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This paper explores the conceptualization and interpretation of ‘European solidarity’ by the French President François Mitterrand. It discusses the relevance of former concepts of foreign and European policy. It differentiates between a European idea and European institutions, also taking into account personal experiences. Finally, it analyses the correlation between different concepts such as ‘European solidarity’, ‘transatlantic solidarity’, ‘West European solidarity’ and ‘pan-European solidarity’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper addresses the impact of the Rhine Crisis of 1840 on Italian countries and explains the role they played in the European State System when the Continent seemed to be on the eve of a general war. As the paper attempts to prove, the crisis seriously alarmed the ruling classes as well as the general public and revealed the internal problems of the Italian countries as well as their deep distrust towards the egotistic and self-serving policies of the Great Powers. The paper therefore introduces the history of Italy during late 1840 within the wider context of European diplomatic history and serves as a probe into the history of the European State System during the Pre-March period in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Durant la Première Guerre Mondiale, la presse parisienne de l'arrière évoque abondamment le génocide des Arméniens, tant pour dénoncer les massacres que pour alimenter un discours propagandiste visant à la mobilisation de guerre de la société civile. Les journaux voient en l'Allemagne l'instigatrice du génocide, plaçant la souffrance arménienne dans la continuité des exactions commises à l'encontre des Belges. Certains journaux parisiens se servent également du génocide des Arméniens pour opposer musulmans et chrétiens dans un discours aux accents de guerre de religion tandis que la presse de droite fait occasionnellement preuve de xénophobie à l'encontre des réfugiés et des victimes. La situation s'inverse même à la fin du conflit; le génocide des Arméniens étant dénoncé comme « bourrage de crâne » dans le but de promouvoir le rapprochement Franco-Turc. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyses French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, a country created after the First World War as a result of the Franco-Serbian military alliance during the war. Cultural diplomacy is examined as part of broader French political and economical action in Eastern Europe to organise the small newly created countries into the French field of interest and oppose Germany. French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS had two aspects: the symbolical and the concrete. Its aim was to spread positive feelings towards France in the ex-Austria-Hungarian regions of the Kingdom, where France was unknown or seen as an enemy, and to maintain the pro-French attitude of the majority of Serbs. The aim was to contribute to the 'internal equalisation and strengthening' of the new ethnically and religiously heterogeneous country, by using culture as a 'soft power'. French cultural diplomacy in the Kingdom of SCS is analysed in its local, regional and European context and in a short- and long-term perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

L'échec du projet britannique de pacte tripartite franco–anglo–soviétique révèle quelques traits majeurs des relations entre la France et le Royaume-Uni au XXème siècle. Le premier est l'existence de divergences qui concernent davantage l'accessoire que l'essentiel. Si les deux pays sont d'accord pour considérer qu'une alliance entre Paris, Londres et Moscou est essentielle à l'équilibre européen, ils divergent sur la forme à lui donner, les Français préférant un système de pactes bilatéraux à la formule tripartite proposée par les Britanniques. En outre cet épisode se caractérise par une absence de consultation entre les deux diplomaties. Les incidents qui en découlent pourraient prêter à sourire s'ils n'étaient pas le signe d'un climat de suspicion réciproque. Celui-ci est d'ailleurs plus marqué à Paris qu'à Londres. Tous ces éléments participent aux difficiles relations franco–britanniques et expliquent qu'il ait fallu attendre le 4 mars 1947 pour voir l'alliance franco–britannique se matérialiser par le traité de Dunkerque. Abstract: The failure of the British project of a tripartite pact between France, Britain and the USSR exemplifies some of the main features of the Franco–British relationship in the twentieth century. The first is the existence of divergences, which concern more incidental details than essential matters. If the two countries agreed to consider that an alliance between Paris, London and Moscow was essential for European balance, they differed on the form it should take. The French preferred a bilateral pact system to the tripartite pact formula proposed by the British. Moreover, this episode was distinguished by an absence of consultation between the two diplomacies. The incidents that followed could be risible if there were not signs of a climate of mutual suspicion which was, incidentally, more distinct in Paris than in London. All these elements contributed to the difficult Franco–British relationship and explain why one had to wait until 4 March 1947 to see a Franco–British alliance realized by the Dunkirk Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]