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This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU). It examines what constitutes a democratic deficit, analyzes whether there is one in the EU, and offers suggestions for a solution. I focus on the output of the legislative process and study whether policies deviate from those emerging in other political systems. In particular, I present a formal model of policy-making in a bicameral system, apply it to the EU, and compare the EU with the United States. I conclude that the institutional setup of the EU does not lead to policies that are fundamentally undemocratic, and that the composition of its institutions is not inherently less democratic than that of the US political institutions. I also find, however, that a democratic deficit may exist owing to a lack of transparency and an excess of delegation in the legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does income inequality increase political backlash against European and global integration? This paper reports research suggesting that it can. The article analyses party opposition to and support for trade openness, European Union integration and general internationalism of political party platforms in advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. It finds that inequality tends to increase anti-globalization positions of parties, net of pro-globalization positions, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or levels of actual globalization. This effect, however, does depend on, and is diminished by, generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify socio-economic conditions underlying the backlash against political and economic globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the issue of labeling in political competition within the sphere of the evolving political dimensionality in Europe. Topics include the separation of actor positioning in political science from traditional sociological roots and towards strategic competition and issue voting, a discussion of the influence of a priori and a posteriori methods in evaluation of political issues and their associations with top-down versus bottom-up strategies, and the role of European integration issues in political dimensionality within the European Parliament

This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments' preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries' financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Parliament elections create structural advantages for challenger parties. Building on the second-order elections theory, this article argues that European Parliament elections foster challenger parties' success on the national level by increasing their visibility and offering an opportunity structure for domestic politicisation of Europe. I test this proposition by exploiting the quasi-exogenous timing of European Parliament elections and the variation in national electoral cycles since 1979. A country-fixed effects model and two placebo-tests show that populist radical right parties gain momentum in the supranational contest, particularly when coinciding campaigns increase the domestic salience of Europe. Considering their antagonism to an integrative Europe, it seems ironic that the European Parliament elections foster the ascendency of just these opponents of the European idea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do parties respond to voters’ preferences on European integration in elections to the European Parliament? In this article, we argue that political parties do respond to voters’ Euroskeptic attitudes, but that party type conditions responsiveness. In particular, we posit that larger parties are more responsive and that governing parties are less responsive to aggregate Euroskepticism. To test our theoretical expectations, we use data from the Euromanifestos Project and European Election Study from 1989 to 2009 for 252 parties across 26 European Union Member States. Our findings have important implications for understanding democratic representation in the European Union and the second-order nature of elections to the European Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How is euroscepticism related to left–right ideology in Western European public opinion? We argue that inconsistent findings on this relationship result from the changing nature of European integration over time. Initially, EU market integration mainly sparked left-wing opposition; after Maastricht the intensification of political integration additionally produced nationalist euroscepticism among the political right. Hence, we hypothesize that the relationship between citizens’ left–right ideology and euroscepticism evolved from linear to U-shaped. We test this hypothesis by means of multilevel logistic regression on 74 waves of the Eurobarometer (1973–2010) in 12 EU member states. The results demonstrate an increase of right-wing euroscepticism across countries, whereas the developments on the left are mixed. In the concluding section, we discuss the theoretical and political implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Against democratic deficits of European Union (EU) governance, recent literature emphasizes the communicative function of national parliaments. Yet, arguments from the broader EU politicization literature have been only rarely applied to public parliamentary debates. This article integrates arguments about supranational authority and partisan competition as key drivers of debates on the EU and tests respective implications by an automated text analysis that retrieves EU references in all 1,393 plenary debates of the German Bundestag during 1991–2013. A panel analysis identifies authority transfers as the strongest predictor for EU salience in the plenary. EU references furthermore increase with supranational policy output, public EU visibility, and a differentiating public opinion. With regard to partisan emphasis, mainstream and particularly governing parties push European issues in the German Bundestag. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The relationship between public opinion and public policy provides a potential criterion for assessing the democratic quality of the European Union. The few existing time series analyses in this area assume that there exists a European-wide public mood towards integration. Analyzing West-European series of public opinion from 1974 to 2011, this article finds considerable support for this assumption. However, the analysis also points towards a ‘periphery-trend’, driven by the UK, Ireland and Denmark, in contrast to a ‘core-trend’, driven by the founders of the European Economic Community (EEC). The analysis further shows that both opinion trends are cointegrated with public policy in this area: European integration appears to be significantly influenced, or constrained, by public opinion both in the core and periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

European integration has grown increasingly differentiated. EU member countries now integrate at different speeds and frequently resort to opt-out clauses, while occasionally voicing deep discontent with the direction of the integration process. Nevertheless, European integration essentially remains a single-track enterprise, whereby member countries move in the same direction under the same set of EU institutions. Offering a novel perspective on EU integration, we argue that the real puzzle is not why integration has become differentiated but rather why it has not become more differentiated. Using a simple formal model to illustrate and deepen our argument, we throw new light on the bewildering coexistence of unity, discontent, and differentiation in the European project. We show that a twin-track Europe would likely leave more EU members discontented. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the extent to which economic ideology affects people's support for European Union integration and how this is conditioned by economic context. We argue that people on the economic left who live in a country with conditions of high income inequality and little state ownership will support European integration, because more integration would move public policy in a left-wing direction. By contrast, people on the left who live in a country with conditions of low income inequality and widespread public ownership are likely to be eurosceptic, as further integration would result in a more right-wing public policy. We empirically confirm our hypotheses and discuss the implications for European Union democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although talk of a ‘Europe of the regions’ has come and gone, regions have come to Brussels but stayed. While such mobilisation has not led to the emergence of a ‘third level’, regional officials in Brussels sometimes outnumber their peers from their country’s permanent representation. Considering the perseverance and size of such a presence, we explore what factors best account for it. To this end, a series of multi-level models inform us about its determinants. Controlling for a number of economic and demographic factors, we find that different dimensions of regional authority matter when accounting for regional presence in Brussels. These findings stress the importance of domestic institutional factors when analysing the extent to which regions project themselves supranationally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How can we explain the decline in support for the European Union (EU) and the idea of European integration after the onset of the great recession in the fall of 2007? Did the economic crisis and the austerity policies that the EU imposed—in tandem with the IMF—on several member countries help cause this drop? While there is some evidence for this direct effect of EU policies, we find that the most significant determinant of trust and support for the EU remains the level of trust in national governments. Based on cue theory and using concepts of diffuse and specific support, we find that support for the EU is derived from evaluations of national politics and policy, which Europeans know far better than the remote political system of the EU. This effect, however, is somewhat muted for those sophisticated Europeans that are more knowledgeable about the EU and are able to form opinions about it independently of the national contexts in which they live. We also find that the recent economic crisis has led to a discernible increase in the number of those who are disillusioned with politics both at the national and the supranational level. We analyze 133 national surveys from 27 EU countries by estimating a series of cross-classified multilevel logistic regression models. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study examines the relationship between educational attainment and euroscepticism from 1973 to 2010. Existing research has shown that, driven by utilitarian considerations, political cues and questions of collective identity, education and euroscepticism are negatively related. However, as the process of European unification has progressed, all three factors have become more salient, so we expect an increasing effect of education on euroscepticism over time. Using 81 waves of the Eurobarometer survey in 12 European Union (EU) member states, our results show that the impact of education on euroscepticism has indeed increased, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses to what extent and why national parliaments have created oversight institutions to adapt to European integration. Employing data from 22 member states from 1984–2006, the analysis suggests that government-supporting parliamentary groups create oversight institutions to enhance policy participation as integration becomes more important. Moreover, parliamentarians improve their access to information about government policy if governing parties are internally divided over European integration. Finally, oversight institutions that constrain the government’s discretion to act in European Union affairs exist in Eurosceptic countries, where they help parliamentarians to enhance electoral security. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the US context, research on ambivalence has established that individuals often simultaneously possess positive and negative considerations on a political object. Yet little is known about ambivalence in support for European integration. This article proposes a measure that distinguishes ambivalence from indifference in attitudes towards the European Union (EU). Using data from Eurobarometer wave 63.4 and the Chapel Hill expert survey I find that the causal logics of ambivalence and indifference are sharply different. Multinomial regression analysis reveals that levels of ambivalence towards the EU increase with political sophistication. Also, citizens are more ambivalent, less indifferent, and less positive about the EU when elite division on European integration is more pronounced. Finally, trust in EU institutions and attachment to Europe decrease indifference and ambivalence about the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the importance of the issue of European integration on the study of political science within the European Union and dimensionality research. Topics include difficulties in the placement of moderate integrationist parties within a continuous European integration dimension, the differences between measurement approaches used to determine political party positions on integration, and an explanation of how EU integration position data becomes significantly less reliable from expert surveys, voter surveys, and European Parliament (EP) roll call votes when analyzed at limited sub-ranges.

Theories of issue evolution and issue manipulation suggest that ‘political losers’ in the party system can advance their position by introducing a new issue dimension. According to these theories, a strategy of issue entrepreneurship, that is the attempt to restructure political competition by mobilizing a previously non-salient issue dimension, allows political losers to attract new voters and reap electoral gains. In this study, we examine the extent to which these expectations hold by exploring issue entrepreneurial strategies of political parties when applied to the issue of European integration. Using multi-level modelling to analyse European Election Study data, we first show that voters are more likely to cast their ballot for parties that are losers on the extant dimension based on concerns related to European integration. Secondly, a time-series cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that parties that employ an issue entrepreneurial strategy are more successful electorally. Put differently, voters are responsive to the issue entrepreneurial strategies of parties. These findings have important implications for our understanding of party competition and electoral behaviour in multi-party systems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study develops and tests arguments about how political parties' electoral fortunes in national elections are influenced by voters' preferences regarding the European Union (EU). To date, there is increasing evidence demonstrating the impact of EU issues on vote choice in national elections — a process commonly referred to as EU issue voting. Yet little is known about which parties actually gain or lose as a result of EU issue voting. Using a two-step hierarchical estimation procedure, I first estimate an individual-level model of vote choice estimating the impact of EU preferences for individual parties. The first stage of the analysis reveals that the extent of EU issue voting varies substantially among political parties. In the second stage, I utilize party characteristics to account for this variation across parties by using an estimated dependent variable model. The analysis demonstrates that the inter-party variation in EU issue voting is largely a function of two factors: parties' intrinsic positioning regarding the EU and strategic considerations. The empirical analysis employs data from UK, Danish, Dutch and German elections between 1992 and 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the EU member states? Are some member states' lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of EU lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and well-resourced groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article outlines the fiscal policies of the Post European Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. It reveals the EMU gives an exceptional opportunity for social scientists to learn the process of institutional change. The public sector in European Union countries consumes or disposes half of the gross domestic product (GDP), eventhough most of the government resources are devoted to the provision of traditional public goods, redistributive transfers and social insurance programs account for much share of the growth in size of the public sector over the past century. Discussed are the details of the issue.

The construction of a monetary union with a single currency in Europe raises serious concerns for those who understand the democratic process as one in which social groups compete on different ideological programs. This is because it increasingly constrains national governments of different partisan hues to follow similar fiscal and monetary policies. Recent empirical studies indicate that these concerns might be somewhat misplaced since there is evidence that partisan convergence on macroeconomic policy predates these institutional developments. One problem with these studies, though, is that they fail to include the electoral system as a constraint on partisan behavior. Since electoral systems generate centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, we should expect to find strong evidence for partisan differences only where electoral rules encourage dispersion. We test this argument using data on fiscal policy from European Union countries between 1981 and 1992. We find that there is still no systematic evidence for partisan differences. Given this, it is hard to see how EMU can add to the democratic deficit in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article outlines the fiscal policies of the European Union. It reveals that the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam deepened the federation on issues pertaining to defense and development and also widened to take in the Austria, Finland and Sweden. Meanwhile, the Treaty of Nice has widened its relations eastward where most East European accession countries join the organization. It mentions that the Treaty of Maastricht laid the groundwork for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and set up the macroeconomic requirements of the member countries that want to join EMU. Discussed are the details of the issue.