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Psychophysiological studies with electroencephalography, focusing on the dynamical aspect of neural correlate of consciousness, reported that visual awareness negativity and P3 enhancement are observed at a latency, 200–300 ms after the visual stimulus onset, when the visual stimulus is consciously perceived. However, access processing to visual awareness (APVA) immediately before conscious perception still remains at the earlier stage of visual sensory processing, though there is little known regarding this subject. The present study hypothesized that visual mismatch negativity (vMMN), which reflects automatic change detection at a latency of 130–250 ms, might be involved in the APVA. In a previous study, vMMN was reported to be evoked by the deviant stimulus that is not consciously perceived in binocular rivalry. To clarify whether the visual change detection affects APVA, we conducted a modified experiment of oddball paradigm on binocular rivalry. The results showed a significant correlation between enhancement of vMMN amplitude and facilitation of perceptual alternation when the unconscious deviant was presented. This implies that vMMN is relevant to the APVA, which is a novel role of vMMN. In early visual processing, the attentional mechanism associated with vMMN is suggested to play an important role in unconscious neural processing at an earlier stage of visual awareness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychophysiological studies with electroencephalography, focusing on the dynamical aspect of neural correlate of consciousness, reported that visual awareness negativity and P3 enhancement are observed at a latency, 200–300 ms after the visual stimulus onset, when the visual stimulus is consciously perceived. However, access processing to visual awareness (APVA) immediately before conscious perception still remains at the earlier stage of visual sensory processing, though there is little known regarding this subject. The present study hypothesized that visual mismatch negativity (vMMN), which reflects automatic change detection at a latency of 130–250 ms, might be involved in the APVA. In a previous study, vMMN was reported to be evoked by the deviant stimulus that is not consciously perceived in binocular rivalry. To clarify whether the visual change detection affects APVA, we conducted a modified experiment of oddball paradigm on binocular rivalry. The results showed a significant correlation between enhancement of vMMN amplitude and facilitation of perceptual alternation when the unconscious deviant was presented. This implies that vMMN is relevant to the APVA, which is a novel role of vMMN. In early visual processing, the attentional mechanism associated with vMMN is suggested to play an important role in unconscious neural processing at an earlier stage of visual awareness.

Syntactic processing has often been considered an utmost example of unconscious automatic processing. In this line, it has been demonstrated that masked words containing syntactic anomalies are processed by our brain triggering event related potential (ERP) components similar to the ones triggered by conscious syntactic anomalies, thus supporting the automatic nature of the syntactic processing. Conversely, recent evidence also points out that regardless of the level of awareness, emotional information and other relevant extralinguistic information modulate conscious syntactic processing too. These results are also in line with suggestions that, under certain circumstances, syntactic processing could also be flexible and context-dependent. However, the study of the concomitant automatic but flexible conception of syntactic parsing is very scarce. Hence, to this aim, we examined whether and how masked emotional words (positive, negative, and neutral masked adjectives) containing morphosyntactic anomalies (half of the cases) affect linguistic comprehension of an ongoing unmasked sentence that also can contain a number agreement anomaly between the noun and the verb. ERP components were observed to emotional information (EPN), masked anomalies (LAN and a weak P600), and unmasked ones (LAN/N400 and P600). Furthermore, interactions in the processing of conscious and unconscious morphosyntactic anomalies and between unconscious emotional information and conscious anomalies were detected. The findings support, on the one hand, the automatic nature of syntax, given that syntactic components LAN and P600 were observed to unconscious anomalies. On the other hand, the flexible, permeable, and context-dependent nature of the syntactic processing is also supported, since unconscious information modulated conscious syntactic components. This double nature of syntactic processing is in line with theories of automaticity, suggesting that even unconscious/automatic, syntactic processing is flexible, adaptable, and context-dependent.

Syntactic processing has often been considered an utmost example of unconscious automatic processing. In this line, it has been demonstrated that masked words containing syntactic anomalies are processed by our brain triggering event related potential (ERP) components similar to the ones triggered by conscious syntactic anomalies, thus supporting the automatic nature of the syntactic processing. Conversely, recent evidence also points out that regardless of the level of awareness, emotional information and other relevant extralinguistic information modulate conscious syntactic processing too. These results are also in line with suggestions that, under certain circumstances, syntactic processing could also be flexible and context-dependent. However, the study of the concomitant automatic but flexible conception of syntactic parsing is very scarce. Hence, to this aim, we examined whether and how masked emotional words (positive, negative, and neutral masked adjectives) containing morphosyntactic anomalies (half of the cases) affect linguistic comprehension of an ongoing unmasked sentence that also can contain a number agreement anomaly between the noun and the verb. ERP components were observed to emotional information (EPN), masked anomalies (LAN and a weak P600), and unmasked ones (LAN/N400 and P600). Furthermore, interactions in the processing of conscious and unconscious morphosyntactic anomalies and between unconscious emotional information and conscious anomalies were detected. The findings support, on the one hand, the automatic nature of syntax, given that syntactic components LAN and P600 were observed to unconscious anomalies. On the other hand, the flexible, permeable, and context-dependent nature of the syntactic processing is also supported, since unconscious information modulated conscious syntactic components. This double nature of syntactic processing is in line with theories of automaticity, suggesting that even unconscious/automatic, syntactic processing is flexible, adaptable, and context-dependent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on – or at least goes hand in hand with – conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the “windows of integration” (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on – or at least goes hand in hand with – conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies demonstrate that syntactic processing can be affected by emotional information and that subliminal emotional information can also affect cognitive processes. In this study, we explore whether unconscious emotional information may also impact syntactic processing. In an Event-Related brain Potential (ERP) study, positive, neutral and negative subliminal adjectives were inserted within neutral sentences, just before the presentation of the supraliminal adjective. They could either be correct (50%) or contain a morphosyntactic violation (number or gender disagreements). Larger error rates were observed for incorrect sentences than for correct ones, in contrast to most studies using supraliminal information. Strikingly, emotional adjectives affected the conscious syntactic processing of sentences containing morphosyntactic anomalies. The neutral condition elicited left anterior negativity (LAN) followed by a P600 component. However, a lack of anterior negativity and an early P600 onset for the negative condition were found, probably as a result of the negative subliminal correct adjective capturing early syntactic resources. Positive masked adjectives in turn prompted an N400 component in response to morphosyntactic violations, probably reflecting the induction of a heuristic processing mode involving access to lexico-semantic information to solve agreement anomalies. Our results add to recent evidence on the impact of emotional information on syntactic processing, while showing that this can occur even when the reader is unaware of the emotional stimuli.

Recent studies demonstrate that syntactic processing can be affected by emotional information and that subliminal emotional information can also affect cognitive processes. In this study, we explore whether unconscious emotional information may also impact syntactic processing. In an Event-Related brain Potential (ERP) study, positive, neutral and negative subliminal adjectives were inserted within neutral sentences, just before the presentation of the supraliminal adjective. They could either be correct (50%) or contain a morphosyntactic violation (number or gender disagreements). Larger error rates were observed for incorrect sentences than for correct ones, in contrast to most studies using supraliminal information. Strikingly, emotional adjectives affected the conscious syntactic processing of sentences containing morphosyntactic anomalies. The neutral condition elicited left anterior negativity (LAN) followed by a P600 component. However, a lack of anterior negativity and an early P600 onset for the negative condition were found, probably as a result of the negative subliminal correct adjective capturing early syntactic resources. Positive masked adjectives in turn prompted an N400 component in response to morphosyntactic violations, probably reflecting the induction of a heuristic processing mode involving access to lexicosemantic information to solve agreement anomalies. Our results add to recent evidence on the impact of emotional information on syntactic processing, while showing that this can occur even when the reader is unaware of the emotional stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People generally have imperfect introspective access to the mechanisms underlying their political beliefs, yet can confidently communicate the reasoning that goes into their decision making process. An innate desire for certainty and security in ones beliefs may play an important and somewhat automatic role in motivating the maintenance or rejection of partisan support. The aim of the current study was to clarify the role of the DLPFC in the alteration of political beliefs. Recent neuroimaging studies have focused on the association between the DLPFC (a region involved in the regulation of cognitive conflict and error feedback processing) and reduced affiliation with opposing political candidates. As such, this study used a method of non- invasive brain simulation (tRNS) to enhance activity of the bilateral DLPFC during the incorporation of political campaign information. These findings indicate a crucial role for this region in political belief formation. However, enhanced activation of DLPFC does not necessarily result in the specific rejection of political beliefs. In contrast to the hypothesis the results appear to indicate a significant increase in conservative values regardless of participant’s initial political orientation and the political campaign advertisement they were exposed to.

People generally have imperfect introspective access to the mechanisms underlying their political beliefs, yet can confidently communicate the reasoning that goes into their decision making process. An innate desire for certainty and security in ones beliefs may play an important and somewhat automatic role in motivating the maintenance or rejection of partisan support. The aim of the current study was to clarify the role of the DLPFC in the alteration of political beliefs. Recent neuroimaging studies have focused on the association between the DLPFC (a region involved in the regulation of cognitive conflict and error feedback processing) and reduced affiliation with opposing political candidates. As such, this study used a method of non-invasive brain simulation (tRNS) to enhance activity of the bilateral DLPFC during the incorporation of political campaign information. These findings indicate a crucial role for this region in political belief formation. However, enhanced activation of DLPFC does not necessarily result in the specific rejection of political beliefs. In contrast to the hypothesis the results appear to indicate a significant increase in conservative values regardless of participant's initial political orientation and the political campaign advertisement they were exposed to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most common method for assessing similarities and differences between conscious and unconscious processing is to compare the effects of unconscious (perceptually weak) stimuli, with conscious (perceptually strong) stimuli. Awareness of these stimuli is then assessed by objective performance on prime identification tasks. While this approach has proven extremely fruitful in furthering our understanding of unconscious cognition, it also suffers from some critical problems. We present an alternative methodology for comparing conscious and unconscious cognition. We used a priming version of a Stroop paradigm and after each trial, participants gave a subjective rating of the degree to which they were aware of the prime. Based on this trial-by-trial awareness assessment, conscious, uncertain and unconscious trials were separated. Crucially, in all these conditions, the primes have identical perceptual strength. Significant priming was observed for all conditions, but the effects for conscious trials were significantly stronger, and no difference was observed between uncertain and unconscious trials. Thus, awareness of the prime has a large impact on congruency effects, even when signal strength is controlled for.

We investigated whether visual orientation anisotropies (known as oblique effect) exist in non-attended visual changes using event-related potentials (ERP). We recorded visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) which signals violation of sequential regularities. In the visual periphery unattended, task-irrelevant Gábor patches were displayed in an oddball sequence while subjects performed a tracking task in the central field. A moderate change (50°) in the orientation of stimuli revealed no consistent change-related components. However we found orientation-related differences around 170 ms in occipito-temporal areas in the amplitude of the ERPs evoked by standard stimuli. In a supplementary experiment we determined the amount of orientation difference that is needed for change detection in an active, attended paradigm. Results exhibited the classical oblique effect; subjects detected 10° deviations from cardinal directions, while threshold from oblique directions was 17°. These results provide evidence that perception of change could be accomplished at significantly smaller thresholds, than what elicits vMMN. In Experiment2 we increased the orientation change to 90°. Deviant-minus-standard difference was negative in occipito-parietal areas, between 120-200 ms after stimulus onset. VMMNs to changes from cardinal angles were larger and more sustained than vMMNs evoked by changes from oblique angles. Changes from cardinal orientations represent a more detectable signal for the automatic change detection system than changes from oblique angles, thus increased vMMN to these larger deviances might be considered a variant of the magnitude of deviance effect rarely observed in vMMN studies.

The most common method for assessing similarities and differences between conscious and unconscious processing is to compare the effects of unconscious (perceptually weak) stimuli, with conscious (perceptually strong) stimuli. Awareness of these stimuli is then assessed by objective performance on prime identification tasks. While this approach has proven extremely fruitful in furthering our understanding of unconscious cognition, it also suffers from some critical problems. We present an alternative methodology for comparing conscious and unconscious cognition. We used a priming version of a Stroop paradigm and after each trial, participants gave a subjective rating of the degree to which they were aware of the prime. Based on this trial-by-trial awareness assessment, conscious, uncertain, and unconscious trials were separated. Crucially, in all these conditions, the primes have identical perceptual strength. Significant priming was observed for all conditions, but the effects for conscious trials were significantly stronger, and no difference was observed between uncertain and unconscious trials. Thus, awareness of the prime has a large impact on congruency effects, even when signal strength is controlled for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, it has been thought that under interocular suppression high-level visual processing is strongly inhibited if not abolished. With the development of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a variant of binocular rivalry, this notion has now been challenged by a number of reports showing that even high-level aspects of visual stimuli, such as familiarity, affect the time stimuli need to overcome CFS and emerge into awareness. In this breaking CFS (b-CFS) paradigm, differential unconscious processing during suppression is inferred when (a) speeded detection responses to initially invisible stimuli differ, and (b) no comparable differences are found in non-rivalrous control conditions supposed to measure general threshold differences between stimuli. To critically evaluate these assumptions was the aim of the present study. In six experiments we compared the time upright and inverted faces needed to be detected. We found that not only under CFS, but also in control conditions upright faces were detected faster and more accurately than inverted faces, although the effect was larger during CFS. However, reaction time (RT) distributions indicated critical differences between the CFS and the control condition. When RT distributions were matched, similar effect sizes were obtained in both conditions. Moreover, subjective ratings revealed that CFS and control conditions are not perceptually comparable. These findings cast doubt on the usefulness of non-rivalrous control conditions to rule out mere detection threshold differences as a cause of shorter detection latencies during CFS. In conclusion, we acknowledge that the b-CFS paradigm can be fruitfully applied as a highly sensitive device to probe differences between stimuli in their potency to gain access to awareness. However, our current findings suggest that such differences can not unequivocally be attributed to differential unconscious processing under interocular suppression.

We investigated whether visual orientation anisotropies (known as oblique effect) exist in non-attended visual changes using event-related potentials (ERP). We recorded visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) which signals violation of sequential regularities. In the visual periphery unattended, task-irrelevant Gábor patches were displayed in an oddball sequence while subjects performed a tracking task in the central field. A moderate change (50°) in the orientation of stimuli revealed no consistent change-related components. However, we found orientation-related differences around 170ms in occipito-temporal areas in the amplitude of the ERPs evoked by standard stimuli. In a supplementary experiment we determined the amount of orientation difference that is needed for change detection in an active, attended paradigm. Results exhibited the classical oblique effect; subjects detected 10° deviations from cardinal directions, while threshold from oblique directions was 17°. These results provide evidence that perception of change could be accomplished at significantly smaller thresholds, than what elicits vMMN. In Experiment 2 we increased the orientation change to 90°. Deviant-minus-standard difference was negative in occipito-parietal areas, between 120 and 200ms after stimulus onset. VMMNs to changes from cardinal angles were larger and more sustained than vMMNs evoked by changes from oblique angles. Changes from cardinal orientations represent a more detectable signal for the automatic change detection system than changes from oblique angles, thus increased vMMN to these "larger" deviances might be considered a variant of the magnitude of deviance effect rarely observed in vMMN studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, it has been thought that under interocular suppression high-level visual processing is strongly inhibited if not abolished. With the development of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a variant of binocular rivalry, this notion has now been challenged by a number of reports showing that even high-level aspects of visual stimuli, such as familiarity, affect the time stimuli need to overcome CFS and emerge into awareness. In this "breaking continuous flash suppression" (b-CFS) paradigm, differential unconscious processing during suppression is inferred when (a) speeded detection responses to initially invisible stimuli differ, and (b) no comparable differences are found in non-rivalrous control conditions supposed to measure non-specific threshold differences between stimuli. The aim of the present study was to critically evaluate these assumptions. In six experiments we compared the detection of upright and inverted faces. We found that not only under CFS, but also in control conditions upright faces were detected faster and more accurately than inverted faces, although the effect was larger during CFS. However, reaction time (RT) distributions indicated critical differences between the CFS and the control condition. When RT distributions were matched, similar effect sizes were obtained in both conditions. Moreover, subjective ratings revealed that CFS and control conditions are not perceptually comparable. These findings cast doubt on the usefulness of non-rivalrous control conditions to rule out non-specific threshold differences as a cause of shorter detection latencies during CFS. Thus, at least in its present form, the b-CFS paradigm cannot provide unequivocal evidence for unconscious processing under interocular suppression. Nevertheless, our findings also demonstrate that the b-CFS paradigm can be fruitfully applied as a highly sensitive device to probe differences between stimuli in their potency to gain access to awareness.