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Résumé Le thème de la santé mentale a considérablement élargi le champ d’intervention de la psychiatrie et de la psychologie, en invitant ces disciplines à considérer non seulement la maladie mais, dans l’accomplissement personnel, l’accès au bien-être. Cette vision de la santé a fortement essaimé au cours des années 1960, notamment dans l’antipsychiatrie. Il n’y est donc pas seulement question d’une perspective thérapeutique mais bien d’une véritable philosophie politique et morale dont on peut tenter de retracer les origines et les fondements. À ce titre, l’article, revenant sur les écrits fondateurs de William James, cherche d’abord à montrer combien la notion de santé mentale est indubitablement liée aux principes d’une psychologie du soi. Partant de ce premier éclairage, il entend ensuite indiquer de quelle manière cette pensée a cherché à mêler un parti épistémologique et méthodologique au projet d’une clinique susceptible d’aiguiller le changement social. Psychology and psychiatry have significantly extended their scope of action by addressing the topic of mental health and by focusing, beyond the study of disabilities, on well-being through personal development. This approach was already widely popular in the 1960's, especially in the field of anti-psychiatry. As a result, mental health, as a therapeutic perspective, went on to become a major concern for moral and political philosophy. This paper aims to trace back the origins of this shift and delineate its foundations. To this end, the pioneering work of William James serves as a basis for showing how the notion of mental health relates to the tenets of the psychology of the self. Then, this paper uses this analysis to demonstrate how this approach combined epistemological and methodological principles to support a new clinical project that was supposed to contribute to social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Lacan has left a teaching, mainly in his “seminars”, which is often synthesized, simplified and reduced to a simple explanatory theory, principally regarding psychotic process. Such a simplifying view can become a discriminatory, iatrogenic conception of the psychotic person and of the psychotherapeutic (or psychoanalytical) treatment. In the first part of this paper, the author tries to show that Lacan’s teaching was principally a transmission of the psychoanalysis itself, in different ways, as half-sayings, ambiguity, poetry and style, topology, mathems… Lacan passed himself on as a possibility of analytical opening, like in a cure. He does not generate a rational discourse, but he proposed several different theories as simple “vectors”. In the second part, the author puts some concepts as “Name of Father foreclosure”, “borromean knot” and “object a” into a political (within the psychoanalytical community) and historical context. If those items of Lacan’s teaching are diverted from their primal function of “vectors” and are considered as explanatory theories, then they lose their pertinence and can lead to a stigmatizing conception and to possibly iatrogenic attitudes in the treatment. That will be examined further. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]