1977) reports data concerning the effect of what we shall term `progressive minorities' (i.e. minorities which advocate positions which involve the evolution of norms, even of norms which are not yet dominant) and `reactionary minorities' (i.e. minorities opposed to the evolution of such norms) on both group discussion towards the attainment of consensus, and polarization. She shows that progressive minorities (in this case, pro-feminist confederates) accentuate group polarization, under the condition that that they are consistent (`consistent' in a somewhat similar sense as that used by Moscovici, 1976). In contrast, consistency loses its effect in the case of reactionary minorities (in this case, anti-feminist con- federates). First, they do not exert as much influence as the progressive minorities; rather, their main effect is to hinder the group in reaching a consensus, by creating what the author calls a `bipolarization', i.e. influencing some subjects positively, and some negatively. The bipolarization appears to have two differentiated effects as a function of the style of behaviour: when consistent, the reactionary minority affects the responses of the least polarized subjects, and when inconsistent, it affects the responses of the most polarized subjects, who compromise during the interaction in order to facilitate the attainment of consensus. Paicheler concludes that (1976, p. 426) `... a consistent style of behaviour is persuasive only to the extent that its content cor- responds to the global evolution of the norms' (in other words: when minorities are progressive). in the opinion of the present author these results warrant close attention, in that Paicheler seems to have uncovered an important issue, one which is relevant to a theorization of innovation processes. After all, innovation does not take place in a [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collective action (CA) research looking at gender has focused predominantly on feminist activism, overlooking activism of women who reinforce gender inequalities and traditional gender roles (such as women supporting men's rights or anti‐abortion protesters). Our research addresses this oversight, demonstrating the key role of identity content in predicting CA in support of progressive and reactionary social change among women. Using two large online samples of women from the US (Study 1: N = 1825) and the UK (Study 2: N = 992), we show that identification with 'women' is either weakly associated or unrelated to progressive and reactionary CA and is thus too broad to differentiate between support for CA with opposing goals. In contrast, subgroup identities matter: feminist identification is associated with support for progressive CA, while identification with traditional women is associated with support for reactionary CA. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on CA and gender inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that gay men and lesbian women face significant economic disparities compared to their heterosexual counterparts, people appear to believe that the opposite is true, a phenomenon which has been dubbed the "myth of gay affluence." In the current research (Ntot = 2,162), we address the consequences of this belief. Specifically, we hypothesize and find that believing that gay men and lesbian women are financially well off—either chronically (Study 1) or because of an experimental manipulation (Studies 2–3)—leads participants to deny discrimination against gay men and lesbian women, above and beyond anti‐gay attitudes, and this is mediated by the belief that there is a "gay agenda" that is backed by powerful lobbyists. Thus, perpetuating this myth—either intentionally or inadvertently—could have deleterious effects on efforts for social change and the promotion of rights for sexual minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional crowd theory decontextualizes crowd incidents and explains behaviour entirely in terms of processes internal to the crowd itself. This ignores the fact that such incidents are characteristically intergroup encounters and draws attention away from the role of groups such as the police in the development of events. This paper begins to rectify this omission through an analysis of interviews with 26 Public Order trained police concerning crowds in general and the Poll Tax ‘riot’ of 31 March 1990 in particular. The analysis shows that, despite a perception of crowd composition as heterogeneous, officers perceive crowd dynamics as involving an anti-social minority seeking to exploit the mindlessness of ordinary people in the mass. Consequently, all crowds are seen as potentially dangerous and, in situations of actual conflict, all crowd members are seen as equally dangerous. In addition, police tactics for dealing with disorder make it very difficult to distinguish between individuals or subgroups in the crowd. This convergence of ideological and practical factors leads to the police treating crowds in disorder as an homogeneous whole. It is argued that such action can often play an important role in escalating (if not initiating) collective conflict and is also a key component of social change in crowd contexts. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using questionnaire data concerning perceptions of the European Community (EC) in Scotland and Andalucia we explored how the EC is perceived, and a European identification adopted as a function of the salience of these ‘regional’ identities. Drawing on the work concerning the concept of ‘comparative identity’ (Ros, Cano & Huici, 1987) it is argued that disidentification with the ‘nation-state’ (i.e. Britain and Spain respectively) is a useful way of measuring the salience of such regional identities in the self/concept. We predicted that such identities would be more salient in Scotland than in Andalucia and that in Scotland the salience of subjects’ regional identities would be associated with beliefs concerning the need for strategies of regional empowerment in its relation to the nation (Britain). We further predicted that the EC would be judged as a function of this comparative identity so that in Scotland (but not in Andalucia), a European identification would be associated with what may be called ‘social change’ beliefs (e.g. beliefs concerning the need for changing aspects of the region's relationship with the nation). Supportive evidence is found for all these predictions. However, no support was found for our prediction of a correlation between the Scots’ regional identification and their European identification. The paper concludes with a discussion of the utility of the concept of comparative identity. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What impact do advantaged group allies have within social movements? Although solidarity between advantaged and disadvantaged group members is often encouraged to achieve long‐term social change, allies run the risk of being ineffective or counterproductive, therefore making it important to shift our focus towards understanding the impact of allies. We propose an integrative theoretical framework describing the positive and negative impact of allies based on their distinct identity‐based needs: advantaged group members' need for moral acceptance and disadvantaged group members' need for empowerment and respect. By consolidating extant literature and identifying gaps in prior research, we propose a set of hypotheses concerning (a) tensions that arise within intergroup solidarity efforts for social change between advantaged group allies and disadvantaged group members, and (b) the role of allies in influencing broader public opinion to advance the psychology of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three studies (N1 = 1,019; N2 = 312; N3 = 494) tested whether seeing intergroup relations as inherently antagonistic shaped advantaged social groups' allyship intentions. More specifically, we tested whether endorsing zero‐sum beliefs related to their willingness to support system‐challenging and system‐supporting collective action. Zero‐sum beliefs were negatively correlated with system‐challenging and positively correlated with system‐supporting collective action intentions. Zero‐sum beliefs were more common among advantaged than disadvantaged groups and translated into lower allyship intentions. Advantaged group members with higher levels of zero‐sum beliefs were also more likely to experience anger and fear when considering the demographic racial shift in the United States. Increased fear was associated with greater support for system‐supporting and lower support for system‐challenging collective action. We find consistent evidence that advantaged group members see intergroup relations as a zero‐sum game and that these beliefs are negatively related to their intentions to become allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One way in which individuals can participate in action to change the society they live in is through the pursuit of an ideal society or "utopia"; however, the content of that utopia is a likely determinant of its motivational impact. Here we examined two predominant prototypes of utopia derived from previous research and theory—the Green and Sci‐Fi utopias. When participants were primed with either of these utopias, the Green utopia was perceived to entail a range of other positive characteristics (e.g., warmth, positive emotions) and—provided it was positively evaluated—tended to elicit both motivation and behaviour for social change. In contrast, the Sci‐Fi utopia was associated with low motivation, even when it was positively evaluated. Furthermore, the Green utopia was shown to elicit greater perceptions of participative efficacy, which in turn predicted the increase in social change motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We tested antecedents (paternalistic beliefs; Study 1) and consequences (social change potential; Study 2) of autonomy‐ and dependency‐oriented help and developed scales assessing paternalistic beliefs and both forms of help. In Study 1 (N = 143 Germans), we focused on paternalistic beliefs as an antagonist to social change and a key distinguishing variable between engagement in both forms of help. As expected, paternalistic beliefs were positively related to dependency‐oriented help, mediated by concern for a positive national moral image, but negatively related to autonomy‐oriented help, mediated by perceived competence of refugees. In Study 2, both refugees (N = 80) and Germans (N = 94) perceived autonomy‐oriented help to have more potential for social change than dependency‐oriented help. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on literatures on social movements and collective action, mentalization, and morality, four studies investigated whether a social movement's use of nonviolence can increase people's willingness to support and join the movement. In a correlational study with a nested design, across 23 movements perceived use of nonviolence predicted participants' willingness to support and join the movement (Study 1, n = 203). This effect was also found experimentally, with Americans supporting nonviolent movements more than violent ones, in hypothetical and real foreign countries (Study 2 and 3, ns = 606 and 373). Study 4 (n = 247) replicated the effects in participants' own country. The effects were transmitted by attribution of mental states to nonviolent movements and subsequent greater perceived morality (Study 2–4). This research demonstrates that nonviolence can benefit social movements in terms of support and mobilization potential, and that these benefits are rooted in perceptions of mental capacity, humanness, and morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and how do social movements form to mobilize action across national boundaries? In the context of the 2015 movement to support Syrian refugees, we develop an integrative model of transnational social movement formation shaped by pre‐existing world‐views (social dominance orientation and right‐wing authoritarianism) and social media exposure to iconic events, resulting in an emergent group consciousness ("we are", "we believe", "we feel"). Group consciousness is, in turn, the proximal predictor of solidarity with refugees. Participants were from six countries: Hungary (N = 267), Romania (N = 163), Germany (N = 190), the United Kingdom (N = 159), the United States (N = 244) and Australia (N = 344). Multi‐group structural equation models confirmed that group consciousness, shaped by individual differences and exposure to events through social media, was the proximal predictor of solidarity. The subjective meaning of group consciousness varied across samples, reflecting national differences. Results support the importance of considering individual and national differences, and group processes in understanding emergent social movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Across two studies, we find evidence for our prediction that experimentally increasing feelings of physical safety increases conservatives' socially progressive attitudes. Specifically, Republican and conservative participants who imagined being endowed with a superpower that made them invulnerable to physical harm (vs. the ability to fly) were more socially (but not economically) liberal (Study 1) and less resistant to social change (Study 2). Results suggest that socially (but not economically) conservative attitudes are driven, at least in part, by needs for safety and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: What motivates people to engage in activism against wealth inequality? The simple answer is perceiving injustice. However, the current work demonstrates that these perceptions depend on political ideologies. More specifically, for political liberals who frequently question the fairness of the economic system, messages simply describing the extent of the inequality (distributive injustice) are enough to motivate activism (Study 1). For political conservatives, who are inclined to believe that inequality results from fair procedures, messages must also detail how the system of economic forces is unjust (procedural injustice; Studies 2 and 3). Together, these studies suggest perceiving injustice can galvanize social change, but for conservatives, this means more than simply outlining the extent of the inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research points to Chinese people's elevated tendency to make positive self-evaluations, despite the general claim that East Asians do not self-enhance. We present three studies in support of a novel prediction that sociocultural change in China plays an important role in augmenting self-enhancement. We operationalized self-enhancement primarily in terms of the better-than-average effect (BTAE) and accounted for trait desirability or importance. We found that: (i) compared with Chinese Canadians, Chinese showed a stronger BTAE; (ii) within the Chinese, identification with contemporary Chinese culture uniquely predicted a stronger BTAE; and (iii) priming contemporary (vs. traditional) Chinese culture led to a stronger BTAE. Finally, we provided further evidence that motivation, in part, underlies the rising Chinese BTAE. We conclude by discussing the importance of both socioeconomic and cultural perspectives for understanding how and when of self-enhancement in contemporary China and other societies undergoing social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kony2012 was a viral Internet video that attracted unprecedented online interest in promoting a campaign to arrest the leader of an African militant group. The current research considers the social psychological bases of social media-based collective action. In three cross-sectional surveys ( N = 304) collected before, on, and after the key action date of 20 April 2012, we consider the nature (opinion based or global) and function (emergent or transforming) of social identity in modern forms of social action. Multigroup structural equation modelling showed that Kony2012 action was best captured by an emergent opinion-based social identity. Moreover, the same factors that predicted Kony2012 action generally also predicted engagement in new repertoires of protest (involving the use of social media) and an observable traditional socio-political action (signing a letter to a government minister). The results suggest that there is no sharp dividing line between traditional and new forms of collective action and that both may be understood as valid expressions of collective selfhood. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although bystanders can play an integral role in the process of social change, relatively few studies have examined the factors that influence bystander collective action. The present research explores the effect of perpetrator power on bystander efficacy and collective action, as well as the moderating role of impact of the injustice event. Across two experiments, bystanders perceived that collective action would be less effective and were less willing to engage in collective action when a high-power perpetrator engaged in injustice, compared with a low-power perpetrator. These effects were moderated by impact of the injustice event, such that the effects of power were especially present under conditions of large impact (many victims), compared with small impact (fewer victims). Whereas the effect of the interaction of perpetrator power and impact on bystander efficacy was explained by perceptions of normativity of the injustice event, the effect of the interaction on bystander collective action was explained by bystander efficacy. Implications for bystander collective action and social change are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite women's increasing representation in elected offices across a range of countries, women remain a minority of elected officials. Although greater gender equality in political leadership may be assumed to promote gender equality in other domains,' the presence of female candidates might ironically facilitate attitudes associated with legitimizing gender inequality. Using experimental methods, we demonstrate that the presence of a female political candidate, relative to a male political candidate, leads to greater beliefs that the sociopolitical system is just (Experiment 1), greater legitimacy of the gender status hierarchy (Experiment 2), and greater implicit preference for stability (Experiment 3). Ironically, within a context in which women are generally underrepresented as political leaders, the increasing presence of women as political candidates might lead' to stronger legitimization of the current sociopolitical system, potentially inhibiting social change. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research investigates how reading stories about past mistreatment of children who had been in institutional care affects support for reparations, perceived difficulty of reparations and group-based guilt were investigated in two experiments. In Study 1 we showed that, when the stories increased in perceived harm, so did the perceived difficulty of making reparations whereas group-based guilt decreased. Furthermore, both perceived difficulty of making reparations and group-based guilt predicted support for reparation. It was suggested that these findings were due to a natural confound between the severity of harm and the difficulty of reparations. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of perceived difficulty that was intended to weaken or strengthen the ability to make reparations. This study demonstrated stronger group-based guilt when reparations were potentially possible and not when they are impossible. Moreover, support for reparations varied as a function of perceived difficulty of reparations and group-based guilt mediated that relationship. The research has two key implications. First, advocates of reparations as a mechanism for reconciliation and community healing need to consider the degree to which reparations are perceived to be possible and consider ways of addressing those perceptions. Second, the research provides an experimental demonstration to the power of stories about experience to bolster support for social change. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigated the relationship between Temporal Collective Relative Deprivation and collective well-being in the context of dramatic social change in Kyrgyzstan. Traditional research has evaluated Temporal Collective Relative Deprivation by comparing a group's present situation to a point in the recent past or future. We argue that a reconceptualization of Temporal Collective Relative Deprivation is needed. We hypothesized, first, that examining several, as opposed to a single, points of comparison will better predict collective well-being. Secondly, we hypothesized that the points of comparison that will best predict collective well-being will not necessarily correspond to the most recent past or future. Third, we hypothesized that the overall trajectory of Temporal Collective Relative Deprivation perceived across time will influence the level of collective well-being. A sample of 565 Kyrgyz participants completed a questionnaire. Hierarchical regressions and group-based trajectory modeling confirmed our three hypotheses. Theoretical and methodological implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three experiments, we manipulated participants' perceived numerical status and compared the originality and creativity of arguments generated by members of numerical minorities and majorities. Independent judges, blind to experimental conditions, rated participants' written arguments. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that participants assigned to a numerical minority generated more original arguments when advocating their own position than did numerical majorities. In Study 3, an equal-factions control group was included in the design, and all participants were instructed to argue for a counter-attitudinal position. Those in the numerical minority generated more creative arguments than those in both the majority and equal-factions conditions, but not stronger arguments. We propose cognitive and social processes that may underlie our obtained effects and discuss implications for minority influence research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The power of individualist and collectivist group norms to influence intergroup and inter-individual differentiation was examined in three studies. Study 1 revealed that intergroup differentiation was lower when group norms prescribed individualism than when they prescribed collectivism. However, inter-individual differentiation was higher when group norms endorsed individualism than when they promoted collectivism. In Studies 2 and 3 we found evidence for the moderating effect of group salience on the relationship between norms and differentiation. Specifically, the effect that individualist group norms reduced intergroup differentiation but enhanced inter-individual differentiation was more pronounced when group salience was high rather than low. This finding demonstrates that conformity to a group norm prescribing individualism influences the manner in which positive differentiation is expressed. The discussion focuses on the caveats of introducing individualist group norms when attempting to reduce intergroup differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twelve hundred Maori and Pakeha (White, European) children in New Zealand ranging from five to twelve years of age, have been tested for intergroup preferences in a series of studies. These investigations spanned the years 1961-1970. and were conducted in four different regions. Previous analysis of these results had concentrated on the ontogeny of ethnic awareness and attitude development, and has not succeeded in relating distinct regional differences to population characteristics such as density or contact rate. The present study re-examines available data, following Tajfel's recent theoretical developments relating social identity to the process of social change. Two judges independently rated the four New Zealand regions in question in terms of perceived status relationships between Maori and Pakeha, ranging from relatively static to relatively fluid. Both resorted to two major variables in the judging: rural versus urban, and year of study. Inter-judge agreement for ratings was total across the four regions. The resulting dimension was conceived as one which could reflect a restructuring of intergroup choices as a consequence of social change. It was found that Maori children have shown a clear shift away from out-group preference as a function of urbanism and of time. While the rural context may have offered a form of security via a more 'classical' Moori identity, the collapse of this system in an urban context reveals Maori/Pakeha social inequity for what it is, particularly in the eyes of older children. This trend has been accelerated in the seventies by a knowledge of minority group assertions elsewhere, particularly in the United Stales There is some evidence of a shift in Fake ha behaviour too. Blatant in-group preference has diminished as a facet of social change, though Pakehas could retrench if a militant pattern appeared in Maori behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1990 1991 Persian Gulf conflict an experiment was conducted with Australian university students (N = 200) to investigate whether the social stereotyping of Americans varied with social contextual manipulations related to the hostilities. The study, conducted in two phases at the start and end of the conflict, examined how the assignment of standard stereotypical traits to Americans was affected (a) by the large-scale social change constituted by the war and (b) by variation in the frame of reference provided by relevant comparison groups. The elicited stereotypes were sensitive to both of these contextual variables, demonstrating significant variation and fluidity. Overall, stereotypes of Americans were relatively negative. They were significantly more negative (a) at the end of the war than at the beginning in the restricted frame (when Australia and Britain were comparison groups) and (b) in the first phase of the conflict when the frame was extended to include Iraq as a comparison group. The findings in line with expectations derived from self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985) that the social categorization of self and other into ingroup and outgroup is inherently variable, comparative and context-dependent. They question the long-held view of stereotypes as fixed, rigid and resistant to change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the experiment reported here, 116 male and female adult subjects allocated the points of Tajfel's matrices so the self an in group (same sex), and an outgroup (opposite sex) member. on the basis of gender stereotypical comparison dimensions. individually or in the presence of an ingroup and two outgroup members. Results show that interindividual and intergroup differentiation are associated with masculine characteristics, but not with feminine ones and that there are differences in the male and female patterns of differentiation. Results are discussed within the framework of social identity theory. A theoretical integration of social stereotypes and social identity is proposed, in order to elucidate the process of intergroup discrimination between gender categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]