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This article explores the implicit self-concept pertaining to psychopathy. Two online studies showed inconsistent results, with Study 1 (n  =  243) suggesting that psychopathy is linked to an implicit self-concept marked by low empathy and Study 2 (n  =  230) implying no such relationship. In a sample of offenders and community controls (Study 3a, n  =  166), higher scores on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) were related to an implicit self-concept of being less rather than more antisocial, and the implicit self-concept showed incremental validity compared to the explicit self-concept. The retesting of an offender subsample (Study 3b, n  =  47) yielded no evidence for temporal stability or convergent validity. The implicit self-concept of highly psychopathic individuals thus appears to vary, depending on the social context. Future studies should replicate these results in different samples, using additional external correlates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the similar clinical features of Olfactory Reference Disorder (ORD) and Social Phobia (SP), or studies showing elevated comorbidity of the two disorders, and the conceptualization of ORD as a form of SP in the East Asian culture, to our knowledge, the relationship between ORD and SP has not been investigated. This study examined the association of ORD according to the 11th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) and SP in 225 German university / college students who completed self-ratings with regard to socio-demographic data and symptoms of SP and ORD within an anonymous internet-based survey. Symptoms of SP were assessed with the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN). Symptoms of ORD according to the ICD-11 were assessed with the Olfactory Reference Disorder Questionnaire (ORDQ), developed for this study. In our sample, 86.6% of the participants who met the self-rated features for ORD also met the self-rated criteria for current SP. ORD severity scores were significantly related to SP. Participants with and without self-reported ORD differed significantly in their SP total scores. SP severity was also significantly correlated with poorer insight of ORD-related beliefs, greater ORD-related avoidance of intimate relationships and higher levels of shame and fear of rejection due to body odor. These preliminary findings indicate that ORD could be closely related to SP and highlight the need for future research on the relationship of ORD and SP in order to gain a better understanding of the development, maintenance, treatment and classification of ORD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the implicit self-concept pertaining to psychopathy. Two online studies showed inconsistent results, with Study 1 (n = 243) suggesting that psychopathy is linked to an implicit self-concept marked by low empathy and Study 2 (n = 230) implying no such relationship. In a sample of offenders and community controls (Study 3a, n = 166), higher scores on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) were related to an implicit self-concept of being less rather than more antisocial, and the implicit self-concept showed incremental validity compared to the explicit self-concept. The retesting of an offender subsample (Study 3b, n = 47) yielded no evidence for temporal stability or convergent validity. The implicit self-concept of highly psychopathic individuals thus appears to vary, depending on the social context. Future studies should replicate these results in different samples, using additional external correlates.

The study investigated the correlation between the intensity of the Aha! experience and participants’ subjective difficulty ratings of problems before and after finding their solutions. We assumed that the Aha! experience arises from a shift in processing fluency triggered by changing from an initially incoherent problem representation to a coherent one, which ultimately leads to the retrieval of a solution with unexpected ease and speed. First, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would indicate more sudden solutions, manifesting in a reduced correlation between the initial difficulty ratings and solution times. Second, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would correspond to a greater shift in the subjective difficulty ratings between the initial and retrospective assessments. To test our hypotheses, we developed a novel set of rebus puzzles. A total of 160 participants solved rebuses and provided initial (within 5  s of problem presentation) and retrospective difficulty ratings (following the generation or presentation of a correct solution). They also rated their Aha! experience (after solution generation or presentation), confidence in solutions, and the likability of each rebus. Our findings revealed that the initial ratings of the problem’s subjective difficulty were positively correlated with the solution time and that this correlation decreased in the case of a stronger Aha! experience. Aha! experience ratings were positively correlated with the differences between initial and retrospective difficulty ratings, confidence, solution accuracy, and rebus likability. We interpreted our results to be in line with the processing fluency and metacognitive prediction error accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the similar clinical features of Olfactory Reference Disorder (ORD) and Social Phobia (SP), or studies showing elevated comorbidity of the two disorders, and the conceptualization of ORD as a form of SP in the East Asian culture, to our knowledge, the relationship between ORD and SP has not been investigated. This study examined the association of ORD according to the 11th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) and SP in 225 German university / college students who completed self-ratings with regard to socio-demographic data and symptoms of SP and ORD within an anonymous internet-based survey. Symptoms of SP were assessed with the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN). Symptoms of ORD according to the ICD-11 were assessed with the Olfactory Reference Disorder Questionnaire (ORDQ), developed for this study. In our sample, 86.6% of the participants who met the self-rated features for ORD also met the self-rated criteria for current SP. ORD severity scores were significantly related to SP. Participants with and without self-reported ORD differed significantly in their SP total scores. SP severity was also significantly correlated with poorer insight of ORD-related beliefs, greater ORD-related avoidance of intimate relationships and higher levels of shame and fear of rejection due to body odor. These preliminary findings indicate that ORD could be closely related to SP and highlight the need for future research on the relationship of ORD and SP in order to gain a better understanding of the development, maintenance, treatment and classification of ORD.

The study investigated the correlation between the intensity of the Aha! experience and participants’ subjective difficulty ratings of problems before and after finding their solutions. We assumed that the Aha! experience arises from a shift in processing fluency triggered by changing from an initially incoherent problem representation to a coherent one, which ultimately leads to the retrieval of a solution with unexpected ease and speed. First, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would indicate more sudden solutions, manifesting in a reduced correlation between the initial difficulty ratings and solution times. Second, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would correspond to a greater shift in the subjective difficulty ratings between the initial and retrospective assessments. To test our hypotheses, we developed a novel set of rebus puzzles. A total of 160 participants solved rebuses and provided initial (within 5 s of problem presentation) and retrospective difficulty ratings (following the generation or presentation of a correct solution). They also rated their Aha! experience (after solution generation or presentation), confidence in solutions, and the likability of each rebus. Our findings revealed that the initial ratings of the problem’s subjective difficulty were positively correlated with the solution time and that this correlation decreased in the case of a stronger Aha! experience. Aha! experience ratings were positively correlated with the differences between initial and retrospective difficulty ratings, confidence, solution accuracy, and rebus likability. We interpreted our results to be in line with the processing fluency and metacognitive prediction error accounts.

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha- experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insight problems are particularly interesting, because problems which require restructuring allow researchers to investigate the underpinnings of the Aha-experience, creativity and out of the box thinking. There is a need for new insight tasks to probe and extend the limits of existing theories and cognitive frameworks. To shed more light on this fascinating issue, we addressed the question: Is it possible to convey a well-known card sorting game into an insight task? We introduced different conditions and tested them via two online experiments (N = 546). Between the conditions we systematically varied the available perceptual features, and the existence of non-obvious rules. We found that our card sorting game elicited insight experience. In the first experiment, our data revealed that solution strategies and insight experience varied by the availability and saliency of perceptual features. The discovery of a non-obvious rule, which is not hinted at by perceptual features, was most difficult. With our new paradigm, we were able to construe ambiguous problems which allowed participants to find more than one solution strategy. Interestingly, we realized interindividual preferences for different strategies. The same problem drove strategies which either relied on feature integration or on more deliberate strategies. The second experiment varied the degree of independence of a sorting rule from the standard rules which were in accordance with prior knowledge. It was shown that the more independent the hidden rule was, the more difficult the task became. In sum, we demonstrated a new insight task which extended the available task domains and shed light on sequential and multi-step rule learning problems. Finally, we provided a first sketch of a cognitive model that should help to integrate the data within the existing literature on cognitive models and speculated about the generalizability of the interplay of prior knowledge modification and variation for problem solving.

Previously published studies on the effect of how different levels of unconsciousness (UC) and different loads of executive functions (EFs) affect insight problem solving are inconsistent. In a set of three experiments, we used scientific innovation problems (SIP) as insight metrics and distractor tasks to induce UC. Experiment 1 confirmed that, compared with conscious processing, unconscious processing is more conducive to obtaining prototype heuristics for correctly solving scientific innovation problems creatively. Furthermore, Experiment 2 found that different levels of unconscious processing, which were induced by different distractor tasks, made a different impact on high or low difficulty creative problem solving. Experiment 3 indicated that unconscious processing could improve prototype activation and the ability to use key heuristics information in prototype heuristics processing by improving working memory, inhibitory control, and shifting ability of EFs. Overall, the present results provide additional evidence for the role of consciousness levels in insight problem solving.

Insight is a construct carried out into different theoretical orientations with increasing application out of the boundaries of clinical psychology. Recent studies have investigated insight also as a promising variable for organizational outcomes. Given the relevance of Insight in promoting change, this paper aimed at describing the psychometric analysis of one of the shortest, most agile, and most versatile tool for measuring some of the characteristics of insight, the Insight Orientation Scale (IOS), using Item Response Theory. To achieve this goal, we applied a Mixed Rash Model to the IOS. Data from 1,445 individuals were analyzed by the means of WIN-MIRA and Multilog. Based on the likelihood statistics (CAIC) we assumed a three-class solution for the IOS. Results also indicated that the greater part of items had good discrimination and threshold parameters. These findings confirmed psychometric stability of the IOS highlighting its measurement precision, supporting its utility in both research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insight is a construct carried out into different theoretical orientations with increasing application out of the boundaries of clinical psychology. Recent studies have investigated insight also as a promising variable for organizational outcomes. Given the relevance of Insight in promoting change, this paper aimed at describing the psychometric analysis of one of the shortest, most agile, and most versatile tool for measuring some of the characteristics of insight, the Insight Orientation Scale (IOS), using Item Response Theory. To achieve this goal, we applied a Mixed Rash Model to the IOS. Data from 1,445 individuals were analyzed by the means of WIN-MIRA and Multilog. Based on the likelihood statistics (CAIC) we assumed a three-class solution for the IOS. Results also indicated that the greater part of items had good discrimination and threshold parameters. These findings confirmed psychometric stability of the IOS highlighting its measurement precision, supporting its utility in both research and practice.

Co-creativity focuses on how individuals produce innovative ideas together. As few studies have explored co-creativity using standardized tests, it is difficult to effectively assess the individual’s creativity performance within a group. Therefore, this study aims to develop a platform that allows two individuals to answer creativity tests simultaneously. This platform includes two divergent thinking tasks, the Straw Alternative Uses Test and Bottle Alternative Uses Test, and Chinese Radical Remote Associates Test A and B, which were used to evaluate their openand closed-ended creative problem-solving performance. This platform has two modes: single-player mode and paired-player mode. Responses from 497 adults were collected, based on which the fluency, flexibility, and originality of divergent thinking were measured. This study also developed a computer scoring technique that can automatically calculate the scores on these creativity tests. The results showed that divergent thinking scores from computer-based calculation and manual scoring were highly positively correlated, suggesting that the scores on a divergent thinking task can be calculated through a system that avoids timeconsuming, uneconomical manual scoring. Overall, the two types of tests on this platform showed considerable internal consistency reliability and criterionrelated validity. This advanced application facilitates the collection of empirical evidence about co-creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Positive mental health (PMH) and mental illness are distinct, yet interrelated, constructs. However, this relationship has yet to be adequately established. We aimed to evaluate the level of PMH and its relationship with sociodemographic and clinical determinants as well as to explore the relationship between PMH and the positive constructs of recovery, subjective wellbeing (SWB), insight and functioning in patients with psychotic disorder. A multicenter, descriptive, cross-sectional and correlational study with a sample of 347 patients with psychotic disorder was conducted. The following assessment instruments were used: Positive Mental Health Questionnaire, Maryland Assessment of Recovery in Serious Mental Illness scale, Insight Scale, Personal Wellbeing Index-Adult version (PWI-A), Overall Life Satisfaction (OLS) and Global Assessment of Functioning scale. The mean global level of PMH was 116.16 (range of 39-156, SD = 19.39). Significant differences were found in PMH in relation to sociodemographic (sex, civil status and employment situation) and clinical variables (family history of mental disorders, number of prescribed antipsychotics, treatment with anxiolytics, treatment with antidepressants and suicide attempts). PMH was significantly and positively correlated with recovery (r = 0.760), SWB (PWI-A: r = 0.728 and OLS: r = 0.602) and functioning (r = 0.243), and negatively with insight (r = -0.335). These results can lead to a major change in mental health care. If actions are taken to increase PMH, then recovery, SWB and functioning will also increase. At the same time, interventions should be carried out to boost insight, since increasing PMH could decrease insight, all resulting in better quality of life for patients with psychotic disorder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn't find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Positive mental health (PMH) and mental illness are distinct, yet interrelated, constructs. However, this relationship has yet to be adequately established. We aimed to evaluate the level of PMH and its relationship with sociodemographic and clinical determinants as well as to explore the relationship between PMH and the positive constructs of recovery, subjective wellbeing (SWB), insight and functioning in patients with psychotic disorder. A multicenter, descriptive, cross-sectional and correlational study with a sample of 347 patients with psychotic disorder was conducted. The following assessment instruments were used: Positive Mental Health Questionnaire, Maryland Assessment of Recovery in Serious Mental Illness scale, Insight Scale, Personal Wellbeing Index-Adult version (PWI-A), Overall Life Satisfaction (OLS) and Global Assessment of Functioning scale. The mean global level of PMH was 116.16 (range of 39–156, SD = 19.39). Significant differences were found in PMH in relation to sociodemographic (sex, civil status and employment situation) and clinical variables (family history of mental disorders, number of prescribed antipsychotics, treatment with anxiolytics, treatment with antidepressants and suicide attempts). PMH was significantly and positively correlated with recovery (r = 0.760), SWB (PWI-A: r = 0.728 and OLS: r = 0.602) and functioning (r = 0.243), and negatively with insight (r = −0.335). These results can lead to a major change in mental health care. If actions are taken to increase PMH, then recovery, SWB and functioning will also increase. At the same time, interventions should be carried out to boost insight, since increasing PMH could decrease insight, all resulting in better quality of life for patients with psychotic disorder.

The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) in which participants report on their moment-to-moment experiences in their natural environment, is a hot topic. An emerging field in clinical psychology based on either EMA, or what we term Ecological Retrospective Assessment (ERA) as it requires retrospectivity, is the field of personalized feedback. In this field, EMA/ERA-data-driven summaries are presented to participants with the goal of promoting their insight in their experiences. Underlying this procedure are some fundamental assumptions about (i) the relation between true moment-to-moment experiences and retrospective evaluations of those experiences, (ii) the translation of these experiences and evaluations to different types of data, (iii) the comparison of these different types of data, and (iv) the impact of a summary of moment-to-moment experiences on retrospective evaluations of those experiences. We argue that these assumptions deserve further exploration, in order to create a strong evidence-based foundation for the personalized feedback procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) in which participants report on their moment-to-moment experiences in their natural environment, is a hot topic. An emerging field in clinical psychology based on either EMA, or what we term Ecological Retrospective Assessment (ERA) as it requires retrospectivity, is the field of personalized feedback. In this field, EMA/ERA-data-driven summaries are presented to participants with the goal of promoting their insight in their experiences. Underlying this procedure are some fundamental assumptions about (i) the relation between true moment-to-moment experiences and retrospective evaluations of those experiences, (ii) the translation of these experiences and evaluations to different types of data, (iii) the comparison of these different types of data, and (iv) the impact of a summary of moment-to-moment experiences on retrospective evaluations of those experiences. We argue that these assumptions deserve further exploration, in order to create a strong evidence-based foundation for the personalized feedback procedure.

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.

Lucid dreaming, a specific phenomenon of dream consciousness, refers to the experience being aware that one is dreaming. The primary aim of this research was to validate a Spanish version of the Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale (LuCiD). A secondary aim was to explore whether meditation experience and mindfulness trait were related to LuCiD scores. Data from 367 Spanish men (34.6%) and women (65.4%) who completed LuCiD, the Five Facets of Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were examined. From the total sample, 40.3% indicated some experience with formal meditation (meditators), while 59.7% did not have any meditation experience (non-meditators). A random subsample of 101 participants, who completed LuCiD for a second time after a period of 10–15days, was used for test–retest reliability analysis. The LuCiD scale comprises 28 items distributed across eight factors: insight, control, thought, realism, memory, dissociation, negative emotion, and positive emotion. Factor structure, reliability by both internal consistency and test–retest reliability, and construct and concurrent validity were tested. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) confirmed the original eight-factor model, showing goodness of fit in contrast to a single-factor model. Item 15 was deleted from the Dissociation factor as it performed poorly (i.e., skewness and kurtosis, non-normal distribution of responses, and corrected item–total correlation under 0.40). The scale showed adequate values of internal consistency (between α =0.65 for Memory and α =0.83 for Positive Emotion) and test–retest reliability by significant Pearson correlations (p <0.001) for each factor. The scores of meditators were higher for the LuCiD scale Insight and Dissociation factors, in contrast to those of non-meditators. The Observing facet of mindfulness was positively associated with all LuCiD factors, except Realism and Positive Emotion , and the Acting with Awareness facet showed a negative correlation with the LuCiD factor Realism. Finally, positive and negative affects was associated with the LuCiD factors Positive Emotion and Negative Emotion. This study provides a valid and reliable measure for exploring lucidity and consciousness in dreams for a Spanish population, Moreover, the results suggest a relationship with meditation experience, mindfulness trait, and positive and negative affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When considering the numerous mindfulness-based and mindfulness-informed programs that have flourished in the past decades it is not always clear that they all refer to the same "mindfulness. " To facilitate more clarity and precision in describing, researching and teaching mindfulness in the secular settings, we propose a classification framework of mindfulness practices, intentions behind them and the experiential understandings the practices may aim to develop. Accordingly, the proposed framework, called the Mindfulness Map, has two axes. The first axis outlines mindfulness practices (and associated instructions) classified into four groups (MGs), e.g. the MG1 focuses on cultivating attention to the present moment somatic and sensory experience while the MG4 focuses on cultivating the ability to recognize and deconstruct perceptual, cognitive and emotional experiences and biases. The second axis outlines possible intentions (INTs) to cultivate particular experiential understanding (EU) via teaching and practicing the MGs, e.g., the INT1 designates the intention to gain EU of how our relationship to experience contributes to wellbeing, the INT2 refers to the intention to gain EU of the changing nature of body, mind and external phenomenon. We suggest that the same MG can lead to different EUs outcomes based on the specific INTs applied in their teaching or practice. The range of INTs and EUs included here is not exhaustive, there are further types the Map could be expanded toward. Aside from encouraging more fine-grained distinctions of mindfulness practices, the proposed Map aims to open discussions about interactions between MGs, INTs, EUs and practice outcomes. The Map may facilitate more nuanced and precise approaches to researching the range of outcomes cultivated by mindfulness practices, help bridge contradictory findings, and catalyze further debate and research into ethical aspects of mindfulness. The Map also highlights the need for further teaching development and research on longer-term trajectories of mindfulness practice. While the proposed Mindfulness Map organises the mindfulness practice territory along two axes, it is aimed as a starting point for further discussion and can be further revised and/or expanded by other axes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lucid dreaming, a specific phenomenon of dream consciousness, refers to the experience being aware that one is dreaming. The primary aim of this research was to validate a Spanish version of the Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale (LuCiD). A secondary aim was to explore whether meditation experience and mindfulness trait were related to LuCiD scores. Data from 367 Spanish men (34.6%) and women (65.4%) who completed LuCiD, the Five Facets of Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were examined. From the total sample, 40.3% indicated some experience with formal meditation (meditators), while 59.7% did not have any meditation experience (non-meditators). A random subsample of 101 participants, who completed LuCiD for a second time after a period of 10–15days, was used for test–retest reliability analysis. The LuCiD scale comprises 28 items distributed across eight factors: insight, control, thought, realism, memory, dissociation, negative emotion, and positive emotion. Factor structure, reliability by both internal consistency and test–retest reliability, and construct and concurrent validity were tested. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) confirmed the original eight-factor model, showing goodness of fit in contrast to a single-factor model. Item 15 was deleted from the Dissociation factor as it performed poorly (i.e., skewness and kurtosis, non-normal distribution of responses, and corrected item–total correlation under 0.40). The scale showed adequate values of internal consistency (between α=0.65 for Memory and α=0.83 for Positive Emotion) and test–retest reliability by significant Pearson correlations (p

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients when “on” and “off” dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients “on” medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were “on” medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while “on” medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias).

Parkinson's disease (PD) patients receiving dopaminergic treatment may experience bursts of creativity. Although this phenomenon is sometimes recognized among patients and their clinicians, the association between dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in PD patients and creativity remains underexplored. It is unclear, for instance, whether DRT affects creativity through convergent or divergent thinking, idea generation, or a general lack of inhibition. It is also unclear whether DRT only augments pre-existing creative attributes or generates creativity de novo. Here, we tested a group of PD patients when "on" and "off" dopaminergic treatment on a series of tests of creative problem-solving (Alternative Uses Task, Compound Remote Associates, Rebus Puzzles), and related their performance to a group of matched healthy controls as well as to their pre-PD creative skills and measures of inhibition/impulsivity. Results did not provide strong evidence that DRT improved creative thinking in PD patients. Rather, PD patients "on" medication showed less flexibility in divergent thinking, generated fewer ideas via insight, and showed worse performance in convergent thinking overall (by making more errors) than healthy controls. Pre-PD creative skills predicted enhanced flexibility and fluency in divergent thinking when PD patients were "on" medication. However, results on convergent thinking were mixed. Finally, PD patients who exhibited deficits in a measure of inhibitory control showed weaker convergent thinking while "on" medication, supporting previous evidence on the importance of inhibitory control in creative problem-solving. Altogether, results do not support the hypothesis that DRT promotes creative thinking in PD. We speculate that bursts of artistic production in PD are perhaps conflated with creativity due to lay conceptions of creativity (i.e., an art-bias). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticisms of the "container" model of pregnancy picturing female and embryo as separate entities multiply in various philosophical and scientific contexts during the last decades. In this paper, we examine how this model underlies received views of pregnancy in evolutionary biology, in the characterization of the transition from oviparity to viviparity in mammals and in the selectionist explanations of pregnancy as an evolutionary strategy. In contrast, recent evo-devo studies on eutherian reproduction, including the role of inflammation and new maternal cell types, gather evidence in favor of considering pregnancy as an evolved relational novelty. Our thesis is that from this perspective we can identify the emergence of a new historical individual in evolution. In evo-devo, historical units are conceptualized as evolved entities which fulfill two main criteria, their continuous persistence and their non-exchangeability. As pregnancy can be individuated in this way, we contend that pregnant females are historical individuals. We argue that historical individuality differs from, and coexists with, other views of biological individuality as applied to pregnancy (the physiological, the evolutionary and the ecological one), but brings forward an important new insight which might help dissolve misguided conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Safety in high-risk and time-pressured situations relies on people’s ability to generate new and appropriate solutions to solve unforeseen problems for which no procedures or rules are available. This type of ability is regularly associated with the concept of creativity. While psychology researchers have studied, for decades, how creative ideas and solutions are generated, this basic research has not made it into the more applied fields of human factors and neuroergonomics. Building on the research on the psychology and the neuropsychology of creativity, this paper will (1) address the question of what creativity means and what are its ties with problem solving and decision-making; (2) focus on the evidence of the creative processes, the underlying mechanisms, and the multiple psychological dimensions of the creative behavior involved in unexpected events in extreme environments such as Apollo 13 mission, United Airline Flight 232, and Mann Gulch wildfire; and (3) explore the implications for future research in the domains of neuroergonomics and differential psychology.

Safety in high-risk and time-pressured situations relies on people's ability to generate new and appropriate solutions to solve unforeseen problems for which no procedures or rules are available. This type of ability is regularly associated with the concept of creativity. While psychology researchers have studied, for decades, how creative ideas and solutions are generated, this basic research has not made it into the more applied fields of human factors and neuroergonomics. Building on the research on the psychology and the neuropsychology of creativity, this paper will (1) address the question of what creativity means and what are its ties with problem solving and decision-making; (2) focus on the evidence of the creative processes, the underlying mechanisms, and the multiple psychological dimensions of the creative behavior involved in unexpected events in extreme environments such as Apollo 13 mission, United Airline Flight 232, and Mann Gulch wildfire; and (3) explore the implications for future research in the domains of neuroergonomics and differential psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) has been utilized to demonstrate the role of emotion and somatic state in decision-making under uncertainty over the past two decades. Despite some debate, the SMH has provided not only a neurobiological framework for understanding emotion and decision-making but also a good empirical support for ecological rationality and embodied emotion. Unlike the traditional maximizing rationality and bounded satisficing rationality, the ecological rationality stresses that emotions should be brought to the decision-making process. The embodied emotion furthermore emphasizes that emotions are embodied in the body and the brain. On the other hand, behavioral decision-making has spawned many new interdisciplines, including neuroeconomics. In this case, the SMH could act as a bridge to translate the ecological rationality and the embodied emotion into emerging neuroeconomics. Thus, this mini-review article aims to propose an integrated framework for introducing ecological rationality and embodied emotion into the field of neuroeconomics by virtue of insights from the SMH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a comprehensive meta-analysis on the effects of mindfulness meditation, Eberth and Sedlmeier (2012) identified a multitude of positive effects that covered a wide range of psychological variables, such as heightened mindfulness as measured through contemporary mindfulness scales, reduced negative emotions, increased positive emotions, changes in self-concept, enhanced attention, perception, and wellbeing, improved interpersonal abilities, and a reduction of negative personality traits. The present research aimed at developing and testing a comprehensive model explaining the wide range of mindfulness meditation effects and their temporal and causal relationships. In Study 1, interviews with meditators at different levels of experience were analyzed using a grounded theory procedure. The resulting model was triangulated and refined by concepts from both Western research and ancient Buddhist scriptures. The model developed highlights equanimity (reduction in emotional reactivity) and insight (alteration of cognitions) as the two key effects of mindfulness meditation that eventually lead to increased wellbeing. The model was pilot-tested with a large sample of meditators and non-meditators in Study 2. Data showed an acceptable fit with the model and indicated that meditators and non-meditators score significantly differently on the model’s core categories.

It still remains uncertain whether working memory updating ability influences spatial insight problem solving and whether working memory updating ability plays a role in the representation restructuring phase. The current study explored the correlation of working memory updating ability and spatial insight problem solving by behavior and eye movement experiments, and the results showed that high working memory updating ability individuals spend significant shorter time to solve spatial insight problem than low working memory updating ability individuals. For participants with high or low working memory updating ability, the underlying mechanism of spatial insight problem solving is sudden rather than incremental, which demonstrated that the working memory updating ability did not influence the representation restructuring phase. Working memory updating ability influences spatial problem solving, and it works critically in the problem space search phase, while the restructuring phase is sudden and immediate, which is not influenced by working memory updating ability. The representation restructuring tends to be spontaneous.

Attempts to estimate the contribution made by motor activity to insight problem solving is hindered by a lack of detailed description of motor behavior. The goal of this study was to develop and put to the test a novel method for studying the dynamics of insight problem solving based on a quantitative analysis of ongoing motor activity. As a proper problem model, we chose the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930), in which solvers had to draw a sequence of connected line segments. Instead of using the traditional pen-and-paper way of solving the nine-dot problem we asked participants to use their index finger to draw line segments on the surface of a tablet computer. We are arguing that successful studying of the role of motor activity during problem solving requires the distinction between its instrumental and functional role. We considered the functional role on the motor activity as closely related to the on-line mode of motor planning. The goal of Experiment 1 was to explore the potential power of the method and, at the same time, to assay the patterns of motor activity related to on-line and off-line modes of motor planning. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to uncover the potential impact of preliminary motor training on the motor output of successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. In these experiments, we tested hypotheses on how preliminary motor training, which presumably played a functional role in Experiment 2 and an instrumental role in Experiment 3, affects the motor activity of a problem solver and hence their effectiveness in solving the problem. The three experiments showed consistent results. They suggest that successful solving of the nine-dot problem relies upon the functional role of motor activity and requires both off-line and on-line modes of motor planning, with the latter helping to overcome the perceptual constraints imposed by a spatial arrangement of the nine dots. The method that we applied allows for systematic comparison between successful and unsuccessful problem solvers based on the quantitative parameters of their motor activity. Through it, we found new specific patterns of motor activity that differentiate successful and unsuccessful solvers.

Recent investigations have established the value of using rebus puzzles in studying the insight and analytic processes that underpin problem solving. The current study sought to validate a pool of 84 rebus puzzles in terms of their solution rates, solution times, error rates, solution confidence, self-reported solution strategies, and solution phrase familiarity. All of the puzzles relate to commonplace English sayings and phrases in the United Kingdom. Eighty-four rebus puzzles were selected from a larger stimulus set of 168 such puzzles and were categorized into six types in relation to the similarity of their structures. The 84 selected problems were thence divided into two sets of 42 items (Set A and Set B), with rebus structure evenly balanced between each set. Participants (N = 170; 85 for Set A and 85 for Set B) were given 30 s to solve each item, subsequently indicating their confidence in their solution and self-reporting the process used to solve the problem (analysis or insight), followed by the provision of ratings of the familiarity of the solution phrases. The resulting normative data yield solution rates, error rates, solution times, confidence ratings, self-reported strategies and familiarity ratings for 84 rebus puzzles, providing valuable information for the selection and matching of problems in future research.

In a comprehensive meta-analysis on the effects of mindfulness meditation, Eberth and Sedlmeier (2012) identified a multitude of positive effects that covered a wide range of psychological variables, such as heightened mindfulness as measured through contemporary mindfulness scales, reduced negative emotions, increased positive emotions, changes in self-concept, enhanced attention, perception, and wellbeing, improved interpersonal abilities, and a reduction of negative personality traits. The present research aimed at developing and testing a comprehensive model explaining the wide range of mindfulness meditation effects and their temporal and causal relationships. In Study 1, interviews with meditators at different levels of experience were analyzed using a grounded theory procedure. The resulting model was triangulated and refined by concepts from both Western research and ancient Buddhist scriptures. The model developed highlights equanimity (reduction in emotional reactivity) and insight (alteration of cognitions) as the two key effects of mindfulness meditation that eventually lead to increased wellbeing. The model was pilot-tested with a large sample of meditators and non-meditators in Study 2. Data showed an acceptable fit with the model and indicated that meditators and non-meditators score significantly differently on the model's core categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attempts to estimate the contribution made by motor activity to insight problem solving is hindered by a lack of detailed description of motor behavior. The goal of this study was to develop and put to the test a novel method for studying the dynamics of insight problem solving based on a quantitative analysis of ongoing motor activity. As a proper problem model, we chose the nine-dot problem (Maier, 1930), in which solvers had to draw a sequence of connected line segments. Instead of using the traditional pen-and-paper way of solving the nine-dot problem we asked participants to use their index finger to draw line segments on the surface of a tablet computer. We are arguing that successful studying of the role of motor activity during problem solving requires the distinction between its instrumental and functional role. We considered the functional role on the motor activity as closely related to the on-line mode of motor planning. The goal of Experiment 1 was to explore the potential power of the method and, at the same time, to assay the patterns of motor activity related to on-line and off-line modes of motor planning. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to uncover the potential impact of preliminary motor training on the motor output of successful and unsuccessful problem solvers. In these experiments, we tested hypotheses on how preliminary motor training, which presumably played a functional role in Experiment 2 and an instrumental role in Experiment 3, affects the motor activity of a problem solver and hence their effectiveness in solving the problem. The three experiments showed consistent results. They suggest that successful solving of the nine-dot problem relies upon the functional role of motor activity and requires both off-line and on-line modes of motor planning, with the latter helping to overcome the perceptual constraints imposed by a spatial arrangement of the nine dots. The method that we applied allows for systematic comparison between successful and unsuccessful problem solvers based on the quantitative parameters of their motor activity. Through it, we found new specific patterns of motor activity that differentiate successful and unsuccessful solvers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies of insight problem solving are focused on both the control and storage systems of working memory. We obtained contradictory data about how working memory systems are involved in insight problem solving process. We argue that measuring the dynamics of the control system and storage systems through the course of problem solving can provide a more refined view on the processes involved, as a whole, and explain the existing controversies. We theorize that specific insight mechanisms require varying working memory capacities at different stages of the problem solving process. Our study employed a dual task paradigm to track the dynamics of working memory systems load during problem solving by measuring the reaction time in a secondary probe-task during different stages of problem solving. We varied the modality (verbal, visual) and the complexity of the probe-task during insight and non-insight problem solving. The results indicated that the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems differs from those in non-insight problems. Our first experiment shows that the complexity of the probe-task affects overall probe-task reaction times in both insight and non-insight problem solving. Our second experiment demonstrates that the solution of a non-insight problem is primarily associated with the working memory control system, while insight problems rely on relevant storage systems. Our results confirm that insight process requires access to various systems of working memory throughout the solution. We found that working memory load in non-insight problems increases from stage to stage due to allocation of the attentional control resources to interim calculations. The nature of the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems remains debatable. We claim that insight problem solving demands working memory storage during the entire problem solving process and that control system plays an important role just prior to the solution.

“Dira” is a novel experimental paradigm to record combinations of behavioral and metacognitive measures for the creative process. This task allows assessing chronological and chronometric aspects of the creative process directly and without a detour through creative products or proxy phenomena. In a study with 124 participants we show that (a) people spend more time attending to selected vs. rejected potential solutions, (b) there is a clear connection between behavioral patterns and self-reported measures, (c) the reported intensity of Eureka experiences is a function of interaction time with potential solutions, and (d) experiences of emerging solutions can happen immediately after engaging with a problem, before participants explore all potential solutions. The conducted study exemplifies how “Dira” can be used as an instrument to narrow down the moment when solutions emerge. We conclude that the “Dira” experiment is paving the way to study the process, as opposed to the product, of creative problem solving.

When we are confronted with a new problem, we typically try to apply strategies that have worked in the past and which usually lead closer to the solution incrementally. However, sometimes, either during a problem-solving attempt that does not seem to lead closer to the solution, or when we have given up on problem-solving for the moment, the solution seems to appear out of nowhere. This is often called a moment of insight. Whereas the cognitive processes of getting closer to the solution are still unknown for insight problem-solving, there are two diverging theories on the subjective feeling of getting closer to the solution: (1) One that states that an intuitive feeling of closeness to the solution increases slowly, but incrementally, before it surpasses the threshold to consciousness and becomes verbalizable (=insight) (continuous approach), and (2) another that proposes that the feeling of closeness to the solution does not increase before it exceeds the threshold to consciousness (discontinuous approach). Here, we investigated the subjective feeling of closeness to the solution, assessed as feeling-of-warmth (FoW), its relationship to solving the problem versus being presented with it and whether a feeling of Aha! was experienced. Additionally, we tested whether Aha! experiences are more likely when the problem is solved actively by the participant or presented to the participant after an unsuccessful problem-solving attempt, and whether the frequency of Aha! experiences correlates with problem difficulty. To our knowledge, this is the first study combining the CRAT with FoW assessments for the named conditions (solved/unsolved, three difficulty levels, Aha!/no Aha!). We used a verbal problem-solving task, the Compound Remote Associates Task (CRAT). Our data revealed that Aha! experiences were more often reported for solutions generated by the participant compared to solutions presented after unsuccessful problem-solving. Moreover, FoW curves showed a steeper increase for the last two FoW ratings when problems were solved with Aha! in contrast to without Aha!. Based on this observation, we provide a preliminary explanation for the underlying cognitive process of solving CRA problems via insight.

Research based on construal level theory (CLT) suggests that thinking about the distant future can prime people to solve problems by insight (i.e., an “aha” moment) while thinking about the near future can prime them to solve problems analytically. In this study, we used a novel method to elucidate the time-course of temporal priming effects on creative problem solving. Specifically, we used growth-curve analysis (GCA) to examine the time-course of priming while participants solved a series of brief verbal problems. Participants were tested in two counterbalanced sessions in a within-subject experimental design; one session featured near-future priming and the other featured far-future priming. Our results suggest high-level construal may temporarily enhance analytical thinking; far-future priming caused transient facilitation of analytical solving while near-future priming induced weaker, transient facilitation of insightful solving. However, this effect is short-lived; priming produced no significant differences in the total number of insights and analytical solutions. Given the fleeting nature of these effects, future studies should consider implementing methodology that allows for aspects of the time-course of priming effects to be examined. A method such as GCA may reveal mild effects that would be otherwise missed using other types of analyses.

Creativeness has been widely recognized as the ability to generate thoughts that are both novel (new) and appropriate (useful) (Barron, 1955). In this paper, we investigated the mnemonic effects of novelty and appropriateness in chunk decomposition tasks. Studies 1 and 2 utilized classical recognition tasks (explicit memory) and ambiguous word identification tasks (implicit memory) to reveal whether novelty and appropriateness are involved in different mnemonic systems. A 2 (familiarity) × 2 (appropriateness) experimental design was utilized in our experiments, and the four conditions were familiar-appropriate, familiar-inappropriate, novel-appropriate and novel-inappropriate. The results indicated that insight induced by novelty (novel-appropriate condition) has a better performance than other conditions; and further, found an interesting phenomenon of Zeigarnik-like effect which referred to remembering uncompleted tasks better than completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927). We further conducted Study 3 to ask participants to recall the encoding process (how the characters had been decomposed in the learning stage), which was more sensitive to Zeigarnik effect and indicated that performance of familiar-appropriate condition (uncompleted tasks) was better than other conditions.

Arguably, it is not possible to study insight moments during problem solving without being able to accurately detect when they occur (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2007). Despite over a century of research on the insight moment, there is surprisingly little consensus on the best way to measure them in real-time experiments. There have also been no attempts to evaluate whether the different ways of measuring insight converge. Indeed, if it turns out that the popular measures of insight diverge, then this may indicate that researchers who have used one method may have been measuring a different phenomenon to those who have used another method. We compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two most commonly cited ways of measuring insight: The feelings-of-warmth measure adapted from Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987), and the self-report measure adapted from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007). We find little empirical agreement between the two measures, and conclude that the self-report measure of Aha! is superior both methodologically and theoretically, and provides a better representation of what is commonly regarded as insight. We go on to describe and recommend a novel visceral measure of insight using a dynamometer as described in Creswell et al. (2016).

Numerous studies of insight problem solving are focused on both the control and storage systems of working memory. We obtained contradictory data about how working memory systems are involved in insight problem solving process. We argue that measuring the dynamics of the control system and storage systems through the course of problem solving can provide a more refined view on the processes involved, as a whole, and explain the existing controversies. We theorize that specific insight mechanisms require varying working memory capacities at different stages of the problem solving process. Our study employed a dual task paradigm to track the dynamics of working memory systems load during problem solving by measuring the reaction time in a secondary probe-task during different stages of problem solving. We varied the modality (verbal, visual) and the complexity of the probe-task during insight and non-insight problem solving. The results indicated that the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems differs from those in non-insight problems. Our first experiment shows that the complexity of the probe-task affects overall probe-task reaction times in both insight and non-insight problem solving. Our second experiment demonstrates that the solution of a non-insight problem is primarily associated with the working memory control system, while insight problems rely on relevant storage systems. Our results confirm that insight process requires access to various systems of working memory throughout the solution. We found that working memory load in noninsight problems increases from stage to stage due to allocation of the attentional control resources to interim calculations. The nature of the dynamics of working memory load in insight problems remains debatable. We claim that insight problem solving demands working memory storage during the entire problem solving process and that control system plays an important role just prior to the solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research based on construal level theory (CLT) suggests that thinking about the distant future can prime people to solve problems by insight (i.e., an “aha” moment) while thinking about the near future can prime them to solve problems analytically. In this study, we used a novel method to elucidate the time-course of temporal priming effects on creative problem solving. Specifically, we used growth-curve analysis (GCA) to examine the time-course of priming while participants solved a series of brief verbal problems. Participants were tested in two counterbalanced sessions in a within-subject experimental design; one session featured near-future priming and the other featured far-future priming. Our results suggest high-level construal may temporarily enhance analytical thinking; far-future priming caused transient facilitation of analytical solving while near-future priming induced weaker, transient facilitation of insightful solving. However, this effect is short-lived; priming produced no significant differences in the total number of insights and analytical solutions. Given the fleeting nature of these effects, future studies should consider implementing methodology that allows for aspects of the time-course of priming effects to be examined. A method such as GCA may reveal mild effects that would be otherwise missed using other types of analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new protocol for eliciting insight (“Aha!”/Eureka) moments is proposed, involving the solving of British-style cryptic crosswords. The mechanics of cryptic crossword clues are briefly explained, and the process is set into the insight literature, with parallels being drawn between several different types of cryptic crossword clues and other insight-triggering problems such as magic, jokes, anagrams, rebus, and remote association puzzles (RAT), as well as “classic” thematic or spatial challenges. We have evidence from a previous survey of cryptic crossword solvers that the “Aha!” moment is the most important driver of continued participation in this hobby, suggesting that the positive emotional “payback” has an energizing effect on a participant's motivation to continue solving. Given the success with which a good quality cryptic crossword elicits “Aha!” moments, cryptics should prove highly valuable in exploring insight under lab conditions. We argue that the crossword paradigm overcomes many of the issues which beset other insight problems: for example, solution rates of cryptic crossword clues are high; new material can easily be commissioned, leading to a limitless pool of test items; and each puzzle contains clues resembling a wide variety of insight problem types, permitting a comparison of heterogeneous solving mechanisms within the same medium. Uniquely among insight problems, considerations of expertise also come into play, allowing us to explore how crossword solving experts handle the deliberate misdirection of the cryptic clue more effectively than non-expert, but equally experienced, peers. Many have debated whether there is such a thing as an “insight problem” per se: typically, problems can be solved with or without insight, depending on the context. We argue that the same is true for cryptic crosswords, and that the key to the successful triggering of insight may lie in both the difficulty of the challenge and the degree to which misdirection has been used. Future research is outlined which explores the specific mechanisms of clue difficulty. This opens the way to an exploration of potential links between solving constraints and the experiencing of the “Aha!” moment, which may shed light on the cognitive processes involved in insight solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creativeness has been widely recognized as the ability to generate thoughts that are both novel (new) and appropriate (useful) (Barron, 1955). In this paper, we investigated the mnemonic effects of novelty and appropriateness in chunk decomposition tasks. Studies 1 and 2 utilized classical recognition tasks (explicit memory) and ambiguous word identification tasks (implicit memory) to reveal whether novelty and appropriateness are involved in different mnemonic systems. A 2 (familiarity) × 2 (appropriateness) experimental design was utilized in our experiments, and the four conditions were familiar-appropriate, familiar-inappropriate, novel-appropriate and novel-inappropriate. The results indicated that insight induced by novelty (novel-appropriate condition) has a better performance than other conditions; and further, found an interesting phenomenon of Zeigarnik-like effect which referred to remembering uncompleted tasks better than completed tasks (Zeigarnik, 1927). We further conducted Study 3 to ask participants to recall the encoding process (how the characters had been decomposed in the learning stage), which was more sensitive to Zeigarnik effect and indicated that performance of familiar-appropriate condition (uncompleted tasks) was better than other conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arguably, it is not possible to study insight moments during problem solving without being able to accurately detect when they occur (Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2007). Despite over a century of research on the insight moment, there is surprisingly little consensus on the best way to measure them in real-time experiments. There have also been no attempts to evaluate whether the different ways of measuring insight converge. Indeed, if it turns out that the popular measures of insight diverge , then this may indicate that researchers who have used one method may have been measuring a different phenomenon to those who have used another method. We compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two most commonly cited ways of measuring insight: The feelings-of-warmth measure adapted from Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987), and the self-report measure adapted from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007). We find little empirical agreement between the two measures, and conclude that the self-report measure of Aha! is superior both methodologically and theoretically, and provides a better representation of what is commonly regarded as insight. We go on to describe and recommend a novel visceral measure of insight using a dynamometer as described in Creswell et al. (2016). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a high-level cognitive activity, humor comprehension requires incongruity detection and incongruity resolution, which then elicits an insight moment. The purpose of the study was to explore the neural basis of humor comprehension, particularly the moment of insight, by using both characters and language-free cartoons in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. The results showed that insight involving jokes elicited greater activation in language and semantic-related brain regions as well as a variety of additional regions, such as the superior frontal gyrus (SFG), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), the superior temporal gyrus (STG), the temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), the hippocampus and visual areas. These findings indicate that the MTG might play a role in incongruity detection, while the SFG, IFG and the TPJ might be involved in incongruity detection. The passive insight event elicited by jokes appears to be mediated by a limited number of brain areas. Our study showed that the brain regions associated with humor comprehension were not affected by the type of stimuli and that humor and insight shared common brain areas. These results indicate that one experiences a feeling of insight during humor comprehension, which contributes to the understanding of humor comprehension.