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This article aims to present regret, an emotion to which sociologists so far have paid little attention, as having great sociological significance. First, it reviews recent research in social psychology and economics which cast anticipated regret as playing a major role in human decision-making. Second, it suggests a regret-based interpretation of the sunk-cost fallacy. Such an interpretation points to the need of a specifically sociological perspective on regret, calling attention to the cultural and institutional framings of regret-arousing events. The article further argues that secular changes in the types of regret imposed on individuals are paralleled by the spread of various forms of coping with it and that anticipated regret is responsible for both commitment to a chosen life-course and for sudden changes in it. The article ends with discussing the relationship between instrumental and moral regret, as well as the general implications of regret as a phenomenon for sociological understanding of rationality and human action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fil rouge goes through Habermas's decade long research. It is the idea that Reason and rationality permeate human societies and may lead human action towards emancipation, if aptly elaborated through the filter of theoretical reflection. Theory must pick up on this rational core and turn the intrinsic rational potential inherent to modern societies into a self-consciously pursued 'project of enlightenment'. This introduction to the special issue 'Habermas, Democracy, and the Public Sphere: Theory and Practice' shows how Habermas's work in different scientific domains contributes to the construction of the 'project of modernity' from the many angles that such a complex project requires. The public sphere is, in Habermas's theory, the societal domain in which communicative interactions have a chance to make Reason come to bear on human societies and lead them on the path to social and political emancipation. The contributions to this special issue focus therefore on the public sphere and illustrate the evolution of the concept in Habermas's work and its relation to democracy at national and supranational level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution ('change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution ('change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]