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This paper responds in its first sections to a series of articles in which Rainer Schmalz-Bruns developed a concept of legitimate governance beyond the constitutional state, which he called ‘deliberative supranationalism’ and contrasted with what Jürgen Neyer and the present author had suggested under the same title. The Epilogue of the paper first comments on more recent critiques brought forward especially by contributors to this Special Issue of the ELJ and then on the programmatic rejection of comitology by the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance in the EU. Our querelles allemandes were not specifically Teutonic: while Schmalz-Bruns presented his approach as a systematic elaboration of the theories of deliberative democracy, based, in particular, on recent contributions by Joshua Cohen, Michael Dorf, and Charles Sabel, Jürgen Neyer and I had offered an interpretation of institutional innovations and decision-making practices as observed in the European market-building project. This discussion has had precursors and follow-ups in various contexts, among both lawyers and political scientists. This essay should hence be understood as a contribution to an ongoing debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word 'governance' has become an increasingly central policy motif in the European Union and elsewhere yet its meanings are ambiguous and often poorly understood. This article examines the genealogy of that concept focusing in particular on the European Commission's claim to have developed a new, more open and progressive model of 'European governance'. The paper is set out in four steps. The first analyses the European Commission's claims for 'governance' as a concept integral to its new vision for Europe. The second interrogates some of the conflicting definitions and meanings inherent in the term and examines the highly selective paradigm of governance that has been developed in official Commission discourse. The third addresses two specific areas where the Commission's governance model has been applied: the Green paper on The Future of Parliamentary Democracy and the Open Method of Coordination. The fourth turns to analyse these findings using critical social theory. I conclude that far from laying the grounds for a more inclusive, participatory and democratic political order, the Commission's model to governance represents a form of neoliberal governmentality that is actually undermining democratic government and promoting a politics of exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on Habermas's notion of cosmopolitan democracy. Reconfiguring the basic ideas of democracy in postnational terms is inevitable if social and political integration is to succeed on a supranational level. In exploring Habermas's ideas, we draw on Rancière, whose thought stands in a complex relationship to Habermas. On the one hand, Rancière largely shares Habermas's diagnosis of the present. Both bemoan the erosion of the political caused by post‐democracy and censure the rise of right‐wing extremism in Western societies. On the other hand, and in contrast to Habermas, Rancière holds that these problems should be addressed not primarily by strengthening political institutions and reaching a consensus between conflicting parties, but by rethinking conflict and resistance. We show that Habermas's and Rancière's propositions can be productively brought in dialogue by focusing on the paradigmatic types of political subjectivity involved in their accounts: the citizen (Habermas) and the plebeian (Rancière). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: By virtue of conceptual abstraction, the notion of nationality plays a pivotal role in liberal democracies, governing distinctions in the allocation of 'absolute' and 'relative' rights, and determining that while national citizens, as full member of a sovereign political community, enjoy both human and political/social rights, resident aliens are excluded from the scope of these latter, community-related, rights. Further, The European Convention upon Human Rights appears to countenance this dichotomy, allowing sovereign states to restrict the political activity of aliens. This paper nonetheless argues that such a distinction undermines the democratic imperative upon which liberal constitutional states are founded. A 'social integration thesis,' holding that individuals should enjoy, as a fundamental right, the possibility fully to develop their personalities though establishing and pursuing secure social contacts, as well as interpreting those contacts in the light of prevailing cultural perceptions, not only raises the right of stable residence to one of most fundamental attaching to the human condition, but also indicates that political rights--a mere extension of self-expression and self-fulfilment within civil society--should be recast as a universal entitlement. Article Three of the First Protocol ECHR may be construed in line with the social integration thesis, and consequently, in the matter of the definition of the members of the national community, the political sovereignty of the Nation State must be limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions pertaining to advancing strategic policies and democracy in the EU cannot afford to disregard a fundamental institutional dilemma of the EU's political system, the conflict between intense interdependence and power sharing in a multilevel polity for one, and autonomy of governments as a condition for democratic legitimacy of power for another. Conceiving the EU as a federal democracy draws attention to this dilemma. This concept suggests democracy‐preserving modes of governance instead of coercive coordination (policy adjustment to competition in the common market, joint decision‐making among governments, central regulation by law and court decisions), which so far predominate in most relevant policy fields. It also calls for procedures to cope with issues of distributive justice stemming from territorial disparities in resources and burdens. The article conceptualises these challenges and outlines feasible steps to advance federal democracy in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution assesses representation in the EU through the lens of demoicracy, focusing on how the demos and the demoi are represented and how this interacts with the executive‐legislative balance and party politics. As the Belgian polity is a living case for the EU but often as flawed as the latter when it comes to democratic standards of representation, we examine whether and how reform proposals for the Belgian polity can inspire future reforms at EU level. We demonstrate that the direction demoicracies should head for when strengthening democratic representation should include a balanced representation of the demos and demoi via a bicameral system, a polity‐wide constituency to represent the demos, involvement of the legislatives of the constituent units at the encompassing level, and a specific role for polity‐wide parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reaction to 11 September damaged the liberty of those living in Europe who found themselves targeted as suspect terrorists while seeming to do little to ensure the security of the wider community. More recently a second emergency, rooted this time in the financial and economic collapse of 2008 onwards, has caused a further unravelling of Europe's constitutional project, even threatening the gains of past generations of European idealists. In today's Europe universal liberty and security have no meaning for many even if their shape is retained in structures that in truth mock rather than deliver democracy and human rights. This article traces the origins of the crises that have afflicted so directly the breadth of liberty and human security in the Union, demonstrating their roots in 'viruses' that have been present from the start of the European movement but which have now spiralled out of control. The essay ends by asking what can be done to prevent the full decline of the region into a state of neo-democratic/post-democratic unfreedom, one in which capital unbound from democracy thrives at the expense of the people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a social-market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re-foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can the process of European unification lead to a form of democracy that is at once supranational and situated above the organisational level of a state? The supranational federation should be constructed in such a way that the heterarchical relationship between the Member States and the federation remains intact. The author finds the basis for such an order in the idea of the EU constituted by a 'doubled' sovereign-the European citizens and the European peoples (the States). In order to sustain such an order, reforms of the existing European treaties are needed. It is necessary to eliminate the legitimation deficits of the EU in a future Euro- Union-that is, a more closely integrated core Europe. The European Parliament would have to gain the right to take legislative initiatives, and the so-called 'ordinary legislative procedure', which requires the approval of both chambers, would have to be extended to all policy fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current crisis in Europe recalls the theory and practice of authoritarian liberalism, the idea that in order to protect economic liberalism and respect for fiscal discipline, representative democracy must be curtailed. This configuration was first identified by Hermann Heller in late Weimar as a response to the imperative to maintain the ideological separation of state and economy and presented by Karl Polanyi as conditioned by broader geo-political pressure to maintain the gold standard in the inter-war period. Authoritarian liberalism is now conditioned by conflicting imperatives to maintain the project of the single currency, respect ordo-liberal concerns of moral hazard, and protect 'militant democracy' but only in one country. Does this reflect a broader geo-political disequilibrium, due to tensions between market integration, constitutionalism and democracy? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that the EU suffers from serious accountability deficits. But how can we establish the existence of accountability deficits? This article tries to get to grips with the appealing but elusive concept of accountability by asking three types of questions. First a conceptual one: what exactly is meant by accountability? In this article the concept of accountability is used in a rather narrow sense: a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. The second question is analytical: what types of accountability are involved? A series of dimensions of accountability are discerned that can be used to describe the various accountability relations and arrangements that can be found in the different domains of European governance. The third question is evaluative: how should we assess these accountability arrangements? The article provides three evaluative perspectives: a democratic, a constitutional and a learning perspective. Each of these perspectives may produce different types of accountability deficits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possible existence of a European democracy does not depend on the prerequisite of a homogeneous public sphere but on the understanding of the relationship between the normative basis of a European democracy—here a social contract—the structure of the European public sphere and the corresponding institutions. The normative concept of democracy as expressed in social contract theory is neither bound to the city-state nor the nation-state, but can be transferred to the European level. To realise the normative aims of the social contract the democratic institutions have to be—and were in the city—and the nation state—adapted to the structure of the respective public sphere. Two institutional characteristics of the democratic European polity could correspond to the heterogeneous European public sphere: (1) a cooperation of institutions with clearly separated and limited competences—contrary to the ideal-type sovereign institutions with broad competences in the nation-state, and (2) the policy field-oriented structure—contrary to the more uniform and functional structure of democratic institutions in the nation states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the impact of integration in Europe on its constitutionalism. Views on its problems on democracy; Relations between its democracy and its constitutionalism; Conclusion.

Examines the statehood aspects of the European Union (EU). Discussion on the treaty which created EU; Interplay of democracy and the rule of law; Factors which hinder the political integration of the member countries of EU; Survey on the statehood of federal countries; Exploration on the basic law which defines the institutional limits of EU.

Abstract: Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe's `democratic deficit' is democratically justified. The expression `democratic deficit,' however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the `regulatory model' of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, nonmajoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]